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This dissertation defends a “non-ideal theory” of justice: a systematic theory of 
how to respond justly to injustice.  Chapter 1 argues that contemporary political 
philosophy lacks a non-ideal theory of justice, and defends a variation of John 
Rawls’ famous original position – the Non-Ideal Original Position – as a method 
with which to construct  such a theory.  Finally,  Chapter 1  uses the Non-Ideal 
Original Position to argue for a  Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory: a 
principle  that  requires  injustices  to  be  dealt  with  in  whichever  way  will  best 
satisfy the preferences of all relevant individuals, provided those individuals are 
all  rational,  adequately informed, broadly moral,  and accept the correct “ideal 
theory”  of  fully  just  conditions.   Chapter  2  then  argues  for  the  Principle  of  
Application – an epistemic principle that represents the Fundamental Principle’s 
satisfaction conditions in terms of the aims of actual or hypothetical reformist 
groups.  Chapters 3-5 then use these two principles to argue for substantive views 
regarding global/international justice.  Chapter 3 argues that the two principles 
establish a higher-order human right for all other human rights to promoted and 
protected in accordance with the two principles of non-ideal theory.  Chapter 4 
argues that the two principles defeasibly require the international community to 
tolerate unjust societies, provided those societies respect the most basic rights of 
individuals.  Finally, Chapter 5 argues that the two principles imply a duty of the 
international community to ameliorate the most severe forms of global poverty, 
as well as a duty to pursue “fair trade” in international economics.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose you accepted some theory of justice according to which that some set of 
conditions,  J, is fully just s.  Suppose next that  J could be brought about from 
actual (i.e. less-than-fully-just) conditions in either of two ways:
Scheme 1: Would impose mild  to  moderate  costs  on people (e.g.,  daily 
inconveniences, public protests, etc.) over the course of 20 years.
Scheme  2: Would  impose  severe  costs  on  people  (e.g.  massive 
unemployment, poverty, etc.) over the course of only 5 years.
You would presumably want to know whether either, both, or neither, of these 
schemes  is  permissible  or  required  by  justice.1  If  you  lacked  this  kind  of 
knowledge,  you would lack  something of  great  importance.   You would know 
which kinds of social conditions would be fully just, but you would not know how 
those  conditions  could  be  justly  brought  into  existence  from  the  world  as  it 
presently is.
It might come as a bit of surprise that contemporary political philosophy is 
in roughly such a predicament.  Political philosophers have defended a variety of 
“ideal theories” – theories of which kinds of social conditions would be fully just, 
or at least more just than the conditions in which we find ourselves.  John Rawls 
famously argued in  A Theory of Justice, for example, that a just society would 
conform to two principles: a principle of equal basic liberty, and a principle of 
equality  of  opportunity  that  requires  society,  more  generally,  to  be  to  the 
1 It seems at least a conceptual possibility that there might be no just ways to bring about an 
otherwise just end.  All paths toward an otherwise just end might impose costs upon people that 
are simply too severe for any means to that end to be permissible.
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maximum  advantage  of  its  worst  off  members.2  Robert  Nozick  argued  in 
Anarchy,  State,  and  Utopia that  a  just  social  order  would  be  one  in  which 
individuals’ natural rights were respected by others.3  A variety of human rights 
theories argue that people have human rights to all sorts of things, such as rights 
to life, means to subsistence, freedom of speech, religion, association, and often, 
many other things as well.4  And so on.  None of these theories include a fully 
general analysis of what it is just to do, however, in order to bring about the sorts 
of conditions they describe.  On the contrary, a number of important figures in 
political philosophy draw attention to the fact that they, and political philosophy 
more generally, lack such a theory.  Rawls, for example, draws attention to the 
idea that a theory of justice should have two parts: a part specifying fully just 
conditions, and a part specifying how to bring about those conditions.  He says,
The intuitive idea is to split the theory of justice into two parts.  The 
first  or  ideal  part…works  out  the  principles  that  characterize  a  well-
ordered society under favorable circumstances.  It develops the conception 
of  a  perfectly  just  basic  structure  and  the  corresponding  duties  and 
obligations of persons under the fixed constraints of human life.  My main 
concern is with this part of the theory.  Nonideal theory, the second part, is 
worked  out  after  an  ideal  conception  of  justice  has  been  chosen…[it] 
2 Rawls (1999a): 53, 266.
3 Nozick (1974).
4 See e.g.  Griffin (2001, 2008), Nickel  (2007),  and the Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy’s 
entry, “Human Rights,” at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/. 
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consists of the principles for governing adjustments to natural limitations 
and historical contingencies, and…principles for meeting injustice.5
When it actually comes to non-ideal theory, however, Rawls only deals with “a 
few special cases” – the cases of civil disobedience and conscientious refusal – 
stating,  of  non-ideal  theory  more  generally,  “I  shall  not  attempt  to  give  a 
systematic  answer  to  these questions.”6  Rawls  is  not the only philosopher to 
draw attention to non-ideal theory, only to set it aside.  Robert Nozick has said, 
referring  to  non-ideal  theory,  “I  do  not  know  of  a  thorough  or  theoretically 
sophisticated treatment of such issues.”7  
It  only  takes  a  brief  survey  of  the  philosophical  literature  to  see  that 
contemporary political philosophy lacks anything like a fully systematic non-ideal 
theory of justice.  Although some philosophers, such as Ronald Dworkin, have 
attempted to grapple with a wide range of issues within non-ideal theory, such as 
the question of how to reform health care and the ethics of affirmative action,8 
whereas others have attempted to understand the compensatory justice, or how 
to rectify  past  injustices,9 political  philosophy simply lacks  any account  of the 
most  general  principles  that  ought  to  govern  how  we  deal  with  injustice. 
Philosophers do of course have various moral theories at their disposal, such as 
utilitarianism, Kantian moral theories, and virtue theories.  None of these sorts of 
theories seem well suited to the task, however (at least without a great deal of 
5 Rawls (1999a): 216.
6 Ibid.
7 Nozick (1974): 152.
8 Dworkin (2000): Part II.
9 See Roberts (2005) for a number of papers on the topic.
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development).  Relatively few philosophers are utilitarians, for one thing, and it is 
not clear,  on the other hand,  how a Kantian theory,  or  a virtue theory,  could 
resolve important questions of non-ideal theory (it is hard to see how either kind 
of theory could help us decide, for example, between Schemes 1 and 2 mentioned 
earlier).
This  dissertation  aims  to  rectify  this  situation.   It  defends  a  particular 
method for investigating non-ideal theory, defends two general principles of non-
ideal theory, and finally, applies those principles to some important matters of 
global/international  justice.   Chapter 1  argues that  a variation of John Rawls’ 
famous  “original  position”  –  the  Non-Ideal  Original  Position –  is,  for  two 
reasons, a uniquely compelling method for investigating non-ideal theory.  First, 
I  maintain  that  the  Non-Ideal  Original  Position  embodies  an  appropriate 
philosophical response to the unusually deep and pervasive disagreements that 
philosophers have about fundamental issues of non-ideal theory.  I  argue that 
because philosophers disagree on so many levels about what is relevant in non-
ideal theory, it is reasonable for them to adopt a method that represents persons 
who accept the correct ideal theory of justice (whatever it might be) as “free and 
equal”  to  one another with respect to choosing principles of non-ideal  theory. 
Second, and more importantly, I argue that the Non-Ideal Original Position leads 
to  a  Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory that,  in  virtue  of  its  sheer 
generality,  political  philosophers  in  general  should  find  compelling.   The 
Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory states simply that we are to respond 
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to injustice in whichever way will best satisfy the collective class of preferences10 
that individuals would have if each of them were rational, adequately informed, 
broadly moral, and accepted the correct ideal theory of justice (whatever it might 
be).  
Chapter 2 recognizes that the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory 
raises a number of difficult philosophical questions – questions concerning the 
nature of rationality, “adequate informed-ness,” morality, and so on.  Rather than 
attempt to provide theoretical answers to these questions – questions that large 
numbers of other accomplished philosophers have not yet definitively (or in some 
cases,  satisfactorily)  answered  –  Chapter  2  instead  defends  a  purely  practical 
solution.  Chapter 2 argues for a Principle of Application: an epistemic principle 
that,  or  so  I  claim,  embodies  the  best  available  method  for  applying  the 
Fundamental  Principle  given  the  very  fact  that  we  lack  fully  satisfactory 
theoretical  answers  to  the  aforementioned  issues.   The basic  idea  behind  the 
Principle  of  Application  is  that  even  though  we  lack  theoretical  solutions  to 
various problems, we have an adequate enough grasp of the relevant issues to 
apply the Fundamental Principle with some justified confidence.  The Principle of 
Application,  at  any  rate,  instructs  us  to  take  the  aims  of  various  “reformist 
groups” – actual or hypothetical bodies of individuals who we have reason to take 
to  be  concerned  with  meeting  injustice  –  to  represent  the  Fundamental 
Principle’s  satisfaction  conditions  (and  therefore,  what  justice  requires), 
depending on how well those groups satisfy an important class of desiderata.
10 As readers will see in Chapter 1, I wish to understand this class of preferences in terms of a 
“social preference ordering”, or a  single preference-ordering representing the collective “will of 
the people” (so to speak).
18
Chapters  3-5  then  argue  from  these  two  principles  to  substantive 
conclusions within the domain of global/international justice.  Chapter 3 argues 
that the two principles of non-ideal theory imply a higher-order human right: the 
right to have all other human rights promoted, and violations of human rights 
eliminated or rectified, in ways that conform to the two principles of non-ideal 
theory.  Chapter 3 also argues that this higher-order human right (via the two 
principles) implies a strong presumption in favor of the priority of two “basic” 
rights  – the rights  to  life  and freedom from severe suffering – over all  other 
rights.   Chapter  3  also  argues,  finally,  that  the  higher-order  human  right 
illuminates, and plausibly resolves, some “hard cases” where it is not clear what 
justice  and  human  rights  require.   Specifically,  I  argue,  by  reference  to  the 
Principle of Application, that there are two reasons why justice forbids violating 
the human right against torture in order to protect the human right to life of even 
very large numbers of people.   I  argue,  first,  that the Principle of Application 
requires us to judge this case by reference to international  law (which forbids 
torture),  as  well  as  (in addition)  by reference to the moral  values of  the very 
people  whose lives  torture  might  be  utilized  to  protect.   If,  as  I  argue,  many 
people  oppose  torture  in principle  – if,  that  is,  many people  would not  want 
torture to be utilized to protect their lives (which, I argue, is plausibly the case) – 
it follows from the Principle of Application that torture is unjust for the simple 
reason that it undercuts the values, and preference, of the very people it would be 
utilized to protect.  
Chapter 4 then argues from the Principle of Application the conclusion 
that justice defeasibly requires foreigners to tolerate unjust societies  up to the 
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point that those societies violate the most basic human rights of individuals.  My 
argument for this conclusion is that our best empirical evidence, both historical 
and  in  the  present-day,  indicates  that  those  reformist  groups  that  have  the 
strongest  claim  to  satisfy  the  Principle  of  Application’s  desiderata  –  “local” 
reformist  groups in unjust  societies  themselves – tend to prefer foreigners  to 
tolerate their society up to the point that basic human rights are violated. 
Finally,  Chapter 5 argues from the Fundamental  Principle of Non-Ideal 
Theory to a duty of the international community to ameliorate poverty resulting 
in great human suffering, and from the Principle of Application to the conclusion 
that other economic injustices should be dealt with via “fair trade.”  I argue that 
because  there  is  no  single  reformist  group  that  can  claim  to  best  satisfy  the 
Principle  of  Application’s  desiderata,  only  a  number  of  opposing  groups,  the 
Principle implies that we have a duty to pursue a fair compromise between those 





GROUNDWORK FOR A NON-IDEAL THEORY OF JUSTICE
This chapter argues (in §1) that political philosophy presently lacks a “non-ideal 
theory” of justice – a theory, that is, of what it is for persons and institutions to 
respond justly to injustices.  It then argues (in §2) that due to the nature of non-
ideal  theory,  political  philosophers  ought  to  adopt  a  variation of  John Rawls’ 
famous “original position” – a “Non-Ideal Original Position” – to investigate non-
ideal theory.  §3 explicates and further defends the Non-Ideal Original Position. 
Finally,  §4  argues  from  the  Non-Ideal  Original  Position  to  what  I  call  the 
Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory  –  a  principle  that  not  only 
illuminates  non-ideal  theory,  suggesting  further  avenues  of  development,  but 
which also,  in virtue  of  its  theoretical  neutrality,  should once  again  appeal  to 
liberal  political  philosophers  generally,  irrespective  of  whatever  their  wider 
commitments may be.
§1.1. NON-IDEAL THEORY: AN UNDERDEVELOPED DOMAIN OF INQUIRY
There are many “ideal  theories” of fully  just or legitimate  social  conditions in 
contemporary political philosophy.  Here is brief sampling of some of the central 
claims of some of these theories:
John Rawls’ theory of domestic justice: The basic structure of a fully just 
domestic society would conform to the following two principles:11
11 This is Rawls’ (2005: 5-6) final statement of his principles.  See Rawls (1999a: 266) for earlier, 
and slightly different, versions.  Note also that Rawls takes the First Principle to take priority over 
the Second, and the first part of the Second Principle to take priority over its second part (Rawls 
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First Principle: Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate 
scheme  of  equal  basic  rights  and  liberties,  which  scheme  is 
compatible with the same scheme for all;  and in this scheme the 
equal  political  liberties,  and  only  those  liberties,  are  to  be 
guaranteed their fair value.
Second Principle:  Social  and economic  inequalities  are  to  satisfy 
two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices 
open to  all  under  conditions  of  fair  equality  of  opportunity;  and 
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society. 
Rawls’  theory  of  international  justice:  A  fully  just  international  order 
would be a Society of Peoples: a world of independent liberal-democratic 
societies  and  illiberal-undemocratic  but  “decent”  societies  that,  roughly 
speaking, respect one another’s autonomy.12
Rawlsian-Cosmopolitan theories of global justice: A fully just global social 
order  would  conform  to  global  analogues  of  Rawls’  two  principles  of 
domestic justice.13 
1999a: 53-4, 130-1).
12 See Rawls (1999b), especially p. 37.
13 Although there is some disagreement over the content that the appropriate global analogues 
should have (because the global order is so different than a domestic society), Beitz (1983: 595; 
1999: Pt. III, 2000), Buchanan (2000), Caney (2005), Kuper (2000; 2006), Moellendorf (2002) 
Pogge (1989: 247; 1994; 2001; 2002: 104-8; 2006), Richards (1982), Scanlon (1973), and Tan 
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Ronald Dworkin’s theory of distributive justice: A just social order would 
distribute social resources equally among persons against a background of 
equal liberty.14
Nozick’s Libertarian Theory: A just social order would respect individuals’ 
natural rights to life, liberty, and private property.15
Desert theories of distributive justice (three variants)16
Contribution: A fully just social order would reward people for their 
work  activity  according  to  the  value  of  their  contribution  to  the 
social product.
 
Effort:  A fully  just  society  would reward people according to the 
effort they expend in their work activity. 
Compensation: A fully just society would reward people according 
to the costs they incur in their work activity. 
(1998; 2004) all agree that moral consistency requires applying the original position to the global 
order and that a global original position as such implies principles reasonably close to Rawls’ 
domestic principles. Of these theorists, Pogge is probably the most cautious, noting, “…it is too 
early to tell how [Rawls’] idea of the original position…should be best adapted to the complexities 
of our interdependent world.” (1994: 197).
14 Dworkin (2000).
15 Nozick (1974).  See also Cohen (1995), Hayek (1960), and Lomasky (1987).
16 See e.g., Dick (1975), Feinberg (1970), Lamont (1994, 1995, 1997), Miller (1976, 1989), Riley 
(1989), Sadurski (1985), and Sher (1987).
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It is noteworthy that the proponents of these theories typically concede that they 
lack anything like a general, systematic non-ideal theory (a theory, once again, of 
how to deal with injustice).  So, for instance, when it comes to the issues of “how 
well [his two principles of domestic justice] apply to institutions under less than 
favorable  conditions,  and whether  they  provide  any guidance  for  instances  of 
injustices”, Rawls states, “I shall not attempt to give a systematic answer to these 
questions.”17  Similarly, Nozick says of the issue of how to deal with injustice quite 
generally, “I do not know of a thorough or theoretically sophisticated treatment of 
such issues.”18  This is not to say, of course, that all theorists have set non-ideal 
theory aside.  On the contrary, as we will now see, at least a few theorists have 
attempted to deal with non-ideal theory in a more or less systematic manner.  Let 
me try to explain, however, how I think the theorists that have dealt with non-
ideal  theory  have  ignored  something  critical:  namely,  the  question  of  what 
constitutes a just distribution of the total costs and benefits associated with social 
progress.
I want to focus on what I take to be two fairly representative approaches to 
non-ideal theory: the approach that Ronald Dworkin adopts in Sovereign Virtue, 
and the approach that Allen Buchanan adopts in Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-
Determination.   Buchanan’s  approach,  insofar  as  it  focuses  on human rights, 
seems to me to be particularly representative of the way in which contemporary 
philosophers have grappled with non-ideal theory.  Human rights discourse and 
law has not only evolved, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights put it, to 
17 Rawls (1999a): 216
18 Nozick (1974): 152.
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prevent  the  sorts  of  “barbarous  acts  which  have  outraged  the  conscience  of 
mankind” over the course of history”, and to “promote social progress and better 
standards of life”; human rights have also come to the forefront of contemporary 
political theory.19  Dworkin’s approach also seems to me representative of a very 
natural way of thinking about non-ideal theory as well, however – so let us begin 
there.
Dworkin  explicitly  devotes  nearly  half  of  Sovereign  Virtue  to  non-ideal 
theory.  His general approach to non-ideal theory is, however, somewhat curious. 
His general strategy is to analyze what ought to be done here and now in the real 
world by reference to hypothetical claims about what fully just conditions would 
be like.  So, for example, when it comes to the question of how much health care 
ought to cost under some class of unjust economic conditions, Dworkin’s answer 
is that health care should cost how much it would cost if social resources were 
justly distributed.20  The problem is that while something about this seems right – 
health care would presumably be more affordable to those who suffer injustice if 
it were made to cost what it would cost under fully just conditions – Dworkin’s 
analysis makes no reference whatever to the issue of transition-costs.  The very 
process of changing health care  prices might impose significant  (and to some 
extent hidden) burdens on people, after all, particularly people who are already 
disadvantaged  by  injustice.     Changing  a  health  care  system takes  time and 
resources,  and  the  requisite  changes  will  presumably  happen over  months  or 
years, not overnight.   It might require raising taxes on everyone, for instance, 
19 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human
20 Dworkin (2000): Ch. 9.
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something which might increase the economic hardships people face (not only by 
increasing  their  tax burden,  but perhaps by negatively  affecting the economy, 
causing people to lose their jobs and ability to afford health care in the interim). 
Offhand, an adequate non-ideal theory will have to tell us what justice requires 
given the sorts of transition-costs we can reasonable expect different policies to 
impose on people.  Dworkin’s hypothetical approach to non-ideal theory – his 
attempt to analyze what ought to be done now in terms of what just conditions 
would be like – is ill suited to this task, however.  To analyze what ought to be 
done under unjust conditions solely in terms of what fully just conditions would 
be like is to ignore transition-costs entirely.    
Some readers  might  want  to  suggest  that  because  Dworkin claims that 
distributive  justice  requires an equal  distribution of  social  resources,  Dworkin 
should claim that  then  transition-costs  ought  to  be  distributed  equally.   This 
seems implausible,  however.   Offhand,  it  would  seem that  people  who suffer 
injustice have a greater claim to have their interests advanced in social progress 
than those who benefit.  Another possibility would be to say that those who suffer 
the worst injustices should have their interests take priority over the interests of 
others.   There problem here is,  what if  minimizing the costs on the worst  off 
would impose enormous costs on the rest of society, such as the middle class? 
Offhand, it would seem bizarre to think that we should subject people in society 
to whatever scheme of transition is best for the worst off, no matter how costly 
such a scheme might be for others.  Intuitively, an adequate account of the just 
distribution of the costs associated with eliminating and rectifying injustices – 
that  is,  an  adequate  non-ideal  theory  – will  fall  somewhere  in between these 
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possibilities.  It will make sense of the idea that just social progress is a delicate 
balancing act, one that gives some sort of greater value to the interests of those 
who  suffer  the  most  without  giving  their  interests  absolute  priority  over  the 
interests  of others.   Dworkin’s approach to non-ideal  theory does not address 
these issues, however.  However illuminating his approach to non-ideal theory 
might be, we have ample reason to want a deeper, more systematic non-ideal 
theory – one that provides an account of how transition-costs are to be weighed 
and distributed among persons.
Allen Buchanan’s non-ideal theory of international law seems to come a bit 
closer  to  providing  an  account  of  the  just  distribution  of  transition-costs. 
Interestingly, Buchanan sets aside ideal theory almost entirely.  He claims that 
because  the  ideals  that  ought  to  govern  a  fully  just  international  order  are 
extremely contentious, we should develop a non-ideal theory of international law 
on the basis of ideas that are not so contentious: namely, that (1) people have 
important interests as human beings, (2) that international law should aim to 
promote and protect these interests, and (3) that the language and law of human 
rights  are  the  best  means  by  which  to  promote  and  protect  those  interests.21 
Buchanan claims, plausibly, that international law and practice ought, here and 
now in the real world, to promote and protect each individual’s ability to live a 
“decent human life.”22  Offhand, this account might seem capable of providing 
some account of the sorts of transition-costs that can be justly imposed on people 
for the sake of justice.  Intuitively, the protection of some rights (e.g. the rights to 
21 See Buchanan (2004): Ch1, §VII, esp. p. 67.
22 Buchanan (2004): 128-30.
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life, freedom from torture, etc.) seem far more essential to the ability of persons 
to live “decent human lives” than others (e.g.  the right to equal pay for equal 
work, etc.).  
Buchanan develops no clear analysis, however, of which rights are more 
important than others, how much more important they are, the extent to which 
justice might allow some human rights to be violated so that large numbers of 
other people might enjoy other human rights, and so on.  Consider Buchanan’s 
list of human rights:
My hypothesis is that the most basic human rights – those most important 
for the capacity to live a decent human life – include the following: the 
right to life (the right not to be unjustly killed, that is, without due process 
of law or in violation of the moral constraints on armed conflict), the right 
to security of the person, which includes the right to bodily integrity, the 
right against torture, and the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest, 
detention,  or  imprisonment;  the  right  against  enslavement  and 
involuntary  servitude;  the  right  to  resources  for  subsistence;  the  most 
fundamental rights to due process and equality before the law; the right to 
freedom  from  religious  persecution  and  against  at  least  the  more 
damaging  and  systemic  forms  of  religious  discrimination;  the  right  to 
freedom  of  expression;  the  right  to  association  (including  the  right  to 
marry and have children, but also to associate for political purposes, etc.); 
and the right against persecution and against at least the more damaging 
28
and  systematic  forms  of  discrimination  on  grounds  of  ethnicity,  race, 
gender, or sexual preference.23
Clearly,  these  rights  can  come  into  conflict.   We  might  be  able  to  achieve 
conditions of due process and equality only by invading a nation, killing many 
people in the process, as might be the case if, as many people hope, the United 
States’ invasion and occupation of Iraq turns out to lead to these things in the 
longer run.  The question, of course, is whether justice permits us to impose the 
ultimate  cost  of  death  upon  some  people  so  that  others  can  enjoy  better 
conditions.  Buchanan gives no clear answer to the question of how the various 
human  rights  are  to  be  weighed.   He  claims  that  these  issues  are  “deeply 
indeterminate”24,  and  that  when  it  comes  to  “the  question  of  how  much 
protection, at what cost, is appropriate,” we should defer to the “complex set of 
processes at the international  and the domestic level…[such as] specific human 
rights  conventions…international  quasi-judicical  agencies...and  agreements 
explicitly  designed to formulate  guidelines and timetables.”25  There are  three 
related problems with Buchanan’s  position here.   First,  in  the absence of any 
theory  of  which  sorts  of  costs  we  can  impose  on  people  for  the  sake  of 
improvements  for  others,  how  are  we  to  know  whether  the  processes  and 
conventions that Buchanan is referring to are doing a good job of deciding these 
matters?  Second, there seem to be independent reasons to doubt whether those 
processes  really  do  a  good  job  as  such.   Many  people  think,  after  all,  that 
23 Buchanan (2004): 129.
24 Buchanan (2004): 185.
25 Buchanan (2004): 186.
29
organizations  such  as  the  United  Nations,  World  Trade  Organization, 
International Monetary Fund, G8, and so on, do a bad job at deciding which sorts 
of costs people should bear for the sake of social progress.26   Finally, and perhaps 
most  to  the  point,  Buchanan’s  reply  seems to  me unjustifiedly  pessimistic.   I 
believe  that  we  can  provide  a  deeper  theory  of  the  indeterminacies  to  which 
Buchanan refers – a theory that can help us resolve them in a more principled 
way.  In order to arrive at such a theory, however, we must first attempt to settle 
on a method for investigating the issues.  It is to this that we now turn.
§1.2. THE CASE FOR UTILIZING AN ORIGINAL POSITION WITHIN NON-IDEAL THEORY
I believe that many, if not all, political philosophers should be prepared to utilize 
a variation of John Rawls’  famous “original  position” to  construct  a non-ideal 
theory of justice.  This might seem to be a strange claim indeed, however.  Why 
should a philosopher who rejects Rawls’ original position argument be prepared 
to utilize some version of the original position within non-ideal theory?  My first 
reply is simply that, at the end of the day, we see that the “Non-Ideal Original 
Position”  (as  I  call  it)  leads  to  principles  of  non-ideal  theory  that  political 
philosophers of all stripes can in fact accept.  As we will see in §1.4, I believe that 
the Non-Ideal Original Position leads to a Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal 
Theory that essentially incorporates whichever wider philosophical commitments 
a theorist has into non-ideal theory.  My first claim, then, is that “the proof is in 
the pudding”: that the Non-Ideal Original Position leads, in an illuminating way, 
26 See Bello (2004), as well as Mander and Goldsmith (1996), for common criticisms of these 
institutions.
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to a principle of non-ideal theory that, as a matter of fact, should satisfy most (if 
not  all)  political  theorists.  I  also  believe,  however,  that  there  are  deeper 
philosophical reasons for philosophers to adopt an original position in non-ideal 
theory even if they do not accept the method elsewhere.  Let me now explain what 
I take those deeper reasons to be.
I should begin by describing what I take an original position to be, exactly, 
and by describing, broadly speaking, how I think an original position for non-
ideal  theory  (or  simply,  the  “Non-Ideal  Original  Position”)  ought  to  be 
constructed.  An original position, as I understand it, is a hypothetical device in 
which (i) rational actors (according to some appropriate conception of “rational” 
– more on this shortly) who are (ii) subject to some class of constraints on their 
ability  to pursue what  they rationally  prefer are (iii)  charged with the task of 
coming to an agreement with one another on moral or political principles, given 
their rational nature and the constraints to which they are subject.  The original 
position that Rawls utilizes in A Theory of Justice consists, for example, of purely 
rational individuals behind a “veil of ignorance” which withholds from them any 
information,  such  as  information  relating  to  their  race,  sex,  social  class,  or 
talents,  which  might  allow  any  of  them to  tailor  the  agreement  to  their  own 
distinct advantage over the advantage of others.  The parties to Rawls’ original 
position  are  then  conceived  as  aiming  to  come  to  a  rational  agreement  on 
principles of justice given the informational constraints imposed upon them by 
the veil of ignorance, as well as given the further constraint (imposed by Rawls) 
that the parties are to be conceived as reasoning under an assumption of “strict-
compliance”: an assumption that, “everyone is presumed to act justly and to do 
31
his  part  in  upholding  just  institutions.”27  The  strict-compliance  assumption 
means, as Rawls points out, that the parties are reasoning to principles of ideal 
theory.   They are reasoning to  an agreement on principles  to  govern a  “well-
ordered society,” not a society in which people can be expected to fail to abide by 
the  principles  agreed  upon  (the  latter,  of  course,  is  the  domain  of  non-ideal 
theory).
Now clearly, if we are going to utilize an original position within non-ideal 
theory, it  will  have to differ from Rawls’  ideal theoretic original position in at 
least one critical respect.   Rawls himself draws attention to this respect in the 
following passage – a passage in which he actually discusses the possibility of 
investigating  non-ideal  theory  with  a  further,  non-ideal  theoretic  step  of  his 
original position:
The intuitive idea is to split the theory of justice into two parts.  The first 
or ideal part assumes strict compliance and works out the principles that 
characterize a well-ordered society under favorable conditions…Nonideal 
theory, the second part, is worked out after an ideal conception of justice 
has been chosen; only then do the parties ask which principles to adopt 
under less happy conditions.28
Rawls sets aside the task he mentions here, stating, once again, that, “I shall not 
attempt to give a systematic answer to these questions.”29  Still, we can see from 
Rawls’ remarks what a non-ideal theoretic use of the original position (the Non-
27 Rawls (1971): 8.
28 Rawls (1999a): 216.
29 Ibid.
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Ideal  Original  Position)  should  be  like.   Rawls’  remarks  indicate,  quite 
reasonably,  that  Rawls  thought  that  deliberations  in  the  Non-Ideal  Original 
Position ought to occur after principles of ideal theory are arrived at.  I say that 
this is reasonable because, clearly, in order to investigate non-ideal theory – in 
order, that is, to arrive at principles for meeting injustice – we must first know 
what injustice is.  Notice, next, that we need not have arrived at principles of ideal 
theory  by  Rawls’  original  position  in  order  to  utilize  the  Non-Ideal  Original 
Position for non-ideal theory.  We might very well reject Rawls’ original position 
argument to his two principles of ideal theory for any of the many reasons that 
Rawls’ critics have adduced.  Rawls’ argument to his two principles of justice is, 
after all, questionable on many grounds.30  Some critics claim that Rawls should 
have understood the parties  to  his  original  position as  not  pursuing “primary 
goods”, but rather simply their own expected utility, a strategy that (these critics 
charge) would lead the parties to agree to nothing other than the very theory of 
justice that Rawls explicitly sets out to reject: utlitarianism.  Other critics accept 
Rawls’ use of primary goods but question Rawls’ argument that the parties would 
agree to his two principles of justice.  The important thing, in any case, is that it 
seems,  offhand  at  least,  that  we  could  sensibly  apply  the  Non-Ideal  Original 
Position  to  any  principles  of  ideal  theory,  and  have  the  parties  deliberate  to 
principles of non-ideal theory from those principles.  It is also important to note 
that  any  Non-Ideal  Original  Position  (Rawlsian  or  otherwise)  will  impose 
constraints on the rational motivation of the parties that did not exist in Rawls’ 
ideal  theoretic  original  position.   Because  the  parties  to  a  Non-Ideal  Original 
30 For nice summaries of these criticisms, see Barry (1973) and Kymlicka (2002): Ch. 3.
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Position  are  deliberating  to  principles  to  govern  how  injustices  are  to  met  – 
because,  that  is,  principles  of  ideal  theory  are  already  on  hand –  the  parties 
cannot  be  conceived  as  purely  rational.   They  must  be  conceived  as  rational 
subject to the constraint that they all must take an interest in – and indeed, be 
motivated by – whatever principles of ideal theory are adopted.  Thus, if we are 
Rawlsians, we must conceive the parties to the Non-Ideal Original  Position as 
being motivated by Rawls’ two principles of justice; if we are Nozickeans we must 
conceive the parties as motivated to respect one another’s moral rights, as well as 
motivated to rectify past violations of rights; and so on.
Now I suspect that it might not be clear to many readers at this point how, 
if the parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position are conceived as motivated by 
one’s favored ideal theory, there is any further “room” for the parties to reason to 
a  rational  agreement.   We will  return to this  issue shortly.   Before  we do so, 
however,  we  should  also  note  that  the  exact  specification  of  the  Non-Ideal 
Original Position’s veil of ignorance will depend on one’s favored ideal theory as 
well.  Clearly, the parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position should be afforded 
whatever, and only whatever, information the ideal theory adopt says they should 
be afforded.  So, for example, suppose we endorse a Nozickean ideal theory: an 
theory  which  says  that  justice  is  a  historical  matter  of  individuals’  rights  and 
violations of those rights (e.g., Nozick says that people have property rights to 
particular things, and that if they are deprived of their property, they ought to 
have their property returned or otherwise be compensated for the violation of 
their property rights).  In this case the parties to Non-Ideal Original Position will 
surely have to be accorded knowledge of their own entitlements (i.e. what their 
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legitimate property-holdings are, which items of property they have been unjustly 
deprived of, who has that property, and so on).  
A fairly obvious question here, however, is whether, in many cases at least, 
the idea that the veil of ignorance should be specified by reference to ideal theory 
will result in any veil of ignorance at all.  What use, after all, would a Nozickean 
have for a veil of ignorance of any sort?  Offhand, it would seem that a Nozickean 
would say that all information is relevant to dealing with injustice – that all we 
need to know is whose rights have been violated, and how, in order to properly 
rectify injustices.  Let me explain, however, why I think that all political theorists, 
even Nozickeans, should be prepared to utilize some veil of ignorance, and hence, 
the Non-Ideal Original Position for non-ideal theory.
The idea of the Non-Ideal Original Position should, for obvious reasons, 
appeal to moral or political constructivists – philosophers who believe that moral 
or  political  principles  are  specified  by  some  sort  of  impartial  deliberative 
process.31  This is a more substantial point than it might seem.  For while it might 
seem  fairly  obvious  that  a  Rawlsian  ought  to  adopt  the  Non-Ideal  Original 
Position in order to arrive at principles of non-ideal theory, if what I have said so 
far  is  right,  the  Non-Ideal  Original  Position  can  be  detached  from  Rawls’ 
particular  brand  of  constructivism  and  attached  to  some  other  constructivist 
moral or political theory, such as perhaps T.M. Scanlon’s32 constructivist theory 
(Rawls is a political but not a moral constructivist).33   I propose, then, that right 
31 See,  for  example,  the  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy’s  entry  on  contractualism, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism. 
32 See ibid. for a nice introduction to different constructivist theories.
33 See Rawls (2005): Lecture III.
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off  the  bat  the  Non-Ideal  Original  Position  has  a  much  broader  domain  of 
application than one might have thought.  Still, I want to say that the Non-Ideal 
Original Position has an even wider domain of application than that.  Many moral 
and political philosophers are not constructivists, and yet I want to say that they 
too should endorse the Non-Ideal  Original  Position for non-ideal theory.   The 
question, of course, is why I think this.  The answer has to do with the very nature 
of non-ideal theory.  Non-ideal theory is so complex, and our intuitions not only 
unsettled  but  also  the  subject  of  reasonable  disagreement,  that  moral  and 
political philosophers who are not constructivists in other domains ought to be 
constructivists in this domain – or so I will now maintain.
It is telling, I think, that the task of providing a fully systematic analysis of 
non-ideal theory has not only been explicitly set aside by all of the theorists that I 
have discussed here – Rawls, Nozick, Buchanan – but indeed, set aside by moral 
and political  philosophers quite generally.   Why is it  that Rawls,  arguably  the 
most systematic political philosopher in history, merely says of non-ideal theory 
(once  again)  that,  “I  shall  not  attempt  to  give  a  systematic  answer  to  these 
questions”?34  And why is that Nozick says similarly of non-ideal theory, “I do not 
know of a thorough or theoretically  sophisticated treatment of  such issues”?35 
Why, in short, is there such a clear gap in moral and political philosophy where a 
systematic  non-ideal  theory intuitively  should be?  Why,  of  all  the moral  and 
political theories that we have, do we lack any sort of fully general or systematic 
analysis of the sorts of costs that we can impose on people, and how those costs 
34 Rawls (1999a): 216.
35 Nozick (1974): 152.
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ought to be distributed, for the sake of eliminating or rectifying injustice?  (We do 
of course have general moral theories – such as Kantianism, utilitarianism, and 
virtue theories.  Still, aside from utilitarianism, which is widely criticized, none of 
these theories seem particularly well-suited to provide a general account of the 
costs that we can impose on people to overcome injustice, nor how those costs 
ought to be distributed among persons).  To put the matter bluntly, it seems to 
me that contemporary political philosophy lacks any systematic accounts of non-
ideal  theory  for  the  simple  reason  that,  due  to  all  of  the  complexities  and 
unsettled intuitions we have about non-ideal theory, it seems hard to know even 
where to begin theorizing.  We have seen, after all, that Allen Buchanan is quite 
explicit about the fact that he takes non-ideal theory to be “too indeterminate” to 
make much headway.  Rawls makes similar remarks, saying that “in the more 
extreme and tangled instances of nonideal  theory…we may be able to find no 
satisfactory answer at all.”36  It seems to me, in other words, that the fundamental 
challenge of non-ideal theory is this: it is generally thought that a systematic non-
ideal theory would be desirable, yet the very domain of non-ideal theory seems 
resistant to systematic analysis.  Theories, by their nature, simplify matters.  Yet 
non-ideal theory, by its very nature, seems almost hopelessly complex.  
I believe, however, that the very challenge of non-ideal theory presents us 
with here shows us the right way to go about answering it.  We must find a way to 
simplify systematize what we can within non-ideal theory without attempting to 
simplify  or  systematize  those  aspects  of  non-ideal  theory  that  cannot  be 
simplified or systematized.   This will  presumably be a difficult  endeavor.   We 
36 Rawls (1999a): 267.
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must begin by attempting to distinguish those things that can be simplified and 
systematized from those that cannot – and it is precisely this, I propose, that the 
Non-Ideal Original Position is good for.  Let me explain.   
We often have all sorts of vague, unsure, and conflicting intuitions within 
non-ideal theory, even when we agree on most matters of ideal theory.  Consider 
first,  from a Nozickean point-of-view, the fact  that most people in the United 
States today have benefitted from immensely from past injustices.  The slaughter, 
displacement, and many frauds perpetrated upon the original native people of 
North America is an enormous black mark on the history of the United States.  So 
too is the institution of slavery.  And many of us today have benefitted from these 
injustices.   Caucasian  Americans  fare  far  better  than  Native  Americans  and 
African  Americans  in  every  quantifiable  aspect.   We  live  longer,  make  more 
money, are convicted for fewer crimes, and so on.37  The question is: what, in light 
of the past injustices themselves and the downstream effects of those injustices, 
does justice require now?  Consider the issue from a Nozickean point-of-view. 
Nozick maintains that the moral rights that he ascribes to persons are somehow 
founded  in  the  Kantian  idea  that  people  ought  to  be  treated  as  “ends-in-
themselves.”38  According to Nozick,  we must respect persons’  rights  as “side-
constraints” on how we treat them for the simple reason that each person, “ is a 
separate person…his is the only life he has.”39  Yet the idea that each person has 
one and only one life to live and therefore ought to be able to live it as she wishes, 
37 http://www.ruralhome.org/pubs/hsganalysis/ts2000/NativeOverview.pdf
38 See Nozick (1974): 28-51.
39 Nozick (1974): 33.
38
so long as she does not force or coerce others to live against their wishes (which is 
clearly Nozick’s basic idea40) seems hard to apply within non-ideal theory.  Each 
person who has benefitted from historical injustices has just as much of a claim 
to live her life  as  she wishes  as  anyone who has suffered the effects  of  those 
injustices.  Yet what is it to say this?  If we take property away from the person 
who has benefitted from injustices due to no fault  of  her own to compensate 
those  who  have  suffered  the  effects  of  those  injustices  (let  us  say  it  is  her 
ancestors who committed the injustices), we intuitively intrude upon her ability 
to live her life as she wishes.  If, on the other hand, we do not take property away 
from her (to compensate those who have suffered), we intuitively intrude upon 
their ability to live their lives as they wish (since they have been unjustly deprived 
of holdings they would have had if their ancestors had not been unjustly deprived 
of their property).  Offhand, it seems as though different Nozickeans could have 
very  different,  as  well  as  uncertain,  thoughts  about  this  sort  of  case.   The 
Nozickean  thinks that  no one should be  “used,”  yet  it  seems that  in order to 
compensate the victims of past injustices, we must in fact use someone – that we 
must  intrude  upon  individuals’  lives  in  order  to  deal  with  the  fact  that  past 
individuals’ lives were unjustly intruded upon.  Yet if Nozickeans can disagree 
about, and have quite uncertain views (as Nozick does) about, what ought to be 
done in these cases, how can a Nozickean develop a reasonable non-ideal theory? 
Now consider a second example of injustice.  “Liberal” political theories 
are  univocal  in  their  commitment  to  the  view that,  in  some sense,  all  people 
40 Nozick (1974: 32-3) says, “Side constraints express the inviolability of other persons.  But why 
may not one violate persons for the greater social good?...To use a person…does not sufficiently 
respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that this is the only life he has.”
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ought  to  be  treated  as  political  equals.   Different  theories  give  very  different 
accounts, of course, of what this equality consists in.  Most liberal theories, at any 
rate,  are committed to the ideas that justice  requires all  persons in society to 
enjoy the same basic  political  rights,  such as rights  to  freedom of  expression, 
association, democratic voting rights, and so on.  But now what about when these 
sorts of conditions fail to exist in a society?  On the one hand, it natural to think 
that  fundamental  political  inequalities  ought to  be eliminated as efficiently  as 
possible.  On the other hand, when we actually look at the aims and policies of 
liberal  reformist  groups,  and  the  individuals  that  compose  those  groups,  in 
societies that fall short of these liberal standards, we often get a very different, 
more  complex  picture  of  how those  inequalities  ought  to  eliminated.   So,  for 
example,  what  are  we to make of  the  fact  that  some women’s  groups in Iran 
explicitly favor grassroots measures to overcome injustices – measures that will 
be sensitive to  the needs of women “on the ground” in the real  world – over 
internationally-based  measures?41  Grassroots  movements  would  seem  to  be 
sensitive to the kinds of important, but subtle, transition-related concerns voiced 
by the following Iranian woman (to take just one example):
…the experience that I want to tell is in regards to one of my closest family 
members, my father. My father is a very kind, sincere, religious and pious 
41 The “One Million Signatures” in Iran campaign asserts as its aims, “to identify the everyday 
concerns of women, especially their legal needs and problems…relying on the needs identified by 
women  themselves”,  “to  carrying  out  bottom-up  reform  and  to  creating  change  through 
grassroots  and  civil  society  initiatives,  and  seeks  to  strengthen  public  action  and  empower 
women.”  It also goes out of its way to restrict participation in the movement to Iranian men and 
women. (www.we-change.org/spip.php?article18). 
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human being. At the same time he is drawn to knowledge, reflection and 
logic as well. At first, he would try to answer my criticisms of the status 
quo laws with kindly advising me not to seek the reasons and causes for 
these historic injustices and discrimination between men and women. He 
would say “Probably there is some wisdom embedded in the unequal laws 
that I have not found, and for this reason I should study more.” Due to this 
rationale, my father was against changing the laws. I listened to my father, 
so with much persistence and diligence I researched the literature, but the 
more  I  studied,  the  deeper  my  convictions  became  that  the  laws  were 
discriminatory and unjust.
With all this, a subconscious fear grew in me. What if my patient father, 
who  has  spent  his  life  in  promoting  science  and  religion  and  has  no 
expectations from anyone or any rankings, was to become offended and 
take away his kindness from me. Because of this, I stopped the discussing 
this topic with him, but I kept up on my research.
After joining the campaign and battling with myself, I broached the subject 
of the movement and its goals with friends and neighbors. All the while I 
was  afraid  of  worrying  my  father.  From  the  corner  of  my  eye,  I  kept 
watching for his reactions.
Talking of the campaign among family and friends resulted in a variety of 
questions regarding the validity of its goals (questions that rarely come up 
when  talking  with  other  activists.)  Of  course,  I  defended  the  woman’s 
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rights movement of my country as well as the inalienable rights of Muslim 
women  with  strong  reasons  and  I  explained  that  the  current  laws  are 
creating  many  problems  for  women.  I  also  described  the  positive  new 
movements in other Islamic countries that were attempting to correct their 
own  discriminatory  laws.  Since  I  believe  that  Islam  is  a  religion  that 
defends justice and equality, at least that is what my father taught me, why 
should  Muslim  women  be  quiet  in  the  face  of  injustice?  Are  we  less 
deserving than other women?  Since we are Muslims, does this mean we 
should be without rights?
These questions continued for some time and I noticed my father carefully 
monitoring my answers. Days and weeks passed by in similar fashion until 
I gradually felt that the clouds of sadness and worry were starting to lift 
from  my  father’s  kind  and  compassionate  face.  Little  by  little,  he 
developed a smile of support for me and my fellow campaigners. Finally, 
one day while  signatures were being collected from various friends and 
family, my father asked to sign and be part of the campaign as well.
That night, I cried tears of joy. The relief I felt made me lighter,  as if I 
could fly. For some time I felt that my dear father was distancing himself 
from me and I thought that I was going down a path that he disapproved 
of. His becoming part of the campaign brought us closer. I was so happy.
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Yes, I have learned a big lesson that change takes time and I have to be 
more patient.  I have realized that influencing other people’s beliefs and 
opinions takes time and doesn’t happen over night!
What is interesting is that my father is now very persistent in wanting to 
collect signatures from friends and co-workers. I have witnessed many of 
his arguments and discussions in the effort to convince his friends for the 
need for women’s rights, as well as the need to interpret religion based on 
changing  times.  I  get  unbelievable  energy  from him and I  bask  in  the 
happiness this brings me….
Long  before  the  start  of  the  “One  Million  Signature”  campaign,  I  was 
frustrated with the difficult plight of women and I wished from the bottom 
of my heart for these unfair laws against women to change. In gatherings 
and various get-togethers, I would broach the topic of the problems that 
women face today, but there were times when I would lose the motivation 
for discussions and arguments. It was as if, I was devoid of hope. In fact, 
prior  to  working  with  the  campaign,  I  would  only  speak  with  specific 
people  such  as  close  friends  and  some  family  members,  and  I  would 
generally  avoid  bringing  up  the  topic  of  women’s  difficulties  in  larger 
groups or in the presence of strangers. Sometimes I would be ashamed. 
Low self esteem and not knowing all the facts would cause me to stop short 
of mentioning women’s issues and I would allow the social gathering to go 
about its traditional routine.
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However,  since joining the campaign,  I  slowly  began to feel  a  sense of 
conviction  and responsibility  in  articulating  the  pain  and difficulties  of 
women,  and  my  self  confidence  in  discussing  these  issues  in  social 
gatherings grew, especially in the presence of my family elders. In a way, 
answering people’s questions about the various details of the laws made 
me even more aware of feminism and the situation of the women in my 
country.  More importantly,  I  knew that  I  was  not  alone.  Knowing that 
many unacquainted friends of the campaign in Tehran and other parts of 
Iran were busy collecting signatures gave me a good feeling. No longer 
feeling alone in this small city gave me a sense of support and hope. Being 
a member of the campaign gave me a new sense of identity.42
Offhand, it seems that liberal political philosophers will be inclined to disagree a 
great  deal  about  which  kinds  of  transition-related  preferences  are  morally 
legitimate.  One the one hand, the concerns of the woman just mentioned seem 
important to take seriously.  On the other hand, is justice really the sort of thing 
we  should  forestall  out  of  concern  for  familial  relations?   Family  is  surely 
important, but is it that important (i.e. important enough to make a difference as 
to how we deal with injustice)?  
I propose that the Non-Ideal Original Position is the uniquely right kind of 
method for resolving these problems: the problem being that when it comes to 
many (if  not most) issues, our moral intuitions are unclear,  unstable,  and the 
subject of reasonable disagreement.  If we situate rational individuals who accept 
42 http://www.we-change.org/spip.php?article326
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some ideal theory T behind a veil of ignorance that, first, (i) provides them with 
whatever information T says they should be afforded (and again, in Nozick’s case, 
this  might  be  all  historical  information),  but  which  also,  (ii)  prevents  those 
parties from knowing which particular views they have in the domain of non-
ideal theory, we in effect imagine a device by which adherents of T can come to a 
fair resolution to the indeterminacies and reasonable disagreements that we have 
seen exist within non-ideal theory.  
The obvious question at this point is: why should philosophers adopt the 
Non-Ideal  Original  Position  to  resolve  these  issues  instead  of  adopting  a 
“competitive” approach to non-ideal theory – an approach according to which 
each of them, as an unique proponent of that ideal theory, theorizes according to 
his own views and intuitions to conclusions within non-ideal  theory?  This is, 
after  all,  the way we usually  do things  in  philosophy,  science,  and indeed,  in 
business and politics.  We allow people, and theories, to compete, and the end of 
the day, the last one standing is the winner (or theory we adopt).  Why think that 
this is the wrong approach within non-ideal theory?
I  propose  that  there  are  two  reasons  why moral  and  political  theorists 
should wish to come to a fair resolution to the uncertainties and disagreements 
that arise within non-ideal theory.  First, I propose that due to these uncertainties 
and  disagreements,  non-ideal  theory  seems  to  me  uniquely  ill-suited  to  the 
competition model.  It is interesting, I think, that there really hasn’t been any 
competition, as it were, with respect to non-ideal theory.  As we have seen in the 
cases of Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin, and Buchanan, each of those theorists sets aside 
the most contentious issues of non-ideal theory for another day.  The reason for 
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this, it seems to me, is that in order for a competition to even take place, we must 
have some idea of what the “finish line” is – of what a good theory would look 
like, broadly speaking.  My point is simply that while we do seem to have some 
idea of what the finish line looks like when it come to ideal theory – we Rawlsians 
believe  that  Rawls’  theory  makes  the  best  sense  of  our  views  of  justice; 
Nozickeans  disagree;  and  so  on  –  things  seem far  different  within  non-ideal 
theory.  Our intuitions, it seems to me, are so uncertain, and so diverse, in non-
ideal theory that a competition to arrive at a non-ideal theory that many people 
can accept is destined to fail.   When our intuitions differ so much, and are so 
uncertain, the very best we can do is to come to a fair resolution to the differences 
between  the  intuitions  that  we  share  –  and  the  original  position  device  is  a 
method for accomplishing this.
Second, I propose that there is are certain matters of “due respect” for one 
another  as  theorists,  and “due humility”,  that  are  particularly  relevant  within 
non-ideal  theory.   We have seen,  once again,  that there seem to be unusually 
broad, and deep, levels of uncertainty and disagreement within non-ideal theory 
– that there seems to be little agreement among moral and political philosophers 
about  which matters  are even relevant  within  non-ideal  theory.   There are,  it 
seems to me, two ways to ways to respond to this problem.  One way is to proceed 
as we do in most other areas of philosophy – by way of individual philosophers 
presenting, defending, and systematizing their own philosophical intuitions, with 
the hope that enough other philosophers will share their intuitions so that many 
other philosophers will find their theory plausible.  This not only seems hopeless 
to me in non-ideal theory, however; I propose that it is unacceptably solipsistic.  I 
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think, first,  that precisely because of how much disagreement there is in non-
ideal theory, any theory that a philosopher bases on his/her own intuitions is not 
likely to gain many adherents, let alone widespread acceptance.  It also seems to 
me, however, that this approach shows something like an inadequate amount of 
respect for our fellow theorists, and indeed, a lack of due humility on the part of 
the  philosopher  who theorizes  in  such a  way.   It  seems to  me that  when we 
recognize particularly broad matters of disagreement in a particular domain of 
inquiry among people we otherwise agree with and take to be reasonable (i.e. 
those who at least agree with us on matters of ideal theory), we have an obligation 
to  give  each  such  person’s  intuitions  a  “fair  hearing”  –  something  that,  once 
again, the Non-Ideal Original Position seems to be a device for accomplishing.    
Now I expect that the following question might be raised here: why think 
that such an approach is appropriate merely for non-ideal theory, rather than 
ideal theory, or indeed, philosophy quite generally?  Philosophers do, after all, 
disagree quite often about what is relevant in different fields.  Should we be fair 
to all philosophical views in all domains, such as imagine a Non-Ideal Original 
Position for epistemologists, or philosophers of mind, and so on?  As an aside, I 
actually think that there is something reasonable about this.  It has always struck 
me as peculiar that dualists in the philosophy of mind (such as David Chalmers) 
seem so convinced that “phenomenal consciousness” raises serious philosophical 
problems, that “zombies” are conceivable, and so on, when as a matter of fact 
other  conscientious  philosophers  (such  as  Daniel  Dennett,  myself,  and  many 
others)  seriously  report  to  find  nothing very  mysterious  about  consciousness, 
zombies to  be inconceivable,  and so on.   How can we be sure that there is  a 
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problem  when,  apparently,  many  people  who  are  as  conscientious  and 
sophisticated as we are disagree with the very premises with which we begin? 
Still, as important as I think these questions are, I do not want to push this line of 
thought too far.  I want to suggest instead that when it comes to ideal theory in 
political philosophy at least, we often are justified in rejecting others views and 
intuitions.  It seems to me that the “competition” model is appropriate for ideal 
theory simply because there are moral and political intuitions in this domain that 
are widely held – intuitions that we can appeal to show that our favored theory 
does a much better job of systematizing common intuitions than other theories. 
It  seems to me, to conclude,  that ideal  theory is  very different than non-ideal 
theory.  In ideal theory, there is much common ground to be had.  If we are to 
make any headway in non-ideal theory, in contrast,  we must grapple with the 
distinct  lack of common ground.  And this,  I  maintain,  is  what the Non-Ideal 
Original Position is an uniquely good device for doing.
§1.3. THE NON-IDEAL ORIGINAL POSITION EXPLICATED
Let me now explicate the Non-Ideal Original Position in more detail so that we 
can see how, or so I believe, it leads us to a Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal 
Theory that systematizes what can be systematized within non-ideal theory in a 
way that (I think we will  see) paves a path that will  enable us to resolve, in a 
principled way, the uncertainties and matters of reasonable disagreement within 
non-ideal theory that cannot be systematized.
 We have already seen that the parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position 
are  to  be  conceived  as  accepting,  and  as  motivated  by  the  acceptance  of, 
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whichever  ideal  theory,  T,  we  favor.   The  next  question  to  address  is  the 
specification of the veil of ignorance.  The veil of ignorance, as I have already 
suggested, ought to afford the parties knowledge of whatever information one’s 
favored ideal theory, T, says they should be afforded.  Thus, to repeat a point 
made earlier, a Nozickean Non-Ideal Original Position should afford its parties 
the best available knowledge of the history of property holdings, injustices, and 
so on.  The natural question now is: if the Non-Ideal Original Position affords its 
parties  whatever  knowledge  T  says  they  should  be  afforded,  what  veil  of 
ignorance is there, really?  The answer to this question was already mentioned in 
my argument for the use of an original position in non-ideal theory.  The veil of 
ignorance  in  the  Non-Ideal  Original  Position  sets  two  sorts  of  limits  on  the 
parties’  deliberations:  it should (i) withhold from them any and all  knowledge 
that  one’s  favored ideal  theory,  T,  says  should  be  withheld  from them (for  a 
Rawlsian, this will be all “self-individuating” information such as one’s race, sex, 
etc.);  but it  should also (ii)  withhold from them any and all  knowledge of the 
particular  views about non-ideal  theory that  they,  as  an adherent  of  T,  might 
hold.  It is in virtue of this feature, I submit, that the Non-Ideal Original Position 
represents  a  fair  resolution  to  the  disagreements  and  indeterminacies  that 
proponents of T face within non-ideal theory (and should commonly want a fair 
resolution to, if my argument in §2 is correct).
This brings us to a somewhat vexing issue: the issue of who, or what, the 
parties  to  the Non-Ideal  Original  Position represent (and how).   How can we 
square the idea that all of the parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position accept, 
and are motivated by, whichever principles of ideal theory we favor with the idea 
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that the Non-Ideal Original Position is supposed to be device for “dealing with 
injustice.”  The answer is that we must distinguish the principles accepted by, and 
the motivations of, the parties from what the parties can expect people in the real 
world to accept and be motivated to do.  The basic idea behind the Non-Ideal 
Original Position, after all,  is this: we want to know which principles ought to 
govern social transition to a fully just state of affairs given the fact that many 
people in the real world will not accept or be motivated to conform to whichever 
principles of ideal theory we endorse.  In light of this, we can see, I think, that it is 
eminently sensible for the parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position to accept 
and be motivated by whichever principles of ideal theory we espouse, but also, 
that they should aim to come to an agreement on principles of non-ideal theory 
from the knowledge that many people in the real world will reject their favored 
principles of ideal theory, and indeed, even their principles of non-ideal theory. 
This is the relevant notion of “partial compliance.”  The parties must look to agree 
to  principles  of  non-ideal  theory  in  light  of  the  levels  of  acceptance  and 
motivation they can expect of actual people in the real world.
We can  now make sense  of  precisely  who the  parties  to  the  Non-Ideal 
Original  Position  represent,  and  how.   Intuitively,  each  person  is  under  an 
obligation to support just social conditions.  The fact that the parties to the Non-
Ideal  Original  Position accept,  and are motivated by,  the correct  principles  of 
non-ideal theory means, then, that the parties represent all of us in the actual 
world qua the obligation we are under to support just conditions even though, as 
a matter of fact,  many of us fail  to live up to our obligation to support those 
conditions.   This  point  can  help  us  see  how  what  might  appear  to  be  an 
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incoherence of the Non-Ideal Original Position is not an incoherence at all.  The 
ostensive  incoherence  is  this:  how  can  the  parties  to  the  Non-Ideal  Original 
Position agree to principles of non-ideal theory given their knowledge that, once 
the veil of ignorance is “raised” and they find themselves in society, they might 
reject  the principles agreed to (out of their rejection,  in the real world,  of the 
correct principles of ideal theory)?  The answer to this question is simple.  We are 
trying to arrive at principles specifying what justice requires here and now in the 
real world on the assumption that many people will not live up to the obligation 
they are under to support just conditions.  It is perfectly sensible, then, for the 
parties  to  be  motivated  by  principles  of  ideal  theory  that  they  can  expect 
themselves to reject in the real world.  Their motivation represents the idea that 
they are under an obligation to support just conditions regardless of whether they 
actually live up to that obligation.
This conception of the motivation of the parties sheds some light on how 
the  parties  ought  to  deliberate.    Since  the  parties  to  the  Non-Ideal  Original 
Position are conceived as accepting the correct principles of ideal theory, they 
must be motivated to advance the interests that people in the real world would 
have only  insofar  as  those  interests  are  consonant  with  the  demands of  ideal 
theory.  The parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position, as such, ought to actively 
aim to  thwart  any and all  “unjust”  ends  of  individuals  in  the  real  world  and 
instead aim to advance the interests that “unjust individuals” would have if those 
individuals  did  live  up  to  their  obligation  to  support  just  institutions.   This 
means, in short, that each party to the Non-Ideal Original Position will have to 
reason counterfactually  about individuals in the real world.  They will  have to 
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estimate the interests that the individuals they represent would have if they lived 
up to their obligations to desire just institutions.  The question now, obviously, is: 
how should they do this?
This  brings  us  to  the  question  of  which  sorts  of  transition-costs  and 
benefits, more precisely, the parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position should be 
permitted to aim to advance (from behind their veil of ignorance, consonant with 
their duty to promote conditions of ideal justice).  This is not an easy question to 
settle.  I take it that whichever ideal theory one endorses, one might disagree with 
other proponents of that same theory about which sorts of transition-costs are 
legitimate.  I also take it that we can all agree, however, that there are some such 
legitimate transition-costs.  Most of us do not think that we have an obligation to 
die, or suffer immensely (such as through torture or starvation), so that injustices 
are eliminated – at least not in most cases.    Other sorts of transition-costs  fall 
into a much greyer area, however.  We saw some examples in §2.  Is it permissible 
to prefer a grassroots approach to social change due, for instance, to concerns for 
one’s familial  relationships,  when a grassroots approach might be expected to 
result in social progress occurring more slowly than some other approach?  This 
seems to be something about which different people will disagree.
I  propose,  in response to the uncertainties  and disagreements  we have 
about the legitimacy of different kinds of transition-costs, that we proceed from 
the default stance that all transition-related concerns the parties to the Non-Ideal 
Original  Position might have are legitimate (against  the background, again,  of 
their acceptance of our favored ideal theory, T).  First,  by doing so, we at least 
give  each  such  concern  a  fair  shot  in  the  Non-Ideal  Original  Position’s 
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deliberative  process,  as  opposed  to  preemptively  setting  potentially  relevant 
issues aside at the very outset.  Second, if the principles of Non-Ideal Theory we 
arrive  at  on  the  basis  of  this  assumption  conflict  with  our  considered  moral 
intuitions,  we can always  go back,  revise Non-Ideal  Original  Position,  and try 
again with a different specification (although, as I think we will  soon see, the 
default stance that I am advocating does not lead to principles that offend our 
convictions).
Before moving on, it important to see why Rawlsians utilizing the Non-
Ideal Original Position ought not to conceive the parties to the Non-Ideal Original 
Position as aiming simply to advance their shares of the “primary goods” (basic 
rights  and  liberties,  opportunities,  wealth,  income,  and  social  bases  of  self-
respect)  that  Rawls  has  the  parties  in  his  (ideal)  original  position  deliberate 
about.43  For  Rawls,  it  is  precisely  the  original  position’s  strict-compliance 
assumption  that  makes  it  rational  for  the  parties  to  the  original  position  to 
deliberate on the basis of primary goods.  Since the parties know (1) that the 
primary goods are all-purpose goods for pursuing conceptions of the good, and 
(2) they know, in virtue of the assumption of strict-compliance, that they will not 
undergo any costs in receiving those goods, they can rationally assume (3) that 
they do want more of those goods rather than fewer.  The problem, of course, is 
that once matters of transition are brought into the picture (as they are within 
non-ideal theory), the parties must take seriously the idea that they might have to 
suffer enormous costs in order to enjoy more of a primary good.  We can see how 
this is by referring back to the autobiographical story told by the aforementioned 
43 See Rawls (1971, 1999a): §15.
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Iranian woman.  This woman appears to regard herself as having much to gain in 
a certain process of achieving liberal-democratic rights.  She seems to see a grass-
roots approach as allowing her to maintain a healthy relationship with her father, 
and sees herself as learning and developing as a result of her engagement in the 
social movement.  To simply provide her with more rights and liberties in some 
other way – by, for example, United Nations intervention – might set back these 
interests that she conceives of herself as having.  Thus, there is a sense in which 
basic rights and liberties are not all-purpose goods under conditions of injustice. 
They are not (necessarily) goods for achieving the various transitional goods that 
people can be concerned with.
The parties  to  the  Non-Ideal  Original  Position  must  for  this  reason be 
conceived as abandoning the single-minded concern they had with primary goods 
in Rawls’ (ideal theoretic) original position.  Rawls’ primary goods are to remain 
in the background of their deliberations, to be sure, just insofar as (for reasons 
already  given)  the  parties  have  a  background  desire  to  realize  the  fully  just 
conditions  that  Rawls’  two principles  of  justice  specify  (the  parties  arrived at 
those principles,  after  all,  by deliberating about primary goods).   The point is 
simply that insofar as at this point of their deliberations the parties can clearly 
have diverging interests – in the ideal stage each party had interests in the same 
primary  goods;  at  this  stage  different  persons  may  have  different,  and  even 
opposing,  transition-related  concerns  –  the  parties  can  no  longer  rationally 
regard Rawlsian primary goods as the appropriate basis for their deliberations. 
The question then, obviously, is: on what basis should they deliberate?  The only 
plausible  remaining  answer  would  seem  to  be  the  one  that  Rawls  explicitly 
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introduced primary goods (in his ideal theoretic argument) in order to avoid: the 
actual  interests (informed preferences, perhaps) that the parties can expect to 
have once the veil of ignorance is lifted.44  
Is  this  move away from primary goods problematic?   I  propose, to  the 
contrary,  that it  illuminates an important  difference between ideal  theory and 
non-ideal that Rawls himself appears to recognize.  For although Rawls says that, 
“Justice as fairness rejects the idea of comparing and maximizing overall well-
being in matters of political justice”45, when he discusses the case of slavery (a 
clear case of injustice), he not only says, “I have assumed that it is always those 
with the lesser liberty who must be compensated.  We are always to appraise the 
situation from their point-of-view…”46; he also says, discussing the case of how to 
deal with injustice when those who suffer injustice may be unable to look out for 
their  best  interests,  that,  “Paternalistic  decisions  are  to  be  guided  by  the 
individual’s own settled preferences and interests as far as they are not irrational, 
or failing knowledge of these, by the theory of primary goods.”47  Rawls himself 
seems to recognize, then, that when it comes to non-ideal theory, it is individuals’ 
preferences – at  least  insofar as their preferences are rational  and adequately 
informed – that are the most appropriate measure of interpersonal comparisons. 
The parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position should aim to advance the 
“just interests” of the people they represent, then, where these are understood as 
the  “rational”  and “adequately  informed”  preferences  they would have if  they 
44 See e.g. Rawls (2005): 75, 178-87
45 Rawls (2005): 188
46 Rawls (1999a): 218.
47 Rawls (1999a): 219
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lived up to their obligations to support just institutions (it is surely also the case 
that individuals have preexisting obligations not to act outside of the bounds of 
ordinary morality – such as by committing murder – so there parties will have to 
take into account an additional “moralizing” constraint on their counterfactual 
reasoning as well).  The parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position seem to be in a 
difficult – and indeed, almost impossible – situation, then.  How are they to make 
these sorts of counterfactual estimations?  It might come as a surprise that I do 
not think that we can, nor that we need to, settle this question prior to allowing 
the parties to deliberate to a principle of non-ideal theory.  I think that we should 
recognize – and indeed, that the parties themselves should recognize – that there 
may  be  a  great  amount  of  disagreement  over  the  very  question  of  what 
individuals’ interests would be if those individuals were “rational”, “adequately 
informed”, “moral”, and “lived up to their obligation to desire just institutions.”  I 
think that we can get from these admittedly (and probably inevitably) vague and 
underspecified ideas to a Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory, and then 
see,  in  light  of  these  issues,  precisely  how it  is  that  that  principle  requires  a 
secondary principle to help us resolve these issues downstream, as it were.  Let 
me explain.
§1.4. FROM THE NON-IDEAL ORIGINAL POSITION TO A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF NON-IDEAL THEORY
We now have what I take to be a full specification of the situation of the Non-
Ideal Original Position (as conjoined with whichever ideal theory we like).  The 
parties are to be conceived as aiming to advance the aims they can expect to have, 
once  the  veil  of  ignorance  is  raised,  if  they  were  (i)  rational,  (ii)  adequately 
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informed,  and  (iii)  accepted  the  correct  principles  of  ideal  theory,  (iv)  under 
unjust  conditions.   In  addition,  we  should  also  presumably  add  two  more 
constraints.  First,  the parties should presumably (v) respect any and all moral 
obligations  they  might  have  more  broadly  (according  to  widely  accepted 
standards, such as ordinary prohibitions against murder, theft, deception, etc., 
or, if one believes a particular moral theory, such as Kantianism, Utilitarianism, 
or some form of Virtue Theory, whatever that theory prescribes).  Second, the 
parties  should  also  (vi)  accept  whatever  principles  of  rectification,  or 
compensatory justice, might fall directly out of the ideal theory they accept.48
The  question  now  is  how,  given  all  of  these  features  of  the  Non-Ideal 
Original Position, the parties to ought to deliberate.  Some readers, followers of 
Rawls, might wonder whether, if Rawls’ ideal theory is accepted (for instance), 
48 I have assumed so far that the parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position are to deliberate from 
principles of ideal theory to principles of non-ideal theory.  This leaves out something potentially 
important.   Some ideal  theories,  such as  Robert  Nozick’s  libertarian theory,  include or  entail 
certain principles of rectification or compensation.  So, for instance, as Nozick (1974: 27, 152-3, 
173,  208, 230-1) points out,  his  account  of  natural  rights seems to include a natural  right of 
persons to have past violations of their other rights (e.g., their rights to life, liberty, and property), 
or the past violation of their ancestors’ rights (rights which would be generally respected in the 
sort of “minimal”,  libertarian state Nozick espouses) to be rectified, where this is understood, 
roughly speaking, as either (i) returning to those whose rights have been violated what has been 
taken  from  them  (e.g.  their  property),  or  (ii)  compensating  them  for  things  that  have  been 
unjustly taken but cannot be returned (such as the freedom of lives of ones ancestors if they have 
been enslaved or subject to genocide).  Strictly speaking, such principles are principles of non-
ideal theory.  Still, since they fall out of ideal theory directly, they are not to be arrived at via the 
Non-Ideal Original Position.  In this case, the Non-Ideal Original Position should be understood 
not as establishing all of non-ideal theory, but instead, as filling out the rest of non-ideal theory 
given whatever principles of rectification fall directly out of ideal  theory.  See Roberts’ (2005) 
anthology of several recent papers about rectificatory justice for a survey of some recent thought 
about rectificatory justice.
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the parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position ought to be conceived as reasoning 
according  to the same strategy  that  Rawls  imputes  to  the  parties  to  his  ideal 
theoretic original position: the so-called “maximin” rule, the rule that selects the 
“best  worst”  outcome, or maximizes the standing of the worst  off  in society.49 
There are clear reasons why the parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position should 
not reason according to maximin, however, even if (against Rawls’ many critics) 
we accept Rawls’ use of maximin within ideal theory.  Rawls, for his own part, 
notes that maximin is only rational when three conditions are jointly satisfied: 
namely, when (1) the deliberating party(-ies) are ignorant of probabilities; (2) the 
parties care very much about avoiding a sub-maximin result (a result worse than 
maximin would allow); and (3) the parties do not care very much about achieving 
a result above what maximin assures.50  Conditions (2) and (3) are not satisfied in 
the Non-Ideal Original Position, however.  People who want justice – even people 
who  think  that  an  ideally  just  society  would  conform  to  Rawls’  difference 
principle – can care very much about how quickly such a just result is brought 
about.  So, for instance, suppose, just for the sake of argument, there were two, 
and only two, ways to bring about a society that fully conformed to the difference 
49 Rawls (1999a): 53-6.  Some people evidently think that Rawls only uses maximin to argue for 
his second principle of justice (the difference principle), not both of his principles (at least a few 
readers of this chapter have taken issue with my understanding of Rawls’ use of maximin).  I reply 
that there is clear textual evidence in favor of my interpretation at Rawls (1999a): 135, where 
Rawls says explicitly, of maximin, that,
…this line of thought is practically decisive if we can establish the priority of liberty.  For 
this priority implies that the persons in the original position have no desire to try for greater gains 
at the expense of the basic equal liberties.  The minimum assured by the two principles in lexical 
order is not one that the parties wish to jeopardize for the sake of greater economic and social 
advantages. (Rawls 1999a: 135).
50 Rawls (1999a): 134-5.
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principle  – a  society  in  which  all  inequalities  are  maximally  beneficial  to  the 
worst  off.   According to Scheme #1,  let  us suppose, we achieve this  result  by 
making the worst off even worse off for a short period of time, but that we could 
bring about a society that conformed to the difference principle in two years time. 
On the other hand, Scheme #2 would aim to maximally benefit the worst off at 
every  point  in  time  moving  forward,  a  result  which  would  slow  down  social 
progress so that a society that fully conformed to the difference principle could 
only be brought about after a much longer period (say, fifty years).  The latter 
scheme conforms to a maximin principle of social progress – a maximin principle 
of non-ideal theory.  It is hard to see, however, why the parties to the Non-Ideal 
Original Position should take themselves unequivocally as preferring the scheme 
that that principle entails (Scheme #2) over Scheme #1.  The parties have every 
reason to expect that many of the people they represent – people who desire a 
just society – actually do prefer Scheme #1 to Scheme #2.  The question now is: if 
the  parties  ought  not  to  rationally  deliberate  according  to  maximin,  which 
strategy they should adopt.  I submit that because the parties to the Non-Ideal 
Original Position are,  
(a) Behind a veil of ignorance (preventing them from knowing who they 
are),
(b) Accept whatever principles of ideal theory and rectification we take to 
be correct, but otherwise,
(c) Rationally  want  to  advance  whatever  ends  they  might  have  under 
whatever conditions of injustice are at issue, so long as those ends are 
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rationally  held,  adequately  informed,  and  consistent  with  whatever 
broader moral obligations they might have,
and  there  is  evidently  nothing  more  we  can  say  about  them,  then,  on  the 
assumption  that  the  idea  of  a  “social  preference  ordering”  is  coherent51,  the 
following principle falls out of the Non-Ideal Original Position directly:
The Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory:  For any action A, agent 
B,  and  less-than-fully-just  social  conditions  C  (past  or  present),  social 
justice52 requires B to perform A given C  if and only if,  of all  available 
actions,  B  has  sufficient  reason  to  expect  A  to  best  satisfy  the  social 
preference ordering that would exist if every relevant individual (defined 
relative  to  ideal  theory)  were  (i)  rational,  (ii)  adequately  informed,  (iii) 
endorsed the correct principles of ideal theory (and rectification), but (iv) 
otherwise  desired  to  advance  his/her  transition-related  preferences  (v) 
within the broader constraints of ordinary morality, (vi) given C. 
51 A  social  preference  ordering  is  a  single  ordering  of  preferences,  or  preference-ranking, 
representing the preferences of many individuals considered as an aggregate.  It is supposed to 
represent, so to speak, the “will of the people.”  As we will soon see, there are many questions 
surrounding the idea of such an ordering.  I will discuss these questions momentarily.
52 I want to note here that I am only purporting to establish what social justice requires of us, not 
what our moral duties as persons are simpliciter.  Most of us tend to think that considerations of 
social justice are not the only morally relevant feature of the world.  Intuitively, duties of justice 
may be outweighed by other moral duties or permissions.  I may be under a duty of justice to 
support to elimination of racial discrimination, and yet morality might require me to set aside this 
duty so that I can attend to my personal duty to care for a dying friend.  I cannot purport to settle 
the questions of when or how considerations of justice outweigh other moral considerations.  I 
offer my theory merely as an account of what social  justice requires (in response to injustice), 
leaving it an open question of where social justice figures into the bigger moral picture. 
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This principle is admittedly complex, and raises many difficult questions.  I have 
already mentioned, in introducing the principle itself, the sorts of questions that 
arise concerning the idea of a social preference ordering.  Another set of problems 
pertains to the rest of the Principle’s conditions.  So far I have been treating the 
terms “rational”,  “adequately informed”, and so on, as though these terms are 
clear and unproblematic.   They are neither clear nor unproblematic,  however. 
We will come back to these issues shortly.  For now, I want to draw attention to 
the fact that, however complex and difficult the Principle may be, it embodies a 
fairly simple and, I think, highly plausible idea.  The Principle says simply that a 
just response to injustice is one that advances each person’s “legitimate” interests 
equally, where their legitimate interests are understood as the preferences they 
would have if they were rational, adequately informed, and so on.  This is surely a 
plausible claim.  I suspect, in fact, that most of us already at least tacitly believe 
something very close to it.  Most people who care about overcoming injustices 
quite naturally care about the well-being of persons, at least insofar as the well-
being of persons is consistent with what justice requires.  But now if the Non-
Ideal Original Position leads us to nothing more than this – to nothing more than 
an idea most of us already accepted (at least implicitly) – what good is the Non-
Ideal Original Position, really?  Did we really need it?  Perhaps we could have 
arrived at the Fundamental Principle in some other, more direct, way.   I am not 
sure.  I submit, in any case, that the Non-Ideal Original Position is a useful and 
important way to arrive at the Fundamental Principle for two reasons.  First, it 
illustrates how the Fundamental Principle would be the result of a fair agreement 
among  free  and  rational  persons,  considered  as  equals,  given  plausible 
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antecedent constraints (e.g. of morality and justice) on the ends such persons can 
legitimately pursue.  This is important in that the defining idea of liberal moral 
and political philosophy is that persons must be treated as “free and equal.”  The 
Non-Ideal Original Position shows us precisely how the Fundamental Principle 
can be understood as an agreement among free and equal persons.  Second, it 
shows that any suitably liberal political philosopher, even a Rawlsian (who, as we 
have seen, adopts a “primary goods” metric for social comparisons within ideal 
theory), must adopt a preference-maximization principle within non-ideal theory 
(though,  once  again,  the  particular  kinds  of  preferences  to  be  maximized are 
subject  to  an  important  class  of  constraints).   This  is  important,  obviously, 
insofar  as  many  liberal  moral  and  political  philosophers  (e.g.,  Rawlsians  and 
Nozickeans)  reject  the  idea  of  justice  as  a  matter  of  preference-maximization 
within ideal theory.  The Non-Ideal Original Position shows us that even if we 
accept  some  non-preference-maximizing  ideal  theory,  non-ideal  justice  is  a 
matter of preference-maximization (though, it is important to keep in mind, ideal 
theory can set severe constraints on which kind of preferences are legitimate).
Let us now return to some of the difficulties raised by the Fundamental 
Principle.   One of the Principle’s most central notions – the notion of a social 
preference ordering – raises all kinds of notorious problems.  One problem has to 
do with how to compare the preference orderings of individuals.  People do not 
only order their  preferences,  after  all;  they care about them.  Let me explain. 
Suppose  your  dominant  preference  –  the  preference  highest  in  your  list  of 
preferences  –  is  for  you  to  be  a  professional  baseball  player,  and  that  my 
dominant preference ranking is for me to be a philosopher.  Offhand, it looks like 
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we should assign your dominant preference and my dominant preference equal 
value, whether we are concerned with moral value or perhaps simply individual 
well-being.  Intuitively, however, there is more to the value of preferences than 
this.   I might be a much more driven individual than you.  Even though your 
highest preference is to be a professional baseball player, you might actually care 
about  it  far  less  than  I  care  about  my  highest  ranked  preference  (to  be  a 
philosopher).   This is a simple fact  about people with which we are all  surely 
familiar.  Some people are just generally more apathetic than others.  But now if 
this is the case, how can preference-rankings be an adequate interpersonal metric 
for social comparison?  It would seem that in order to arrive at a truly accurate 
social  preference  ordering  –  one  that  treats  all  persons  equally  (as  the 
Fundamental Principle requires) – we must be able to interpersonally weigh the 
relative  strengths  of  individuals’  preferences.   It  is  not  clear  how  to  do  this, 
however.53  Another  worry  has  to  do  with  composition.   The  fallacy  of 
composition is well-known, after all.  It might well be the case that if we aggregate 
a  bunch  of  individuals’  preference  rankings  into  a  single  social  preference-
ordering,  we  arrive  at  a  preference-ordering  that  is  actually  very  low in  each 
person’s own preference-ordering – a preference-ordering, in other words, that is 
undesirable from every person’s point of view.54  More generally  still,  however 
intuitive  the idea of  a  social  preference  ordering may be – and indeed,  there 
intuitively should be some way to agglomerate the preferences of large numbers 
of  persons  into  a  specification  of  what  is  best  for  the  class  of  individuals 
53 See Gaus (2008): Ch. 5. 
54 Ibid.  
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considered as an aggregate – there is a great deal of philosophical debate over 
whether it can be done at all.  Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is widely agreed to 
demonstrate  that  there  is  no  way  to  transform  the  preference-rankings  of 
individuals into a social preference ordering while at the same time satisfying a 
particular set of highly intuitive criteria.55  Another set of problems concerns the 
Fundamental  Principle’s  other  conditions.   Presently,  we  have  no  real 
specification of what it is for a preference to be rational, adequately informed, or 
consistent with ordinary moral requirements.  One might wonder whether each 
of these terms is hopelessly vague.  They are, at any rate, clearly underspecified.  
We seem to  have  a  lot  more  theoretical  work  to  do,  then,  in  order  to 
provide a  full  defense of  the  Fundamental  Principle.   Unfortunately,  I  cannot 
purport to do this work here.  I do not know how to solve the many problems just 
raised.  The fact that we do not have a full defense of the Fundamental Principle 
is not to say, however, that we lack an adequate argument for it.  One can have an 
adequate argument for a principle even though one lacks solutions to a number of 
problems it raises.  This, I submit, is our situation here.  We do have an adequate 
defense of the Fundamental Principle.  We know that free and equal individuals 
would agree to it from the Non-Ideal Original Position.  We just do not know, as 
of yet, how to resolve many issues that it raises.  The question I want to ask now 
is: can we apply the Fundamental Principle adequately  without resolving all of 
the thorny theoretical questions that surround it?  I will now argue, in Chapter 2, 
that we can.  I will argue that even without compelling theoretical answers to the 
55 Arrow (1950).  For a nice overview of Arrow’s Theorem, as well as some attempts to respond to 
the problem, see Gaus (2008): especially Ch 5.
64
issues  surrounding  the  Fundamental  Principle,  we  can  still  come  to  an 
epistemically  justified  practical principle  –  a  “Principle  of  Application”  –  for 
applying the Fundamental Principle even without adequate theoretical solutions 
to the problems it raises.
§1.5.  CONCLUSION
I have argued that political philosophy presently lacks a fully general non-ideal 
theory of justice; I have argued that most (if not all) philosophers should utilize a 
variation  of  John  Rawls’  famous  original  position  –  a  “Non-Ideal  Original 
Position” – to construct such a theory; I have developed the Non-Ideal Original 
Position; and finally,  I have argued from the Non-Ideal  Original  Position to a 
“Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory,”  recognizing  some  thorny 
theoretical issues that this Principle raises.  My task now will be to argue that 
even  though  I  cannot  purport  to  resolve  those  theoretical  issues,  we  can 
nevertheless  arrive  at  a  practical  principle  for  applying  the  Fundamental 
Principle adequately in the real world.
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CHAPTER 2
 FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF NON-IDEAL THEORY 
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF APPLICATION 
Chapter 1 argued for the following principle:
The Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory:  For any action A, agent 
B,  and  less-than-fully-just  social  conditions  C  (past  or  present),  social 
justice  requires B to perform A given C  if  and only if,  of  all  available 
actions,  B  has  sufficient  reason  to  expect  A  to  best  satisfy  the  social 
preference ordering that would exist if every relevant individual (defined 
relative  to  ideal  theory)  were  (i)  rational,  (ii)  adequately  informed,  (iii) 
endorsed the correct principles of ideal theory (and rectification), but (iv) 
otherwise  desired  to  advance  his/her  transition-related  preferences  (v) 
within the broader constraints of ordinary morality, (vi) given C. 
It was recognized, however, that this principle raises many difficult questions. 
First,  it  is  hard  to  determine  what  any  single  individual  would  prefer  under 
relatively  simple  counterfactual  conditions,  let  alone  what  individuals  would 
prefer  given  the  complex  set  of  counterfactual  conditions  listed  in  the 
Fundamental Principle.  Consider the question of what I would prefer to do today 
if it were rainy rather than sunny.  My answer to this question, offhand, is that I 
am not sure.  A second problem concerns the idea of a social preference ordering. 
A social preference ordering is supposed to represent the preference orderings of 
a large number of individuals considered as a single aggregate – the “will of the 
people,” so to speak.  There are all sorts of serious difficulties with the idea of a 
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social preference ordering, however.  Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is known to 
demonstrate, for example, that no system can transform the ranked preferences 
of  individuals  into  a  single  social  preference  ordering while  at  the  same time 
satisfying  a  set  of  highly  intuitive  criteria.56  A  third  problem  concerns  the 
counterfactual requirements the Fundamental Principle imposes on individuals’ 
preferences: the conditions of “rationality,” “adequate informed-ness”, “broader 
constraints  of  morality,”  and so on.   I  have deliberately  left  all  of  these ideas 
opaque, as there have been longstanding philosophical debates about all of them, 
and I do not wish to hang the non-ideal theory I am defending on any particular 
conceptions of them.  
In an ideal world, I (or someone else) would be able to resolve all of these 
issues decisively.  This is not such a world, however, and for my part I have little 
to say about any of them.  I cannot purport to resolve the problems surrounding 
the notion of a social preference ordering, or provide the definitive account of 
what it is for persons to be rational.  What I hope to show in this chapter, though, 
is  that  we  can  arrive  at  a  practical  principle  –  an  epistemic  principle  –  for 
applying  the  Fundamental  Principle  to  the  real  world  with  confidence,  even 
without  theoretical  solutions  to  the  kinds  of  problems  just  mentioned.   I 
recognize that to some readers this might sound like a fool’s errand.  How could 
we possibly be confident – that is, justifiably confident – that we are applying the 
Fundamental  Principle  correctly  without  knowing  precisely  what  its  main 
components  (the  idea  of  a  social  preference  ordering,  rationality,  adequate 
informed-ness, and so on) amount to?  My basic claim – the fundamental claim 
56 See Arrow (1950), as well as Gaus (2008): Ch. 5.
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upon which this chapter, and all that follows, hangs – is that there is a critical 
difference  between  “knowing”  and  “knowing  precisely.”   I  submit  that  we  all 
know, broadly speaking, what it is for people to be rational, adequately informed, 
and moral.  We use these terms, after all, and make judgments using them, all the 
time in real life.  When we come across individuals or classes of individuals who 
have constructed their views and aims on the basis of faulty information, or on 
the  basis  of  ignoring  relevant  information,  we  judge  them  as  “inadequately 
informed.”  We also have all kinds of ideas about what constraints morality sets 
on behavior.  We may not know precisely what these things are – that is the task 
of philosophers in the longer run – the idea that we do not know what they are, 
broadly speaking, is surely false.  My claim now is that if this is the case – if we 
have an admittedly fallible but nonetheless adequate grasp of the Fundamental 
Principle’s constitutive notions, as I think we do – we can apply the Fundamental 
Principle using the grasp we have of those notions.  That, at any rate, is what I 
shall try to show here.
I  expect  some  of  my  skeptical  readers  to  doubt  the  promise  of  this 
approach.  These readers might think that some, or even all,  of the questions 
surrounding the Fundamental  Principle call  that principle itself  into question. 
So, for example, consider Arrow’s Theorem.  Some readers might take Arrow’s 
theorem as  proving that  there  is  no  such thing as  a  correct  social  preference 
ordering, in which case the Fundamental Principle is defective (and there would 
seem  to  be  no  good  reason  to  even  look  for  a  “good  practical  guide”  to  its 
implementation).   My reply  to  these  skeptical  worries  is  that  a  great  deal  of 
important philosophy is done in the face of similar problems, and that here, as in 
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many areas of philosophy, it is well worthwhile to develop and construct theories 
even when serious problems arise at a fundamental level.  Fundamental problems 
arise, after all, literally everywhere in philosophy.  Consider epistemology.  Few 
epistemologists  believe  that  the  problem of  skepticism regarding  the  external 
world has been adequately resolved (do we really know that we are not in “the 
Matrix”?)57, or that a fully adequate analysis of the nature of knowledge has been 
given.  At one time it was widely agreed that “knowledge is justified true belief.” 
Then Gettier came along, disproving that analysis, and debates about the nature 
of  knowledge  have again  raged  ever  since.58  Or  consider  metaphysics,  where 
there is a lack of consensus about the nature of many, and probably most, of the 
most important aspects of reality, such as the nature of causation.59  We do not 
generally take these kinds of problems as fatal to philosophical theorizing.  We 
may not know precisely what knowledge or causation are, or be able to establish 
once and for all that we know that the external world exists, and yet we move 
forward.  We develop theories on the assumption that we have knowledge, and on 
the assumption that causation exists, and so on, because it is really the only good 
option.  The only other options would be to give up theorizing altogether, or else 
focus  exclusively  on  the  fundamental  problems  until  (we  hope)  we  arrive  at 
solutions that satisfy us.  Neither of these options is attractive, however.  It is well 
worth investigating what philosophy can tell  us  on the assumption that things 
57 See  the  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy’s  entry  entitled,  “Skepticism”,  at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/
58 See  Gettier  (1963).   Cf.  the  Stanford Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy’s  entry,  “The  Analysis  of 
Knowledge”, at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/
59 See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry, “The Metaphysics of Causation”, at http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/
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like knowledge and causation exist.  By a similar token, I submit, it is well worth 
investigating what political philosophy can tell us on the assumption that there 
are such things as a correct social preference ordering, and so on.  
This chapter argues, at any rate,  that the following principle is the best 
available  epistemic  indicator  of  what  the  Fundamental  Principle  requires  (i.e. 
given our admittedly vague and infirm philosophical grasp of the Fundamental 
Principle’s constitutive components):
The Principle of Application:  For any action A, agent B, and less-than-
fully-just conditions C, we should tailor our confidence that social justice 
requires B to perform A in direct proportion to the extent to which we can 
expect B’s performance of A to either
(i)  Best  advance the overall  aims of whichever reformist group – 
past,  present,  or  hypothetical  --  best  satisfies  the  following 
desiderata:
a. Its  members  (at  least  tacitly)  pursue  correct,  and 
relevant,  principles  of  ideal  theory,  rectification,  and 
morality;
b. Its members are voluntary participants;
c. Its  leadership  is  equally  responsive  to  each  of  its 
members’ interests;
d. It has more members than rival reformist groups;
e. Its leadership and members are rational and adequately 
informed; and
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f. Its membership is more similar to the complete class of 
individuals  who  suffer  C’s  injustice(s)  than  any  other 
group;
Or, if more than one reformist group appears to satisfy these desiderata 
roughly equally well, 
(ii) Best advance a fair compromise between the overall aims of the 
reformist groups in question.
Let me say a few things about this principle.  It is important, first, to get clear on 
the notion of a “reformist group.”  A reformist group, as I wish to understand it, is 
any class of persons who, as a collective, display some interest in eliminating or 
rectifying  whatever  injustices  obtain,  as  specified  relative  to  whichever  ideal 
theory (and theory of rectification) we, as theorists, take to be correct.  As we will 
see later, a number of potential objections to the Principle of Application, as well 
as misuses of it,  can result from a failure to attend to this definition.  Indeed, 
there are two ideas readers must keep in mind.  The first idea is that reformist 
groups are not to be understood narrowly as dissident groups within particular 
societies  (such  as  the  NAACP  in  the  United  States  or  women’s  groups  in 
patriarchal societies).  Though I do consider these classes of individuals reformist 
groups,  much larger  institutions,  such as  entire  nations  or  even international 
institutions such as the United Nations, can also qualify, depending on whether 
(by  reference  to  ideal  theory)  the  classes  of  individuals  who  compose  those 
groups display an interest in eliminating or rectifying injustices (as they often 
do).  It is also absolutely critical to keep in mind that whether a particular group 
counts as a reformist  group will  depend upon the ideal  theory (and theory of 
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rectification) we endorse as theorists.  Suppose, for example, we came to accept 
some sort of libertarian political theory, such as the theory that Robert Nozick 
defended in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.  According to Nozick’s theory, all people 
have certain natural moral rights that no individual or institution can legitimately 
violate.  On my account, if we adopt this theory, a group will count as a reformist 
group only if group displays an interest in justice that is consistent with Nozick’s 
conception of rights.  Accordingly, all  sorts of groups that we might ordinarily 
refer to as reformist groups – groups, once again, such as the NAACP – might not 
be  rightly  thought  of  as  reformist  groups,  at  least  so  far  as  the  Principle  of 
Application is concerned.  
I want to draw readers’ attention now to another critical idea: namely, that 
I  have  intentionally  set  up  the  Principle  of  Application  so  that  it  is  not an 
algorithm, or a principle that will always drive us, like a mathematical formula, to 
definitive conclusions about what justice requires.  It should be clear, even at first 
glance,  that  Principle  of  Application  requires  the  use  of  judgment,  and  even 
debate.   The  question  of  which  reformist  group  best  satisfy  the  Principle  of 
Application’s desiderata in any particular case may not be an easy question to 
answer.  People may in fact disagree about, and debate, these issues.  I do not 
think, however, that this is a failure of the Principle.  Far from it.  I propose that 
when it  comes to  the  question of  how to  deal  with  injustices,  an algorithmic 
principle is exactly what we should  not expect.   The real world is, after all,  an 
incredibly  complex  place,  and  the  best  we  can  do  in  light  of  all  of  the 
aforementioned complexities that surround the Fundamental Principle of Non-
Ideal Theory, I think, is to arrive at a principle to focus further debate.  This, I 
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propose,  is  what  the  Principle  of  Application  accomplishes.   It  may not  solve 
every  problem.   It  does,  however,  distinguish  which  issues  are  relevant  from 
those that are not.  It tells us that in order to determine what justice requires, the 
aims of reformist groups are relevant; other things are not.  Our job is then to 
debate which reformist group, if any, best satisfies the Principle of Application’s 
desiderata.
Let me now, finally, describe how this chapter will proceed.  §1 argues that 
the Principle of Application is prima facie plausible by showing that, as a matter 
of fact,  something very close to it actually underlies the judgments we tend to 
make about particular cases of injustices, at least when we are thinking about 
those cases carefully.  §2 then aims to defuse a few initial worries some readers 
might have about the Principle of Application.  §3 aims to show, in detail, how the 
Principle of Application is our best epistemic guide to estimating whether any 
particular  action  satisfies  the  Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory. 
Finally, §4 applies the Principle of Application to an important real world case: 
the case of whether the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2002 was just or 
unjust.  As we will see, there are two reasons for discussing this case.  First, we 
will  see  that  the  analysis  of  the  case  we  get  by  applying  the  Principle  of 
Application is plausible as well as illuminating.  Second, the case enables us to 
clear up some further possible misconceptions about the Principle itself.
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§2.1. A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF APPLICATION: CONFORMITY WITH CONSIDERED MORAL 
JUDGMENTS
It is  a common practice in moral and political  philosophy to test our theories 
against “our considered moral judgments”, such as our judgments that lying and 
stealing are morally  wrong, business monopolies are unjust,  and so on.60  We 
would  hardly  accept  a  moral  theory  that  entailed  that  lying  and  stealing  are 
morally right, for example.  Much of moral and political philosophy, in fact, goes 
much further  than  this,  assigning  some justificatory  status  to  our  considered 
judgments and intuitions about particular cases.  Of course it is widely recognized 
that  we  should  not  treat  our  moral  intuitions,  even  our  strongest  ones,  as 
sacrosanct.  We take challenges to morality seriously.  Many of us still worry a 
great deal about the “immoralist challenge” that Plato spent much of his Republic 
responding to over two-thousand years ago.  We wonder how it can be true that 
we ought not to steal,  or lie,  if  (as  seems plausible)  there are times when we 
would be better off doing those things.
I do not want to adopt any strong views about the justificatory power (or 
lack thereof) of our moral intuitions.  I want instead to adopt what I take to be an 
uncontroversial idea: namely, that coherence with our moral intuitions is at least 
some  reason  to  take  a  moral  principle  or  theory  seriously.   The  fact  that 
something coheres with what we already believe is, after all, an indication that 
that thing “fits” with things that we already take ourselves to have good reason to 
believe.  In any case, I want to show how the Principle of Application coheres 
60Rachels’ (2007) introductory text to moral philosophy and Kymlicka’s (2002) introductory text 
to political philosophy demonstrate the ubiquity of this approach in both fields, respectively.
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with our considered moral judgments.  My hope is that this will warm my readers 
to the Principle and pave the way for the full argument that I will give for the 
Principle in §3.
§2.1.1. Case #1: The Montgomery Bus Boycott
Consider the Montgomery Bus Boycott – a boycott organized by the NAACP and 
Montgomery Improvement Association  (MIA) to  protest  racial  segregation  on 
public transportation that occurred from December 1955 to December 1956 in 
Montgomery, Alabama.  Was the Boycott a just response to the injustices that 
blacks faced in Montgomery (and America in general) at the time?  I assume that 
most of us have the strong moral conviction that it was.  The question, though, is 
why we think it was just.  The Boycott imposed all kinds of costs on people.  It 
required  many  blacks  to  forego  their  only  method  of  transportation,  leading 
many of them to walk to and from work in the long, hot, and humid Alabama 
summer.61  Many participants (as well as blacks more generally) were threatened 
or physically attacked, and surely had to lead their daily lives under conditions of 
severe stress.62  The houses of several black leaders and citizens were bombed, 
and snipers even shot at buses once the boycott was over and blacks began to ride 
the buses again.63  
61 See http://www.montgomeryboycott.com/article_overview.htm.  See also, 
http://www.worldbook.com/wb/Students?
content_spotlight/climates/north_american_climate_alabama.




Consider, moreover, the many abuses that participants in the American 
Civil Rights Movement faced more generally.  Southern blacks who registered to 
vote were harassed, beaten, and in some cases even killed.  In 1963, the NAACP’s 
Medgar Evers was shot and killed in front of his wife and children in Jackson, 
Mississippi; Reverend George Lee of Belzoni Mississippi was murdered after he 
refused  to  remove  his  name from a  list  of  registered  voters;  three  “Freedom 
Summer”  field-workers  (Michael  Schwerner,  James  Chaney,  and  Albert 
Goodman) were shot and killed for helping Mississippi blacks register to vote; 
and so on.64  Whites also resorted to economic warfare, cutting off federal food 
relief  to blacks  in the poorest  counties  of Mississippi,  and by refusing to give 
blacks credit at local banks.65  The “Freedom Riders” who rode Greyhound Buses 
between states to test the Supreme Court’s ruling banning racial discrimination 
and interstate travel were often attacked at bus terminals by angry mobs armed 
with lead pipes, baseball bats, bicycle chains, thanks in part to the conspicuous 
absence of local police.66  I could go on.
One natural  thought is  that the Montgomery Bus Boycott,  the Freedom 
Rides, demonstrations, and other actions to protest racial inequalities were just 
for  the  simple  reason that  they were  attempts  to  eliminate  real  injustices.   A 
natural thought is that they were just because they were ultimately successful. 
Public pressure in response to the Montgomery Bus Boycott ultimately led, after 






But are either of  these explanations  the best  account  of  why we consider the 
tactics of the American Civil Rights Movement to be just?  I think not.  I think 
that we judge the Montgomery Bus Boycott  and other such actions to be just 
because they were conscientious responses to injustice chosen by the oppressed 
themselves.  Let me explain.
§2.1.2. Case #2: What if Things Had Gone Differently?
Suppose things had been even worse than they actually were in 1955.  Suppose 
that the situation was so perilous for blacks that during meetings of the NAACP 
and the MIA, the members of those organizations came to reject the idea of the 
boycott.   Suppose furthermore, to be more specific,  that although most of the 
attendees at these meetings believed that a boycott would successfully promote 
racial  desegregation  in  the  longer  run,  a  number  of  particularly  persuasive 
attendees at the meetings convinced a majority of the other attendees that the 
costs that a boycott would impose on blacks – probably riots, lynchings, and so 
on – were far too great.  Suppose, accordingly, that a majority of attendees at the 
meetings came to hold the view that it would be better, all things considered, for 
progress toward the end of racial desegregation to proceed  in a more measured 
way (a way that would avoid riots, minimize lynchings, and so on).
Suppose that in some such way the NAACP and MIA both came to reject 
the  idea  of  the  boycott  and  decided  against  petitioning  federal  courts  for 
intervention.  Would this a just response to the racial injustices that blacks faced? 
It seems clear to me that it would be.  In this case, we have (1) two groups, the 
NAACP and MIA, which seem to represent the overall interests of the oppressed; 
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and (2) agreement within each of those groups that the costs that a boycott or 
judicial intervention would impose on their people are not worth the benefits, all-
things-considered.
I recognize that it  is  not exactly  natural  to think that it  is  ever just for 
“justice to be delayed” due to the costs that progress would impose on people. 
Still, this seems to me to precisely the sort of example where this is plausibly the 
case.  It seems to me that if the very people who have the most to gain from the 
elimination of injustice reject a means for doing so because they are unwilling to 
bear the particular costs associated with that means, we have reason to think that 
that means, however efficient it may be, is not in the best interests of the very 
people (the oppressed) whose interests we have reason to care about the most.
§2.1.3. Case #3: Reformist Groups at Cross-Purposes
Now consider a case in which there are different classes of oppressed individuals: 
an oppressed racial  minority on the one hand, and an oppressed gender (e.g. 
women) on the other hand.  It is likely that the reformist groups that advocate in 
favor of each of these classes might stand in the other group’s way.  Consider, for 
example, a policy to achieve equal voting rights for women in the society.  The 
oppressed racial minority might worry, not unreasonably, that if women in their 
society achieved equal voting rights, it might make it more difficult for that racial 
minority to overcome the injustices they face.  Suppose, for example, that equal 
voting  rights  for  women  might  lead  to  a  strong  reaction  on  behalf  of  the 
oppressing class in the society (e.g. white males), such as a movement in favor of 
a  constitutional  amendment  prohibiting  equal  voting  rights  for  the  racial 
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minority.  In this case, justice for women might be achieved at the cost of greater 
injustice for the racial minority.  
What  are  our  intuitions  about  this  case?   For  my  part,  I  think  our 
intuitions are fairly clear.  I think we can agree that if there are multiple classes of 
oppressed persons, then the most just thing to do is to advance the interests of all 
of those classes equally.  Now, as a matter of fact, in the real world it might often 
turn out that we do not have many choices.  It might not be possible, for instance, 
to achieve equal voting rights for women and a racial minority at the same time. 
It will probably often be the case, moreover, that advancement of the rights of 
one group (equal voting rights for women) will promote the advancement of the 
rights of the other group.  Social progress often does build upon itself, after all. 
Once it is seen that men and women should be treated equally, the logical next 
step (one that has been historically realized!) is for different races to be treated 
equally as well.  Still, I take it that when we do have realistic options to advance 
the interests of both groups, justice prohibits us from arbitrarily privileging one 
group over the other.  If there are two oppressed groups in a society – women, on 
the one hand, and a racial  minority on the other – then surely the most just 
response  to  injustice  is  one  that  embodies  a  fair  compromise  between  the 
interests of these groups (if and when their interests conflict).
§2.1.4. Analysis of the Test Cases: Conformity With the Principle of Application
The three cases just discussed indicate that the justice of a particular response to 
injustice is not a simple matter of whether the response is effective in eliminating 
or rectifying the injustice.  It matters a great deal whether the particular response 
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is one that is chosen by, or at least endorsed by, reformist groups.  And indeed, I 
think we see that our reasoning in these cases corresponds quite closely to the 
Principle of Application.
Recall  that  according  to  the  Principle  of  Application,  we are  to  pursue 
whatever action (under conditions C) we have reason to take to advance the aims 
(or compromise among the aims) of whichever reformist group(s), past, present, 
or hypothetical,  we have sufficient reason to take to best  satisfy  the following 
desiderata:
a. Its members (at least tacitly) pursue correct and relevant 
principles of ideal theory, rectification and morality;
b. Its members are voluntary participants;
c. Its  leadership  is  equally  responsive  to  each  of  its 
members’ interests;
d. It has more members than rival reformist groups;
e. Its leadership and members are rational and adequately 
informed; and
f. Its membership is more similar to the complete class of 
individuals  who  suffer  C’s  injustice(s)  than  any  other 
such group.
When we look at Cases 1-3, it is evident that all of the groups are pursuing correct 
principles of ideal theory (qua desideratum (a)).  In Cases 1-3, the NAACP and 
MIA are both seen to be advocating in favor of racial equality; and in Case 3 the 
women’s groups were said to advocate in favor of equal rights for women.  The 
fact  that  these  groups  advocate  in  favor  of  the  correct  principles  of  justice  is 
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clearly  important.   We would be much less  confident that  it  would be just  to 
pursue the aims of a reformist group, such as the Nation of Islam, that we take to 
endorse  false  principles  of  ideal  theory  (the  Nation  of  Islam  endorses  a 
prohibition against interracial mixing and marriage).
It is also intuitively important that a reformist group satisfy the Principle 
of Application’s other desiderata.   We would be less and less confident of the 
justice of pursuing the aims of a reformist group to the extent that that reformist 
group consisted of people coerced into participating (contra desideratum (b)), to 
the  extent  that  we  suspected  its  leadership  of  ignoring  its  members’  wishes 
(contra desideratum (c)), to the extent that the group had fewer members than 
rival  reformist  groups  pursuing similar  ends  (contra  desideratum (d)),  to  the 
extent that we suspect its leadership of being irrational or inadequately informed 
(contra  desideratum  (e));  and  so  on.   Each  of  the  Principle  of  Application’s 
desiderata intuitively speak to the question of how well that group functions as an 
indication of what justice requires.
So, for example, let us compare the NAACP to the Nation of Islam.  We 
have already seen that we seem to have reason to prefer the NAACP’s aims simply 
insofar  as  it  endorsed racial  equality,  whereas  the  Nation  of  Islam wanted to 
prohibit  racial  mixing  and  marriage.   The  NAACP  also  seems  to  clearly 
outperform  the  Nation  of  Islam  on  many  of  the  Principle  of  Application’s 
desiderata  as  well.   The  NAACP  has  always  enjoyed  much  greater  popular 
support among the oppressed than the Nation of Islam did (desideratum (c)) – 
something which would seem to support the proposition that the NAACP does a 
better job of representing the interests of more blacks than the Nation of Islam; 
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the NAACP’s was much more representative of the oppressed population as a 
whole  in  terms of  its  composition  (desideratum  (f)).   The  Nation  of  Islam is 
explicit  that  its aims are to advance the interests  of black Muslims,  not black 
Americans or blacks generally.68  But of course it was not only black Muslims who 
were  subject  to  discriminatory  laws  in  the  American  South.   In  1955,  black 
individuals  in the South suffered the effects  of  unjust  laws regardless  of their 
religious creed.  A group that represented the interests of black individuals as 
such, then, would surely better represent the interests of the oppressed than the 
Nation of Islam.  And of course this is another count on which the NAACP seems 
to fare far better.  Although many aspects of the Montgomery Bus Boycott were 
planned by ministers and meetings were held at Baptist churches69, the aim of the 
boycott was clearly achieve conditions of racial equality.
Our  considered  convictions  in  the  test  cases  appear  to  conform to  the 
Principle of Application.  We have seen that in all three test cases, we really do 
think that  social  progress  should conform to  the  aims of  whichever  reformist 
group best  satisfies  the Principle  of  Application’s  desiderata.   If  the reformist 
group that best satisfies those desiderata decides to organize a bus boycott, then 
we judge the boycott to be a just response to injustice.  If, on the other hand, that 
group decides not to organize a boycott, then we judge that decision to be a just 
response to injustice.   And so on.   In each of  the cases  discussed so far,  our 




really  do  seem  to  embody  a  sort  of  tacit  acceptance  of  the  Principle  of 
Application.
§2.1.5. Two Harder Test Cases
The test cases that we have discussed so far are relatively “easy” cases.  Boycotts 
and  decisions  to  petition  federal  courts  are  one  thing.   Some  readers  might 
wonder whether our considered convictions about more difficult cases – such as, 
for example, the question of whether a decision to wage war is a just response to 
injustice  –  involve  the  same  kind  of  tacit  acceptance  of  the  Principle  of 
Application.  I want, therefore, to consider two additional test cases: the case of 
the  American  Revolutionary  War  against  the  British,  and  the  decision by  the 
United States and a coalition of other nations to invade the nation of Iraq in 
2003.  I believe we will see that the considered convictions that many (though 
perhaps not all) of us have about these cases correspond directly to the Principle 
of Application.
§2.1.5.a. Case #4: The American Revolution
Historians  have  estimated  that  approximately  40-45%  of  American  colonists 
actively supported the Colonies’  rebellion against  the British government, that 
15-20%  were  British  Loyalists  who  wanted  to  reconcile  with  the  British 
Government,  and  35-40%  of  American  colonists  were  “neutral”  between 
supporting  the  rebellion  or  supporting  some  sort  of  reconciliation.70  Similar 
diversity of opinion was evident in the Continental Congress, the political body in 
70 See Calhoon (2003): 245.
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the American colonies that debated the question of rebellion, sent entreaties to 
the  British  Crown to  protest  various  injustices,  and eventually  authorized  the 
formation of the Continental Army and war against the British.71  Some members 
of the Congress (e.g. Joseph Galloway and John Jay) wanted to keep the Colonies 
in  the  British  Empire72,  others  (such  as  John  Dickinson)  wanted  to  avoid 
bloodshed73,  whereas others (such as John Adams and Patrick Henry) thought 
war to be necessary and inevitable.74
This suggests that there were two, or perhaps three, reformist groups in 
the American colonies in the time leading up to and including the Revolutionary 
War.  It is not obvious that the British Loyalists should be considered a reformist 
group at all,  since they were apparently content to live with the injustices the 
British Crown visited upon the Colonies.  In any case, however – whether or not 
we consider the British Loyalists reformers – we can say that there were more or 
less two kinds of people: (1) those who supported war against the British, and (2) 
those  who  wanted  to  avoid  war  (for  one  reason  or  another).   Eventually,  of 
course, the pro-war group “won out”, and there was unanimous agreement upon 
the Declaration of Independence, which asserted the right of the American people 
to dissolve its ties with Britain by force. 
Let us ask ourselves now what our considered moral convictions about the 
Revolutionary War are.  It is widely thought, of course, that the Revolution was 
just.  What made it just, however?  Was it simply that the American people had a 
71 Greene (1922): 434.
72 Ibid.
73 See Ferling (2003).
74 Ibid.
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right to secession from the British Empire?  For my part, I think it was something 
more.   For  suppose  there  had  been  no  agreement  on  the  Declaration  of 
Independence.   Would  it  have  been  just  for  the  pro-war  faction  to  visit  the 
horrors of war on the anti-war factions without such an agreement?  I think we 
can  agree  that  it  is  doubtful.   The  fact  the  leaders  of  the  American  Colonies 
eventually came to an agreement on the justification of war is what made the war 
just.
But now if this is true, then it seems that our considered convictions about 
the justice of the American Revolution do indeed (at least tacitly) conform to the 
Principle of Application.  In this case, as in the previous cases, we see that our 
confidence about the justice of a particular response to injustice (the injustice 
here of the British rule) corresponds directly in proportion to our confidence that 
that response would advance the overall aims of that reformist group that best 
satisfies a certain class of desiderata.
§2.1.5.b. Case #5: The 2003 Invasion of Iraq
Let us now consider a more contentious and complex case: the case of the United 
States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Although this is a contentious case, I think 
that common doubts regarding the justice of the invasion and occupation can be 
found in the Principle of Application.  Why is it, after all, that many of us doubt 
the justice of the invasion and occupation of Iraq?  I think we can trace many of 
our doubts to two facts: namely, (1) the fact that the Iraqi people did not request 
military intervention, and (2) the fact that a vast majority of the international 
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community opposed the invasion at the time it occurred.75  Let me explain why, 
by reference to the Principle of Application, these two facts do indeed constitute 
reasons to doubt the justice of the invasion.
The United States government has attempted to justify the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq on many grounds.  The two primary grounds, however, were 
(1)  the  military  threat  Iraq  was  thought  to  pose  to  the  United  States  and 
international  community,  and  (2)  Iraq’s  “brutal  repression  of  its  civilian 
population.”76  Let us utilize the Principle of Application to evaluate the justice of 
both of these purported justifications.  
The Principle of Application tells  us that we should pursue the aims of 
whichever reformist group best satisfies the following class of desiderata:
a. The group’s members at least tacitly pursue correct and 
relevant  principles  of  ideal  theory,  rectification,  and 
morality;
b. Its members are voluntary participants;
75 The  failure  of  the  United  States  and  its  allies  to  gain  broad  international  support  for  the 
invasion (and continued occupation of Iraq), and indeed, its failure to gain the support of the 
Iraqi  people  have been  two of  the  most  common criticisms  of  the  invasion  (and occupation, 
respectively).  The United Nations and international community were, of course, concerned with 
the possible threat posed by Iraq.  At the time of the U.S.-led invasion, however, the U.N. had 
approved  Resolution  1441,  giving  Iraq  “a  final  opportunity  to  comply  with  its  disarmament 
obligations.”  The U.S.-led invasion did not allow Iraq this opportunity.  U.N weapons inspectors 
had  found  no  evidence  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  in  Iraq,  and  claimed  that  several 
additional months of inspections would be able to resolve the question of whether such weapons 
existed.  See also Blix (1999), as well as “Hans Blix’s Briefing to the Security Council”, which can 
be found at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/14/iraq.unitednations1. 
76 The Iraq War Resolution can be found at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ243.107.
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c. It has more members than rival groups;
d. Its  leadership  is  equally  responsive  to  each  of  its 
members’ interests;
e. Its leadership and members are rational and adequately 
informed; and
f. Its membership is more similar to the complete class of 
individuals  who  suffer  the  injustice  aiming  to  be 
overcome or rectified than any rival group.
Let  us consider how well  various candidate  reformist  groups could be said to 
satisfy these desiderata.  The United States and its pro-invasion allies could be 
considered one such group,  seeing as they (correctly)  perceived Iraq to be an 
unjust regime, one that was widely believed to pose a serious international threat. 
On the flip side, the United Nations and international community more generally 
could also be considered reformist groups as well.  These latter two groups had, 
of course, very different attitudes toward the justice of the Iraq invasion than the 
former.  Survey results just prior to the invasion showed that while a full 73% of 
American  citizens  supported  the  invasion,  a  majority  of  citizens  in  41  other 
nations did not support an invasion without U.N. approval, and approximately 
half  of  the  world’s  population  as  a  whole  opposed  invasion  under  any 
circumstances.77  There  were,  then,  to  put  it  roughly,  broadly  two  reformist 
groups  prior  to  the  invasion,  each  of  which  had  approximately  opposite 
viewpoints about the justice of an invasion: the United States and its allies, which 
77 Gallup International Poll 2003, http://www.gallup-international.com/download/GIA%20press
%20release%20Iraq%20Survey%202003.pdf
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supported the invasion, and the United Nations and international community, on 
the other hand, which did not.78
Let us now compare these two groups – call them the “pro-invasion” and 
“anti-invasion” groups – with respect to the Principle of Application.  Begin with 
desideratum  (a):  the  “correct  principles  of  ideal  theory  and  morality” 
desideratum.The United Nations and international community clearly satisfied 
this desiderata better than the United States or the other invading forces.  The 
primary  justification  the  U.S.  gave  for  invading Iraq  was  the  threat  that  Iraq 
supposedly posed to the U.S. and the international community,79 as well as wars 
to liberate oppressed populations, are not only both prohibited by international 
78 Some readers might wonder whether we should consider the member nations of the U.N. and 
the international community to be two different candidate groups, not one.  Strictly speaking, this 
is correct.  All the same, I think that for the sake of our discussion we can consider them both as a 
single group.  One nice thing about the Principle of Application is that we do not always need to 
pare  down the number  of  candidate  reformist  groups and evaluate each  of  them against  one 
another with respect to the Principle’s desiderata.  If we know that a number of candidate groups 
(such as the member nations of the U.N., on the one hand, and the international community as a 
whole, on the other) both support some policy P, and both of those groups fare better with respect 
to the Principle of Application’s desiderata than every candidate group that prefers ~P, we do not 
need to determine which of the groups that support P, at the end of the day, satisfy the Principle 
of Application’s desiderata the best – for we already know (without comparing those groups) that 
whichever group performs the best, that group prefers P to~P.  We can therefore often simplify 
our inquiries by considering two or more groups that agree with one another policy-wise (in this 
case, the U.N. and international community more generally) as constituting a single groups.
79 See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html, “Saddam Can Rule if He 
Complies: Bush” at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_23-10-2002_pg4_1, 
as well as 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020924/debtext/20924-05.htm, 
where British Prime Minister Tony Blair said, “Regime change in Iraq would be a wonderful 
thing. That is not the purpose of our action; our purpose is to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction.”
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law80; they are also categorized as unjust by most modern just war theorists81, and 
were  evidently  regarded  as  illegitimate.   Then  consider  desideratum  (e):  the 
“rational  and  adequately  informed”  desideratum.   It  is  now  known,  and  was 
suspected  by  many  prior  to  the  invasion,  that  the  United  States’  intelligence 
“proving” the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was incorrect, and 
indeed, was tainted by a bias in favor of building a case in favor of invasion – a 
bias  that  ignored  disconfirming  evidence.82  In  contrast,  the  U.N.  and 
international community as a whole, both of which favored continued weapons 
inspections  to  discover  the  truth,  seem  to  have  been  clearly  committed  to 
obtaining more adequate information, and to considering the evidence in a cool, 
rational (as opposed to out of a bias in favor of war) than the U.S..  Now consider 
desideratum  (f):  the  desideratum  which  instructs  us  to  consult  the  reformist 
group that  is  most  similar  overall  to  the entire class  of  individuals  subject  to 
injustice.  Here again, the international community and U.N. both fare far better 
than  the  United  States  and  supporters  of  the  war.   If  Iraq  was  ever  an 
80 See the U.N. Charter (www.un.org/aboutun/charter/).  For a brief analysis of the U.N. Charter 
applied to the Iraq war, see www.worldpress.org/specials/iraq/.
81 See  §2.1  of  the  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy’s  entry  on  “War”  at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/.
82 See  the  Downing  Street  Memo  (sometimes  referred  to  as  the  “smoking  gun  memo”), 
www.downingstreetmemo.com/docs/memotext.pdf,  a  note  from  a  secret  meeting  of  senior 
United Kingdom government at the personal residence of British Prime Minister Tony Blair (at 10 
Downing Street) which records the head of the British intelligence agency, MI6, asserting that, 
“Bush  wanted  to  remove  Saddam,  through  military  action,  justified  by  the  conjunction  of 
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”  The 
memo also quotes British Foreign Secretary Jack Shaw stating that Bush had “made up his mind” 
to take military action even though “the case was thin,” as well as British Attorney General Lord 
Goldsmith warning that it would be difficult to justify invading Iraq on legal grounds.
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international threat at all, it was not just a threat to the United States but to the 
international community as a whole.  Second, there is little (if any) evidence in 
the  history  of  international  affairs  of  oppressed  groups  preferring  to  be 
“liberated”  from  oppressive  governments  by  military  force.   Then  consider 
desideratum (c): the desideratum which instruct us to defer to larger reformist 
groups over smaller ones (all things being equal)?  Here again the international 
community  and  U.N.  both  fare  far  better  than  the  United  States  and  other 
supporters of the invasion.  The international community and U.N. both include a 
wide variety of nations, whereas the forces that supported the Iraq invasion were 
far fewer in number.  
I  believe  we  can  see  here,  yet  again,  that  the  Principle  of  Application 
accounts for and explains some of the judgments we make.  I think that many of 
us who judged the war to be unjust from the start believed the war to be unjust 
largely,  if  not  entirely,  because  we  believed  that  the  U.N.  and  international 
community as a whole – both of which opposed the invasion – were, for all of the 
reasons just mentioned, in a much better position to appreciate the legitimate 
interests of all.  Many of us who doubted the justice of the war, or who believed 
from the outset that it was deeply unjust, doubted whether the U.S. was pursuing 
correct and relevant principles of justice (qua desideratum (a); whether the U.S. 
was  acting  rationally,  as  opposed  to  in  a  reactionary  manner  to  the  terrorist 
events  that  occurred  on  9/11/2001,  and  whether  the  U.S.  was  adequately 
informed (qua desideratum (e)); whether the U.S.’s  near-unilateral  decision to 
invade Iraq (with a relatively  small  “coalition of the willing”)  was appropriate 
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given the existence of particularly large an diverse international community that 
opposed the invasion (qua desiderata (c) and (f)); and so on.  
§2.1.6. Conclusion
We have seen in this section that the Principle of Application accounts for and 
explains the considered moral convictions, as well  as doubts, we have about a 
variety test-cases.  The question now is whether a deeper philosophical argument 
can be made for the Principle.  Before we investigate that question, however, I 
want to consider some possible worries about the Principle.
§2.2. DEFUSING SOME INITIAL WORRIES
I expect readers to have a few worries about the Principle of Application, worries 
that are worth addressing before moving on to the full argument for the Principle.
§2.2.1. Reformist Group Bias
One worry about the Principle of Application has to do with its focus on reformist 
groups, particularly (following desideratum (f)) its focus on reformist groups that 
are the most similar in composition to the complete class of persons who suffer 
from whatever injustices are at issue.  Recall that the Fundamental Principle of 
Non-Ideal  Theory requires  us to  aim to satisfy  the  social  preference  ordering 
composed of the preferences that all persons in the relevant domain (society or 
world) would have if each person were rational, adequately informed, accepted 
the correct principles of ideal theory and rectification, and so on.  The worry here 
is  that  reformist  groups,  particularly  those  that  are  the  most  similar  in 
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composition to the complete class  of  individuals  who suffer  injustice,  will  not 
represent very well  (or even adequately)  the preferences that persons in other 
classes would have if those individuals were rational, adequately informed, and 
so on.  Let me explain what I mean with an illustration.
Consider once again the American Civil Rights Movement.  According to 
the Principle of Application, we ought to aim to advance the aims of reformist 
groups such as the NAACP.  How responsive, however, can we expect the NAACP 
to be to the legitimate interests of white males?  Offhand, the NAACP would seem 
clearly the most responsive to the interests of blacks, not whites.  Yet, the worry 
goes, it surely the case that white people had legitimate interests related to social 
progress as well.  Why couldn’t a white person who truly accepted principles of 
racial equality, who was rational and adequately informed, and so on, desire, say, 
that the Montgomery Bus Boycott had not occurred (for the simple reason that it 
made daily life very difficult)?  If it is possible for such a person to desire this, 
then according to the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory that person’s 
preference  should  carry  some  weight  (no  more  and  no  less  than  any  other 
person’s  legitimate  preferences)  in  the  social  preference  ordering  that  defines 
what justice requires of us.  The worry, obviously, is that if we follow the Principle 
of Application, we will in practice fail to give such preferences the weight they are 
due.
My reply to this worry has two parts.  First, it seems to me that groups that 
satisfy the Principle of Application’s desiderata comparatively well will tend to be 
responsive  to  the  legitimate  interests  (i.e.  rational  and  adequately  informed 
preferences  grounded  in  acceptance  of  correct  principles  of  ideal  theory, 
92
rectification, and morality) of members of the majority class.  Why?  Consider 
what a reformist group such as the NAACP must do in order to gain a great deal 
of voluntary participation among the class of persons who suffer injustice.  People 
who accept correct principles of ideal theory and rectification (qua desideratum 
(a)) who are adequately informed and rational (qua desideratum (e)) will surely 
tend to  voluntarily  join  reformist  groups (qua  desideratum (b))  that  they can 
expect to be relatively successful in promoting social progress.  No one who is 
rational and adequately informed and who truly wants justice is going to waste 
his/her time joining a group that stands little chance of achieving any measure of 
success.   A person who wants justice and is rational  and adequately informed 
will, all things being equal at least, want to participate in a social movement that 
he/she can expect to achieve some real results.  Yet what does it take to achieve 
results?   Intuitively,  it  takes  a  certain  amount  of  willingness  to  appeal  to 
“moderates”,  including  members  of  the  class  who benefit  from injustice  (who 
want justice but may or may not be willing to endure the same costs as those who 
suffer  from injustice).   To  see  this,  consider  once  again  the  NAACP  and  the 
Nation of Islam.  The NAACP has always been much more  popular among black 
Americans than the Nation of Islam or other militant movements (such as the 
Black Panthers).  Why is this?  Intuitively, part of the answer must be the fact 
that  militant  movements  are  less  likely  to  make  real  headway  in  a  society  in 
which whites are a vast majority.  The sheer popularity of the NAACP, in other 
words,  seems  to  attest  to  its  members’  willingness  to  engage  with  and  take 
seriously  (if  only  begrudgingly,  and  strategically)  the  interests  of  the  white 
majority.  One worry here, obviously, is that the popularity of the NAACP must be 
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due  to  its  members’  (begrudging)  willingness  to  engage  with  the  interests  of 
whites  will  tend  to  lend  weight  to  the  illegitimate  interests  that  many  white 
people have.  Indeed, this seems to be a main complaint of more militant groups. 
Groups such as the Nation of Islam and Black Panthers have repeatedly accused 
the NAACP of being overly sensitive to the interests of whites.  I do not think that 
this is a serious worry, however.  According to the Fundamental Principle of Non-
Ideal Theory, justice is a matter of advancing the preferences that people would 
have if each person accepted the correct principles of ideal theory, and so on.  The 
mere fact that the NAACP and other mainstream civil rights groups have enjoyed 
greater popularity among blacks than more militant groups indicates that more 
blacks  who  desire  racial  equality  prefer  the  aims  and  policies  of  the  more 
mainstream groups than those of the militant groups.  The point now is that if 
more blacks and whites (presumably) who desire justice prefer the NAACP’s aims 
and policies over the aims and policies of more militant groups, then we seem to 
have ample reason to think that the NAACP’s aims and policies are a much better 
representation of the preferences that all persons in society would have if they 
satisfied  the Fundamental  Principle’s  conditions.   I  submit,  in short,  that  the 
comparative popularity of a reformist group among the oppressed (the popularity 
of the NAACP among blacks) is itself ample reason to think that that group’s aims 
and policies is responsive to the legitimate interests of all.  A reformist group that 
gains  popularity  among  the  oppressed  just  will  tend  to  be  responsive  to  the 
legitimate interests of all insofar as (i) the oppressed (if they are rational) will 
want to see progress achieved and, (ii) progress tends to require some measure of 
compromise with the interests of the interests of oppressing classes.
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The second part of my response to the worry that reformist groups will 
tend to be biased in favor of the legitimate interests of the oppressed over the 
legitimate interests of others is more straightforward.  I propose that if we have to 
estimate  the  legitimate  interests  of  persons  (as  we  do  according  to  the 
Fundamental Principle), but any method of estimating those interests will have to 
be fallible (as I think is the case), then we ought to “err on the side of caution” 
and advance the legitimate interests of members of the oppressed class over the 
legitimate interests of the members of the oppressing class.  The basic idea here is 
simple.  If mistakes in estimating individuals’ legitimate interests are inevitable 
(as  I  think  they  are),  then  surely  it  is  a  better  policy  to  err  in  a  way  that  is 
beneficial to the oppressed rather than in a way that is beneficial to those that do 
the oppressing.  Thus, I submit, even if the Principle of Application’s focus on 
reformist  groups does run some risk  of  biasing judgments  about  what  justice 
requires in favor of the legitimate interests of some persons (the oppressed) over 
the legitimate interests of others (the oppressing class) – and I have done my best 
to  show that  the risk is  far  more minimal than it  might appear at  first  – the 
Principle of Application is still  the best  principle for estimating the legitimate 
interests of all.  Whatever risk of bias is inherent in the Principle is regrettable. 
Still,  if  bias  is  unavoidable,  it  is  better  to be biased in favor of the oppressed 
rather than in favor of the unjust.
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§2.2.2.  Don’t  Reformist Group Often Have Immoral or Morally Questionable  
Aims?
I just claimed that if we have to choose between running the risk of illegitimately 
privileging the interests of the oppressed over the non-oppressed (i.e. giving the 
legitimate interests of the oppressed too much weight) or running the risk of the 
opposite, we should, indeed, run the risk of erring on the side of the oppressed.  It 
is the oppressed who suffer injustice, after all, not the non-oppressed majority. 
Still, one might wonder whether it is appropriate, generally speaking, to advance 
the aims of reformist groups.  What about when reformist groups advocate or 
organize acts of violence or terrorism, such as was the case, for example, when (in 
response to the Grand Apartheid in South Africa and the Sharpesville Massacre 
in 1960 in which South African police shot into a crowd of black civilians) the 
African National Congress – South Africa’s main anti-Apartheid reformist group 
–  renounced  non-violent  methods  as  inefficacious  and  began  engaging  in 
targeted killings, guerilla actions, and bombings that killed civilians?83
It is important to keep in mind in cases like these that the Principle of 
Application  instructs  us  to  evaluate  reformist  groups  along  a  number  of 
desiderata, a particularly important one being that the group is pursuing correct 
and relevant principles of ideal theory, rectification, and morality.  Indeed, it is 
important to keep in mind that the Principle of Application instructs us to tailor 
our confidence about the justice of an action in proportion to the extent that we 
are,  or  are  not,  confident  about  whether  a  reformist  group  satisfies  those 
desiderata.  Accordingly, the Principle suggests that we should indeed be cautious 
83 www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,954942-2,00.html
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in cases like these.  Ordinary morality surely tells us, for example, that violent 
responses  to  injustices  –  particularly  bombings,  targeted  killings,  and  killing 
civilians – are very questionable methods at best.  Ordinary morality also surely 
tells  us,  however,  that  the  worse  that  injustices  get,  the  more likely  it  is  that 
violent  responses  are  justified.   So,  to  take  one  example,  most  Americans 
presumably  believe  that  the  American  Revolution  against  the  British  was  a 
justified response to British tyranny, even though, obviously, it involved a war. 
We should judge reformist groups in these kinds of cases very carefully then.  So, 
for example, let us return to the African National Congress’s adoption of violent 
methods.  It is evident, first, that the ANC adopted these methods only as a last 
resort.   The ANC continued to espouse non-violent tactics for twelve years, in 
fact, after the Apartheid regime instituted “Grand Apartheid” a policy of ethnic 
cleansing  that  forcefully  resettled  millions  of  blacks  into  “group  areas”  and 
subjected  them to a  particularly  severe  set  of  laws,  including,  of  course,  laws 
denying them voting rights in the Apartheid Government itself.84  The ANC only 
turned to violent methods after (a) particularly severe policies were put in place, 
(b) the ANC itself was exiled, and (c) innocent black protestors were shot and 
killed at during the Sharpesville Massacre.  Second, these violent methods were 
actually efficacious where non-violent tactics had failed.  The end of Apartheid in 
South Africa was clearly precipitated by the fact that the ANC’s violent tactics had 
rendered South Africa ungovernable.  In the 1980s and early 1990s South Africa 
was in a virtual civil war.  The government was losing control, and the economy 
was  growing  weaker  and  weaker  due  to  boycotts,  strikes,  and  international 
84 A list of these laws can be found at http://africanhistory.about.com/library/bl/blsalaws.htm.
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sanctions  (the latter  of  which,  by the way,  were requested by the ANC at the 
U.N.85).   Indeed,  all  three  sets  of  initial  negotiations  between  the  ANC  and 
Apartheid regime – the Groote Shuur Minute, the Pretoria Minute, and National 
Peace  Accord,  which  led  to  further  negotiations,  and  ultimately  the  fall  of 
Apartheid  –  focused  almost  exclusively  on  resolving  the  violence  and 
intimidation resulting from the ANC’s violent tactics.86 
The fact that reformist groups sometimes call for questionable measures is 
not, then, a serious problem for the Principle of Application.  Far from it.  The 
Principle requires us to think carefully about whether reformist groups satisfy its 
desiderata,  and  to  tailor  our  confidence  about  the  aims  of  reformist  groups 
accordingly.  In fact, in the Principle of Application’s defense, it seems to me that 
if the United States had actually accepted the Principle and thought through the 
ANC’s use of violence fairly carefully (as we have here), the United States would 
not now be in the awkward position of  having once labeled the ANC, and its 
Nobel Peace Prize-winning leader Nelson Mandela – a man now widely regarded 
as a symbol of freedom and equality – “terrorists.”87  As U.S. Senator John Kerry 
remarked on July 2, 2008 (the day that President George W. Bush finally signed 
a bill removing Mandela from the U.S.’s terrorist watch list), “[Mandela] had no 
place on our government's terror watch list” to begin with.88  Senator Kerry is 
85 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/1960s/sp631029.html.
86 For the Groote Shuur Minute and Pretoria Minute, see the Minutes and Accords between the 
ANC and the South African Government, May 1990-February 1991, 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/transition/minutes.html.  The full text of the National 




surely right.  Mandela and the ANC utilized violent tactics, but they were no more 
terrorists than the American Colonies were terrorists against the British Empire 
in the Eighteenth Century.  The Principle of Application helps us see why.  Both 
of  these  cases  (the  American  Revolution  and  the  ANC-led  South  African 
rebellion) are cases in which widely popular reformist groups, headed by rational 
and informed leaders who extolled correct principles of justice and abided by the 
commonplace moral norm that political violence is appropriate as a last resort to 
grave injustice, espoused violence only as a last resort.  If only the U.S. and other 
international  critics  of  the  ANC  had  reasoned  according  to  the  Principle  of 
Application as such.  Perhaps Apartheid could have been eliminated with less 
bloodshed.
§2.2.3. Aren’t Reformist Groups Often Irrational or Inadequately Informed?
Some readers might suggest that reformist groups are often, or even typically, 
irrational  or  ill-informed.   So,  for  example,  Jagdish  Bhagwati,  a  well-known 
economist, appears to think that opponents to the World Trade Organization and 
globalization tend to have an “inadequate intellectual grasp” of economics and 
social policy.89  Similarly, one reader of an earlier draft of this chapter remarked: 
“In  my  lifetime  the  reformist  groups  have  generally  been  ill-informed  about 
economics, and have pushed really detrimental policies.”
My reply to this worry comes in two parts.  The first part of my reply is 
that it is absolutely critical to keep in mind that the phrase, “reformist group”, as 
I am using it, is not to be understood as referring merely to (or even primarily to) 
89 Bhagwati (2004): 18.
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the sorts of groups that this worry seems to have in mind, such as trade unions or 
groups  of  “anti-globalization”  protestors.   Quite  the  contrary,  the  Principle  of 
Application  implies  that  any  class  of  persons  that  displays  an  interest  in 
eliminating or rectifying injustice (defined relative to ideal theory) can qualify as 
a “reformist” group, including the World Trade Organization or even economists. 
The Principle of Application says that we are to consider all  such groups, and 
then rank them according to how well we judge them as satisfying the Principle’s 
desiderata.   This  is  important  because  if,  hypothetically  speaking,  due  to  the 
complexity of a particular case, we became convinced (in a particular case) that, 
in the face of some injustice, only a certain class of economists were rational and 
adequately  informed  (as  well  as  displaying  an  interest  in  eliminating  that 
injustice), we could very well come to judge that class of economists as satisfying 
the Principle of Application’s desiderata better than any other group – in which 
case, following the Principle, we should judge that their opinions best represent 
what justice requires.  
It is also critical to keep in mind here that the Principle of Application is 
not any sort of algorithm.  Some readers might wonder how we could possibly 
judge  some  class  of  economists  as  satisfying  the  Principle  of  Application’s 
desiderata  overall  better  than some other group(s)  when many of  those other 
groups will  clearly  satisfy many of the Principle’s other desiderata better than 
economists (economists are not, for example, very similar as a class to those who 
suffer injustice).  It is always important to keep in mind, when thinking about the 
Principle  of  Application,  that  if  a  group that  fails  miserably  with  respect  to  a 
single  particularly  important  desideratum  –  such  as  the  desideratum  of 
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rationality – we should surely rank that group as performing poorly vis-à-vis the 
desiderata overall.  No matter how well a reformist group satisfies a number of 
the Principle’s desiderata, gross failures with respect to some of the Principle’s 
most important desiderata (particularly its rationality and “correct principles of 
justice” desiderata)  will,  for  fairly  obvious reasons, justify us in ranking other 
groups more highly with respect to the desiderata as a class.
The second part of my reply to the worry raised is that we must be careful 
to  take  a  suitably  broad  view of  what  is  at  issue  when we  evaluate  reformist 
groups along the dimensions of rationality and informed-ness.  As readers will 
see  in  Chapter  5,  where  I  discuss  global  economic  justice,  I  believe  that 
proponents of particular economic policies (such as Jagdish Bhagwati) often miss 
the  point  in  criticizing  opponents  of  their  views  as  having  an  “inadequate 
intellectual  grasp”  of  economics.   As  readers  will  see,  I  think  that  the  most 
interesting  debate  about  globalization,  free  trade,  and  so  on,  is  not  about 
economics  but  over  the  morality  of  forcing  economic  policies  on  people 
regardless of whether or not those people want the (perhaps very real) benefits of 
those policies.  It is absolutely critical, then, to apply the Principle of Application 
to reformist groups – to judge how “rational” and “adequately informed” a group 
is – according to the correct set of criteria.  The fact that a particular reformist 
group is inadequately informed about economics may well be irrelevant if the real 
issue is not economics, but rather something else entirely (such as principles of 
morality).
101
§2.2.4. Does the Principle of Application Imply That All Reformist Groups Aside  
From One Must Disband?
Some  readers  might  have  a  simple  technical  worry  about  the  Fundamental 
Principle – one that might seem to amount to a reductio ad absurdem of it.  The 
Principle  tells  us,  once  again,  that  we  ought  to  take  the  aims  of  whichever 
reformist group best satisfies various desiderata to be the best representation of 
what justice requires (qua the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory).  One 
might worry that if we accept this, it follows that all other reformist groups have a 
duty founded in justice to give up their aims and adopt the aims of the reformist 
group in question.  So, for example, suppose there are several reformist groups in 
an unjust society:  groups A, B, C, D, and E.  Then suppose that group B best 
satisfies the Principle of Application’s desiderata.  In that case, does it not follow 
that all of the other groups – A, C, D, and E – now have a duty to stop existing 
altogether,  or  disband?  The worry then,  obviously,  is  that  if  that is  true,  the 
Principle  of  Application  has  intolerable  implications.   Indeed,  the  idea  seems 
paradigmatically fascist.   The famous Reign of Terror that plagued the French 
Revolution  seems  to  have  been  the  result  of  just  this  kind  of  intolerance. 
Different factions of revolutionaries in France mutually radicalized one another, 
leading  to  mass  violence  and  mass  executions  that  took  the  lives  of  tens  of 
thousands of French men and women.90  
This worry is worth mentioning because it draws our attention once again 
to an important aspect of the Principle of Application that we must always be 
carefully to remind ourselves of: namely, that its desiderata themselves suggest 
90 Secher (2003).
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the promotion of conditions of free and open debate among reformist groups. 
After all, how are we to know whether a reformist group is pursuing correct and 
relevant principles, or whether it is rational and adequately informed, if there are 
not other groups to challenge it?  The arrogance of facism is that fascists “think 
they know best” unilaterally without allowing other people to speak their mind. 
In  order  for  us  to  judge  which  reformist  group  around  us  best  satisfies  the 
Principle of Application’s desiderata, there must be competing reformist groups. 
Accordingly, the Principle of Application does not support or imply that as soon 
as we single out a particular reformist group as best satisfying its desiderata in 
particular  case,  all  other  reformist  groups  must  disband and join  it.   On  the 
contrary,  the  Principle  implies  that  we  must  remain  ever-vigilant  about 
maintaining conditions of free and open debate and association.
§2.2.5. Cases Where Reformist Groups Are Absent
Thus  far  I  have  dealt  with  cases  in  which  relevant  reformist  groups  exist. 
Offhand,  however,  we  can  imagine  all  sorts  of  cases  in  which  there  are  no 
reformist groups.  Consider a closed society that does not tolerate dissent.  Which 
reformist group could we possibly appeal to in this case?
I submit, first, that in many cases there will be reformist groups in other 
societies that we can take to satisfy the Principle of Application on behalf of the 
class of persons who suffer in the closed society.  Injustices in different societies 
are often quite similar, after all.  Consider two Islamic societies in which women 
are afforded fewer rights than men.  Then suppose that one of these societies is 
closed, whereas the other is relatively tolerant of dissent.  Finally, suppose that 
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the  latter  society  includes  women’s  groups  that  advocate  in  favor  of  gender 
equality  and espouse particular aims and policies in support of achieving that 
end.  The Principle of Application tells us – plausibly, I submit – that although 
the two societies may be different in many respects, we should take the women’s 
groups in the open society to be the best “voice” in favor of the interests of the 
women in the closed society, at least if the two societies are alike in most respects.
What  if  the closed society  is  very different,  however?  So, for  example, 
suppose  the  open  society  is  Islamic  whereas  the  closed  society  is  Confucian. 
Intuitively, the women in the two societies might have very different concerns (at 
least if, qua the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory, they accepted the 
correct  principles  of  ideal  theory).   What,  if  anything,  does  the  Principle  of 
Application  tell  us  about  this  case?   Recall  that  the  Principle  of  Application 
instructs us to advance the aims of whichever reformist group, past, present, or 
hypothetical, best satisfies the Principle’s desiderata.  In this case at hand, the 
Principle of Application would presumably have us extrapolate from the aims of 
the women’s groups in the open Islamic society to a hypothetical account of what 
the aims of women’s groups in the closed Confucian society might be if (contrary 
to fact) such groups existed.  This may of course be difficult, but oftentimes there 
will  be  known  similarities  and  differences  between  the  oppressed  classes  of 
different  societies  that  would  enable  us  to  make  such  an  extrapolation  with 
confidence.  We might know, for example, that “family” is of great importance to 
women in both societies.  Accordingly, if the women’s groups in the open Islamic 
society  espoused policies  of  reform that  purport  to  reconcile  their  interest  in 
family  with  the  achievement  of  gender  equality,  then  by  a  similar  token,  we 
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should imagine that if there were such reformist groups in the Confucian society, 
they would have similar aims.    
I submit, then, that the Principle of Application deals with cases in which 
reformist groups are absent in two ways: it (1) directs our attention to reformist 
groups where they do exist and (2) instructs us to extrapolate from those groups 
to the case where such groups are absent.
§2.2.6. Why Not Go Entirely Hypothetical?
Some readers might wonder, in light of the case just discussed, whether it might 
be  better  to  abandon  the  Principle  of  Application’s  focus  on  actual  reformist 
groups  in  favor  of  a  principle  which  focuses  our  attention  on  hypothetical 
estimations from the outset.   The Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory 
tells us that we deal justly with injustice, after all, simply insofar as we advance 
the preferences that people would have if they satisfied various conditions.  Why 
shouldn’t we just bypass reformist groups altogether and just estimate what we 
think people would prefer under those conditions?  My answer to this question, 
as a first pass, is that the Principle of Application keeps us grounded in reality as 
opposed to what we think reality is.  One of my greatest worries about Western 
social  and  political  theories,  a  worry  that  often  raised  by  theorists  of  other 
traditions91,  is  that  Western  theorists  fail  to  afford  enough  attention  to  the 
differences between people of different cultures.  Just to be clear,  I think it  is 
important not to lend these sorts of worries more weight than they are due.  For 
my own part, I think we have a duty founded in justice not to accept values that 
91 See Beitz (2001): 270-274 for a brief summary (and Beitz’s reply) to some common concerns.
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are inconsistent with the equal treatment of persons, no matter how common 
those values may be in some parts of the world.  Still,  the worries surely have 
some  bite.   If  we  want  to  eliminate  and  rectify  injustices,  we  should  surely 
consider the views of the very people we want to help: the oppressed people on 
the  ground  who  have  day-to-day  lives  to  live,  family  members,  friends,  and 
associates  to  deal  with,  and so on.  I believe that the Principle of Application 
keeps us appropriately grounded in this reality in a way that purely hypothetical 
judgments about what is best for people cannot.
§2.3. THE ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF APPLICATION
Now that we have a prima facie case for the Principle of Application, as well as 
replies to a few initial worries, let us turn to the full justification of the Principle – 
the argument that the Principle really is the best available indicator (to us in the 
real world) of whether an action satisfies the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal 
Theory (and is therefore required by justice).
In order to defend the Principle of Application, then, three things must be 
accomplished.   First,  the case  must  be  made for taking  the aims of  reformist 
groups to be the best available indicator of the social preference ordering that 
constitutes the Fundamental Principle’s satisfaction condition.  Second, it must 
be  shown  that  our  confidence  that  a  reformist  group’s  aims  represent  that 
preference-ordering should increase  to  the extent that  that group satisfies  the 
Principle of Application’s desiderata (and decrease to the extent that the group 
fails to satisfy those desiderata).  Finally, it must be shown that when two or more 
competing  reformist  groups  satisfy  the  Principle  of  Application’s  desiderata 
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roughly  equally  well,  a  fair  compromise  between  the  aims  of  those  groups 
represents the Fundamental Principle’s satisfaction conditions better than any of 
the groups’ aims taken individually.  It is to these three tasks that I now turn.
§2.3.1.  Stage  1:  The  Argument  for  Taking  Reformist  Groups  to  be  the  Best  
Available  Representation  of  the  Fundamental  Principle’s  Social  Preference 
Ordering
Suppose you wanted to estimate what I would believe or prefer if I were different 
in some way(s) than I actually am.  We make these sorts of estimations quite 
often, if only implicitly.  As a teacher, I often find me asking myself questions 
such as, “What would student X be able to accomplish if she studied harder?” 
Usually I ask this question because I see a student who, in my estimation, has 
some real talent but is not making the most of it.  I have an idea that the student 
would probably be able to accomplish quite a bit more, and produce better work, 
than she has, if only she put more time and effort into her work.  
I assume these kinds of estimations often have some accuracy.  Indeed, 
much of what we do in life is predicated upon our ability to predict what people 
would do under various conditions.  So, for instance, consider a “talent scout”, 
such as a scout for a major-league baseball team.  Such a scout is paid to watch 
young prospects play the game of baseball and then estimate, on the basis of what 
he sees, not only whether a particular player can be expected to work hard, but 
also, on the basis of that player’s natural  skills,  whether if that player worked 
hard, he would display the sorts of skills  necessary to compete effectively at a 
major-league level.  Now, of course, anyone who pays attention to baseball, or to 
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just about any other business that involves the evaluation of talent, knows that 
talent evaluators often mis-estimate talent.  So, for instance, it is not uncommon, 
particularly  in  professional  sports,  for  talent-evaluators  from  diverse 
backgrounds to come to a consensus that a particular person is a “can’t miss” 
talent  –  a  person  who  they  are  fairly  certain  will  develop  certain  skills  and 
succeed  in  the  some domain  –  but  then  discover,  at  a  later  point,  that  their 
estimations  were  quite  of  the  mark.   The  fact  that  we  often  make  incorrect 
judgments  about  what  people  will  do  in  the  future,  or  would  do  under 
counterfactual conditions, does not, however, make us give up our belief that the 
sorts of estimations we do make can have strong accuracy-making features.92  So, 
for instance, while it is the case that some sports superstars, such as Tom Brady 
(who,  at  the  young  age  of  thirty,  is  already  considered  one  of  the  greatest 
quarterbacks  to  ever  play  professional  American  football),  were  widely 
underestimated early on in their career (Brady was drafted in the sixth round of 
the NFL Draft), it is still the case that players selected in earlier rounds of the 
Draft  tend to succeed more often,  and succeed at  a higher level,  than players 
selected in later rounds.  Thus, while our estimations about what people will do in 
the future, and what they would do under counterfactual conditions, are surely 
fallible (often highly so), it is surely also the case that these sorts of estimations, 
92 Although the truth-conditions for indicative conditionals (i.e. conditionals of the form “If p, 
then q”) is a matter of much contention, one leading view is that the truth-conditions of “forward-
looking” indicatives (i.e. “will” conditionals, such as “If p is the case, then q will be the case”) are 
identical to the truth-conditions for counterfactuals (i.e. “would” conditionals, such as “If p were 
the case, then q would be the case”).  See Gibbard 1981: 222-6; Dudman 1984, 1988; and Bennett 
1988.  See also http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conditionals/#TruConRevStaJac).  
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when we make them in the right ways, tend, if only in a probabilistic way, to track 
objective facts (about the future and counterfactual conditions). 
The  point  just  made  about  the  NFL  Draft  alerts  us,  I  think,  to  what 
grounds the accuracy of these kinds of counterfactual judgments.  In the case of 
the  NFL,  we  see  that  some  actual  number  of  individuals  with  a  certain 
combination of properties – natural talents and hard work – succeed at a very 
high  level,  and  we  make  probabilistic  counterfactual  assessments  about  new 
players on the basis of these frequencies.  So, for instance, if we see that nine out 
of ten quarterbacks with “first-round talent” who work hard succeed in the NFL, 
it  seems natural  – and epistemically  warranted  – for  us to  conclude that  the 
chances of this particular quarterback succeeding (if he has first-round) talent is 
nine in ten.
We  can  put  the  same  point  here  by  saying  that  the  ratio  of  actual 
individuals  who  possess  two  particular  properties  (first-round quarterbacking 
talent  and  hard  work)  who  also  possess  a  third  property  (NFL  success), 
represents the probability, for any particular person, whether that person would 
instantiate the latter property if he/she had both of the former properties.  This 
analysis in turn seems to suggest a way to represent the probability of whether, 
for any particular individual I and proposition P, I would prefer that P obtain (to 
some  alternative(s))  under  the  counterfactual  conditions  the  Fundamental 
Principle of Non-Ideal Theory specifies.  Since the Fundamental Principle asks us 
to estimate, of every individual in a relevant domain (i.e. society or world), what 
that  person  would  prefer  under  some  relevant  set  of  less-than-fully-just 
conditions  C  if  that  person  were  (i)  rational,  (ii)  adequately  informed,  (iii) 
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accepted the correct principles of ideal theory and rectification, (iv) desired the 
rectification  of  past  injustices  (as  required  by  some  independent  theory  of 
rectification,  assuming  there  is  one),  but  (v)  otherwise  rationally  desired  to 
advance  his/her  own  transition-related  preferences  (vi)  within  the  broader 
constraints  of  morality  more  generally,  (vii)  under  C,  we  should  be  able  to 
estimate  those  preference  by  reference  to  the  actual  frequency  of  preferences 
among individuals  in the population who actually  are rational  and adequately 
informed, accept the correct principles of ideal theory and rectification, and so 
on, under the conditions of injustice in question.
There is a serious problem to consider here, however.  In the case of the 
NFL  prospect  and  the  case  of  the  talented  student  discussed  earlier,  the 
reference-classes  that  we  use  to  estimate  the  counterfactual  probabilities  are 
composed of by individuals who are relevantly similar to the person in question. 
So, for instance, if we return to the case of the talented student, I estimate the 
probability that she would produce strong work if she worked hard in terms of 
similar students who had her sort of talent and who worked hard.  Similarly, in 
the case of the NFL quarterback prospect, we estimate the probability that he will 
have success in the NFL by reference to similarly talented quarterbacks who have 
been drafted in the past.  What we do in both cases, in other words, is estimate 
the probability that a particular person will have some property in terms of the 
number of individuals in a representative sample.  We estimate the probability of 
whether this first-round talent quarterback would have NFL success if he worked 
hard in terms of the past successes of other first-round talents who worked hard.
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The main problem with attempting to represent the satisfaction conditions 
of the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory in similar terms, however, is 
that it is hard to see what might constitute such a representative sample.  Which 
kinds of people, in the real world, do we tend to have good reason to take, under 
conditions of injustice,  to be (i) rational,  and (ii) adequately informed, to (iii) 
desire fully  just  conditions (as  specified by the correct  ideal  theory of  justice, 
assuming  there  is  one)  and  (iv)  desire  the  rectification  of  past  injustices  (as 
required by some independent theory of rectification, assuming there is one), but 
(v)  otherwise  desired  to  advance  his/her  own  transition-related  preferences 
within the broader constraints of morality,  (vi) under those conditions?  If we 
make the fairly uncontroversial assumption that desires have at least a ceteris 
peribus motivational component – that is, that an individual who desires X will at 
least, all things being equal, actually be motivated to pursue X – we should aim to 
single  out  those  classes  of  individuals  who,  generally  speaking,  appear  to  be 
composed of by rational and adequately informed individuals who are actually 
motivated to bring about fully just conditions, and properly rectify past injustices, 
who  are  otherwise  concerned  with  advancing  whichever  interests  they  take 
themselves to have vis-à-vis transition within the broader constraints of morality, 
under conditions of injustice.  The question then is: which classes of individuals 
satisfy  these  conditions?   Generally  speaking,  the  answer  seems to  me to  be: 
reformist groups.  Let me explain.  
Consider  once  again  the  members  of  the  black  American  Civil  Rights 
Movement during the 1960s.  Generally speaking, it seems that the members of 
those groups were not only rational and adequately informed (at least insofar as 
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their members pursued the principles of a well-informed leadership), but also, 
were clearly  motivated to pursue correct  principles of justice – in this  case,  a 
basic principle of equal civil rights – in ways that also seem to have taken into 
account the transition-interests of the members of the group.  Many members of 
those  groups  were  willing  to  march,  demonstrate,  engage  in  acts  of  civil 
disobedience, be abused by police, and so on, in order to achieve equal rights; 
other  members  were  not  necessarily  so  willing  to  incur  all  of  those  costs. 
Generally speaking, though, I think we take the “movement” itself to be defined 
largely by the sorts of costs that its members were willing to incur – that it is 
precisely because so many activists were willing to perform acts of disobedience 
and  put  themselves  in  dangerous  situations  for  the  cause  of  equality  that  we 
think,  on average,  that  those  are  the  costs  that  members  of  that  group quite 
generally were willing to incur against their background desire for justice.  
Now again, not all reformist groups are like this.  Reformist groups can 
pursue false principles of justice, or even no principles of justice at all (they may 
be out for nothing but revenge).  Reformist groups can also be non-voluntary, or 
conscript their members (as is the case with various “freedom fighter” groups in 
parts  of  Africa).   Finally,  there  may  be  cases  where  reform  groups  pursue 
irrational policies – policies that set back their group’s very own goals – as well as 
cases in which reformist groups settle on the goals and policies they do on the 
basis of inadequate information.  
In all of these cases, we should be skeptical of whether the goals of such 
groups  accurately  represent  the  preferences  that  individuals  in  society  or  the 
world at large would have under the counterfactual conditions mentioned in the 
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Fundamental  Principle of Non-Ideal Theory.  Let us set these issues aside for 
now, however.  We will come back to them later.  The point for now is simply is 
that it looks as though the membership of reformist groups can and often actually 
do  satisfy,  as  a  collective,  the  conditions  mentioned  in  the  Fundamental 
Principle.  First, we seem to often have strong evidence, via the voluntary nature 
of participation in these groups, that the members of some such groups (at least 
implicitly, through their joining the group and promoting its aims and policies) 
do prefer correct and relevant principles of justice (when, as is the case in the 
mainstream American civil  rights  movement,  the leadership of  many of  these 
groups explicitly pursued racial equality).  Second, we seem to often have strong 
evidence, once again via the voluntary nature of these groups, that the goals and 
policies of these groups must generally be sensitive to the transition-costs that 
their members, as a group, prefer to incur (such groups would presumably lose 
great  numbers  of  members  to  some  rival  group(s)  if  their  goals  and  policies 
imposed costs their members are unwilling to face).  Finally,  it seems that we 
often  have  good  evidence  relating  to  the  question  of  whether  the  goals  and 
policies  these  groups  pursue  are  rational  and  adequately  informed  (so,  for 
example, it is hard to see how the goals and policies of mainstream American civil 
rights groups could be condemned as being otherwise).  We appear to sometimes 
have good evidence, then, that certain groups of people – the members of certain 
reform  groups  –  generally  do  satisfy  the  conditions  mentioned  in  the 
Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory, as well as strong evidence of what 
the members of those groups generally prefer.  The question now is whether we 
have  good  reason  to  take  those  individuals’  preferences  to  represent  the 
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preferences that members of an entire society, or the world, would probably have 
under those same counterfactual conditions.
The problem that arises at this point, however, is this.  In the case of the 
NFL football prospect, we evaluate what this talented prospect would probably 
accomplish by reference to the successes of similarly talented prospects in the 
past  who worked hard.   The group that  in this  case we take  to represent the 
probability that this prospect will succeed, then, seems properly representative of 
him.  It represents what we can expect of a person of his talents.  The problem in 
the case of reformist groups – of using them to represent what individuals in the 
larger  society  or  world  would  prefer  under  the  conditions  listed  in  the 
Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory – is that the two classes at issue here 
(the group doing the representing, and the group supposedly being represented) 
are very different.  Reformist groups are typically composed of by members of 
social classes that are poor, downtrodden, and subject to injustice.  The idea of 
using  their  preferences  to  represent  the  preferences  that  other  classes  of 
individuals would have, and indeed the preferences that the members of an entire 
society  or  the  world  at  large  would  have,  if  the  individuals  in  those  classes 
satisfied the conditions listed in the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory, 
might sound a lot like taking the success rates of very untalented quarterbacks to 
accurately represent what we could expect of talented quarterbacks  who work 
hard.  How can we claim to know, or estimate with any sort of claim to accuracy, 
what  the  members  of  a  society  or  world  probably  would  prefer  under  the 
conditions listed in the Fundamental Principle in terms of what a very different 
class of individuals actually does prefer under those conditions?  
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At  first  glance,  this  problem  might  seem  to  be  insurmountable. 
Fortunately, though, I believe that we have more resources at our disposal.  We 
often estimate what a person would believe or prefer under certain counterfactual 
conditions by, in part, considering the nature of the counterfactual conditions in 
question.  So, for instance, we might ask what I would believe if I were a religious 
believer (of, say, some major faith, e.g. Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc.).  At first 
glance,  it  might  seem difficult  to  speculate,  with  any  accuracy,  what  I  would 
probably believe if I were a believer.  I am, after all, not only a committed Atheist, 
but a person who is by all accounts extremely skeptical in general.  It does not 
seem impossible to estimate what I would probably believe if I were a believer, 
however.  After all, we presumably know quite a lot about the properties of being 
a religious believer, as well  as about other properties (such as the property of 
being an Atheist).  We know that religious believers, by the very nature of the 
property of being a religious believer, believe in the existence of some God or 
gods.  We know that Jewish individuals typically believe in a particular God – the 
one  described  in  the  Old  Testament.   In  contrast,  we  know  that  Christian 
individuals tend to believe in the God described by the Old and New Testaments 
together.  We know that Atheists believe that no god of any sort exists.  And so 
on.
I  propose,  next,  that  we  can  (and  I  think  often  do)  make  accurate 
counterfactual  judgments  in  virtue  of  what  we  know  about  these  sorts  of 
properties.  So, for instance, suppose once again that we wanted to know what I 
would prefer or believe if I were a believer.  It is difficult to answer this question 
simpliciter for the following reason.  As a skeptical individual, I find it hard to 
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conceive myself as being a believer.  I almost want to say, “If I were a believer, I 
wouldn’t be me.”  But of course that cannot be exactly right.  I do not think it is an 
essential property of me that I am as skeptical  as I am.  I surely can imagine 
myself having been born and raised in a devoutly religious community, and as 
having come to believe some religion or other.  In doing so, however, I seem to be 
imagining myself as somewhat less skeptical than I actually am.  I still might have 
had  a  somewhat  skeptical  nature,  of  course,  given  that  I  do  seem  naturally 
inclined to skepticism.  It seems hard, therefore, to judge with any strong claim to 
accuracy what I would have believed or preferred if I were a religious believer 
simpliciter.   I  think  we  can,  however,  make  justified  judgments  about  more 
specific questions.  So, for example, we might ask what I would probably prefer or 
believe if I were a skeptical believer, on the one hand, or a devout believer, on the 
other.  In each of these cases, the very nature of the properties in question – the 
properties  of  being  skeptical  and  devout,  respectively  –  seem  to  single  out 
relevant comparison classes in the real world.  There are, after all, populations of 
comparatively  skeptical  religious  believers  in  the  real  world,  as  well  as 
populations of devout religious believers – and the members of both groups (in 
the real world) have very different properties.  So, for instance, it is surely true 
that, on average, less devout religious believers tend to attend religious services 
less often than more devout believers.    
Accordingly, it seems as though we can come to justified judgments about 
what you, I, or anyone else would believe or prefer under various counterfactual 
conditions in virtue what the members of relevant comparison classes of actual 
individuals – classes that instantiate relevant classes of properties – actually do 
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believe and prefer.  Even though we may not be able to judge with any accuracy 
exactly what I would believe if I were a believer simpliciter, the point is that we 
surely  can  look  to  populations  of  actual  individuals  to  judge  what  I  would 
probably  believe  or  prefer  if  I  were  a  skeptical  believer  or  a  devout  believer, 
respectively.  In the former case, we should surely just look at what populations 
of skeptical believers in the real world tend to prefer and believe, whereas in the 
latter class we should look at what populations of what devout believers tend to 
prefer and believe.  
The question now is whether we can make a similar move with respect to 
the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory.  I believe we can – that we can 
see, by reflecting on the nature of the property of desiring justice, that the sorts of 
reformist groups I mentioned earlier comprise the relevant comparison class for 
us to estimate what the members of entire societies, or even the world as a whole, 
would prefer under the conditions mentioned by the Fundamental Principle.  The 
Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory tells, once again, us to aim to satisfy 
the preferences that everyone in a relevant population would have, given past or 
present injustices, if those individuals desired conformity to correct principles of 
ideal theory and rectification.  So, for example, if we consider the case of racial 
inequality, the Fundamental Principle instructs us to aim to maximally satisfy the 
preferences that the entire population of individuals would have if each member 
of  the  population  desired  racial  equality.   Or  consider  economic  injustice. 
Suppose Rawls is correct that justice requires the basic structure of a society to be 
such that it maximizes the wealth and income of the least well-off class.93  In this 
93 See e.g., Rawls (1999a): 65-73.
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case,  the  Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory  instructs  us  to  aim  to 
maximally  satisfy  the  preferences  that  the  members  of  society-at-large  would 
have  if  each  member  of  that  society  desired  the  basic  structure  of  society  to 
maximize the wealth and income of the least well-off. 
Notice, first,  that each of these desires requires us to aim to satisfy the 
preferences that  individuals  in a larger  domain would have if  they  desired to 
advance the interests of the downtrodden.  The point here, more broadly, is that 
it seems as though a genuine desire for justice is, by its very nature, a desire to set 
one’s interests aside so that those who are suffering injustice no longer have to 
suffer  it  (and that  those  who have suffered injustice  in  the  past  are  properly 
compensated).  Accordingly, we have one reason to take reformist groups to be 
the relevant comparison class for estimating what everyone in a population would 
prefer if the individuals in that larger class desired justice.  If desiring justice is a 
matter  of  setting one’s  interests  aside so that  the downtrodden can enjoy the 
conditions of justice that they ought to enjoy – e.g., if a desire for racial equality 
just is a desire that the members of discriminated races enjoy the conditions of 
equality they are due as a matter of justice – then indeed, it would seem that we 
should take the preferences of the members of reformist groups to represent, or 
stand for, the preferences that we all ought to have, at least so to the extent we 
are confident that the group satisfies the Principle of Application’s desiderata. 
I italicized the last part of the previous sentence to head off, once again, an 
important  (but,  I  think,  misplaced)  sort  of  worry:  the  worry  that  the 
“downtrodden” will, for all kinds of reasons, be most unlikely to take the interests 
of others adequately into account.  Here is a concrete realization of the worry. 
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One reader of an earlier draft of this chapter remarked that in a meeting with a 
NAACP  lawyer  at  a  conference  on  affirmative  action,  the  lawyer  categorized 
opponents of affirmative action as simply evil.  The worry, of course, is that this 
lawyer is evidently not concerned at all with the interests (or even opinions) of 
those who would be negatively affected by affirmative action.  But now what does 
this case really show?  I think it shows, first, that we must be very careful when it 
comes to applying the Principle of Application.  Remember, how we evaluate a 
reformist group vis-à-vis the Principle of Application will depend on many things. 
A  political  libertarian  such  as  Nozick,  for  example,  will  presumably  reject 
affirmative action as inconsistent with libertarian principles from the outset.  The 
NAACP will,  then,  fare very poorly vis-à-vis the Principle of  Application for a 
Nozickean from the outset.  I also think, second, that the Principle of Application 
makes  good sense  of  the  skepticism that  many people  have about  affirmative 
action policies.   The Principle of Application says, if  you recall,  that we are to 
tailor  our  confidence  about  the  justice  of  an  action  in  proportion  to  our 
confidence about  how well  particular  reformist  groups satisfy  the Principle  of 
Application’s desiderata.  In light of this, let us reconsider the case of the NAACP 
lawyer.   This  case is  disturbing precisely  because  the lawyer’s  attitudes  about 
opponents to affirmative action seem patently unreasonable.  My claim now is 
that insofar as we do think this,  we should apply the Principle of Application 
accordingly.  The Principle of Application tells us to tailor our confidence about 
the justice a group’s aims (such as the aims of the NAACP) in proportion to how 
confident  we are  that  the group is  actually  motivated by correct  principles  of 
justice, morality, whether it is actually informed, rational, and so on.  My reader’s 
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encounter with the NAACP lawyer, as such, should presumably lead us to have 
less  confidence in the NAACP’s  views on affirmative  action that  we otherwise 
might have, as the lawyer’s claim that opponents to affirmative action not only 
seems irrational and ill-informed (what, if anything, supports such a judgment); 
it also seems (to me, at any rate) immoral (the idea that those who disagree with 
us are evil seems to me to be a paradigmatically fascist attitude).
I  now want  to  argue that  there is  a  second reason to take  the aims of 
reformist  groups  (to  the  extent  that  those  groups  satisfy  the  Principle  of 
Application’s  desiderata)  to  represent  the  preferences  we  all  would  have 
(collectively)  if  we  satisfied  the  Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory’s 
conditions.  I think, as a general matter, we should recognize that self-interest is 
one of the greatest,  if  not the greatest,  source of bias for individuals.   So, for 
instance, consider Martin Luther King’s famous criticism of white clergy in his 
“Letter from Birmingham Jail.”  Dr. King devotes much of his letter to casting 
doubt  on  whether  the  white  clergy,  despite  their  claims  to  desire  justice, 
genuinely did desire justice.   Dr.  King’s  argument,  more or less,  is  that if  the 
white clergy had a genuine desire for justice, they would not be saying the things 
they were saying, such as that the tactics of civil rights groups as “too much, too 
soon”; they would instead support civil rights groups.
Now, we all know how powerful,  but also subtle, the motivation of self-
interest can be.  Dr. King’s worry, I take it, was that even if members of the white 
clergy truly believed that they desired justice, we have reason to take their desires 
to have been distorted, or biased, by their position of relative privilege.  But now 
if self-interest is such a powerful source of bias, how is it to be counteracted? 
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Here again, it seems as though reformist groups stand for, or represent, the best 
way  to  avoid  this  bias  against  justice.   If  we want  to  estimate,  with  as  much 
accuracy as possible, the preferences that individuals in a society or world would 
have if each of them desire justice,  it would seem that we should defer to the 
preferences of those who have the least reason to be motivated against justice (or 
alternatively, the greatest motivation to desire justice).  But again, it is surely the 
members of reformist groups who best fit this bill.  They are, after all, not only 
subject to injustice, bearing its greatest costs; they are, as members of reformist 
groups, actively seeking to overcome it.
We  have  an  argument,  then,  to  take  the  aims  of  reformist  groups  to 
represent  the  social  preference  ordering  composed  of  the  preferences  that 
members of a particular society, or world as a whole, would have if each member 
of  that  whole  counterfactually  satisfied  the  Fundamental  Principle’s  various 
conditions.  I have just argued,
(1) That the preferences that persons counterfactually would have under 
some set of conditions are best represented by the actual preferences of 
persons actually satisfy those conditions; 
(2) That  the  aims  of  reformist  groups  typically  reflect  the  actual 
preferences  of  large  bodies  of  persons  who  actually  satisfy  the 
Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory’s various conditions.
If we then suppose something that seems eminently plausible, namely, that,
(3) The  aims  of  reformist  groups  thus  reflect  a  single  social  preference 
ordering compose of the actual preferences of large bodies of persons 
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who actually satisfy the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory’s 
conditions.
It follows that,
(4) The aims of reformist groups are the best available representation of 
the  Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory’s  satisfaction 
conditions.
Now clearly, this is not all there is to be said.  Once again, how well a reformist 
group represents the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory’s satisfaction 
conditions (and so, what justice requires) will depend on other features of that 
group.  Some reformist groups, such as the Nation of Islam, pursue some correct 
principles  of  ideal  theory  (equal  civil  rights  for  all  races),  but  also  pursue 
incorrect principles (no racial mixing or intermarriage).  Also, reformist groups 
can  also  be  motivated  by  pernicious  forces,  such  as  revenge  against  their 
oppressors.  Reformist groups can also have poor leaders, their members can be 
poorly informed; and so on.  We should tailor our confidence as to how well a 
particular  reformist  group  represents  the  Fundamental  Principle’s  social 
preference ordering, then, according to how well that group fares along various 
dimensions.  We need a list of desiderata that will enable us to judge how well a 
particular  group  represents  that  preference  ordering.   It  is,  therefore,  the 
Principle of Application’s desiderata that I now turn.
§2.3.2. Stage 2: The Case for the Principle of Application’s Desiderata
I think that we have already seen implicitly, in discussing the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott and other toy cases, how the Principle of Application’s desiderata bear on 
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how well a particular reformist group’s aims represent what justice requires (qua 
the  Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory).   My  aim  in  this  section  is 
simply  to  make  the  case  for  the  Principle  of  Application’s  desiderata  more 
explicit.
§2.3.2.a. Desideratum (a): Correct and Relevant Principles of Ideal Theory and 
Morality 
It is obviously important that the Principle of Application contain desideratum 
(a):  the  desideratum  which  instructs  us  to  aim  to  advance  the  overall  set  of 
tradeoffs endorsed by a majority of the members of that reformist group which 
best satisfies the Principle’s other desiderata, but whose members endorse those 
tradeoffs out of a concern for correct principles of justice.  It is crucial, after all, 
that  we  not  advance  unjust  aims.   We  should  take  desideratum  (a)  to  be 
something like a “side-constraint”, then, on the sort of group whose members can 
satisfy the Principle of Application.  Any failure to satisfy desideratum (a) should, 
in other words, be taken as a disqualifier – one that requires us not to aim to 
satisfy the tradeoffs endorsed by the members of that group.94 Still, conformity to 
the correct-and-relevant-principles requirement can come in degrees – degrees 
that should inform the extent to which we take the preferences of the members of 
a given reformist group to be just.  Let me explain.
94 What if  no reformist groups, past and present, satisfies this desideratum (no group has the 
courage, perhaps, to organize and speak up)?  It is in this case, I submit, that we can do no better 
than appeal to our own hypothetical estimations about what such groups’ aims would be if they 
did exist.
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Suppose, contrary to fact, there had been no NAACP in 1965 – only the 
Nation of Islam.  We have seen that some, but only some, of the principles the 
Nation of Islam pursued were just.  The Nation of Islam did, after all, endorse a 
principle of equality before the law.  Now remember, the Principle of Application 
tells us that we should indeed pursue the tradeoffs endorsed by a majority of the 
members of the group, so long as those tradeoffs are consistent with the common 
obligation we are all under to support the realization of just conditions.  What we 
would have to do in this case, then, is judge to the best of our ability whether a 
particular policy/aim of the Nation of Islam really is in line with justice.  The 
Principle of Application tells us, after all, to tailor our degree of belief as to what 
justice requires here and now, all-things-considered, to how well we can take the 
group  to  satisfy  the  desiderata.   Since  correct  principles  of  justice  are  an 
absolutely vital desideratum – we do not want to ever pursue false principles of 
justice – it follows in the case at hand, according to the Principle of Application, 
that we should pursue the Nation of Islam’s favored set of trade-offs only insofar 
as  we  are  confident  that  those  tradeoffs  really  are  consistent  with  correct 
principles of justice.  Doing this might be difficult, but it would not, presumably, 
be  impossible.   We  can  often  tell,  with  at  least  some  accuracy,  whether  a 
particular  policy  goal,  or  action,  by  a  group  is  informed  by  some  correct 
principle(s) of justice.
It important to keep in mind that precisely which principles we count as 
“correct” will depend on which ideal theory (and possibly, theory of rectification) 
we endorse.  The Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory purports only to 
specify  what  justice  requires  once  we have come to some conclusion(s)  about 
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ideal  theory.   So,  for  instance,  suppose  one  believes  that  Rawls’  theory  of 
domestic  justice  is  correct.   In  this  case,  one  should  take  the  Fundamental 
Principle of Non-Ideal Theory to require us to aim to perform those actions we 
can  expect  to  best  satisfy  the  preferences  that  individuals  would  have if  they 
desired  conformity  with  Rawls’  two  principles  of  justice  –  the  first  of  which 
assigns everyone in society equal  basic rights  and liberties,  and the second of 
which assigns everyone in society equal opportunities and requires the economic 
order to be maximally beneficial to the worst off class in society.  But of course 
one might not accept Rawls’  theory.  One might accept  some other theory, in 
which case one should take the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory to 
require performance of those actions we can expect to best satisfy the preferences 
that individuals would have if they desired conformity with the principles of that 
theory.  And so on.95
One problem that might appear to arise at this point has to do with the 
question of whether reformist groups ever actually do pursue the principles of 
justice of a particular ideal  theory or theory of rectification.   So,  for  instance, 
suppose that one takes Rawls’ theory of domestic justice to be correct.  What are 
we to say about mainstream American civil rights groups?  They clearly pursued 
racial equality (in conformity with Rawls’ first principle of justice).  At the same 
time, however, it seems that we have little to no evidence that those groups were 
pursuing  an  economic  order  that  would  maximally  benefit  the  worst  off  in 
95 What  if  one endorses  no ideal  theory  at  all?   In this  case,  I  take it  that  the  Fundamental 
Principle’s  “correct  principles  of  ideal  theory”  clause  is  vacuously  satisfied  in  this  case,  and 
therefore,  that absent any ideal theory, the Fundamental  Principle collapses more or less into 
utilitarianism.  This is an interesting result, I think.  
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society.  But now if we do not have any good reason to believe that such groups 
were pursuing goals in conformity with both of Rawls’  principles, how can we 
take those groups’  policies to represent the preferences that individuals in the 
larger  domain would have if  those individuals  desired conformity with  Rawls’ 
principles?   The  answer  in  this  case  is  that  Rawls’  principles  tell  us  which 
principles are relevant.  Rawls’ theory specifies that his first principle of justice 
stands in a position of lexical priority over the second principle of justice.  It tells 
us, in other words, that equality of basic rights and liberties is more important 
than equality of opportunity or an economic order that is maximally beneficial to 
the worst  off  in society.   For this reason,  it  seems that even if  American civil 
rights groups were not committed to the realization of an economic order that 
satisfies Rawls’ requirement, this is irrelevant.  The fact that such groups were 
pursuing a society that conformed with Rawls’ first principle is all that is relevant 
in this case.  Thus, we can take such a group as representing the preferences that 
individuals  in  society  would  have  if  individuals  in  society  desired  (Rawlsian) 
justice even if that group is only pursuing conformity with Rawls’ first principle.
But now what if the ideal theory or theory of rectification that one adopts 
is  very  different?   So,  for  example,  suppose one endorses Nozick’s  libertarian 
theory.   Are  there  any reformist  groups  pursuing libertarian  principles?   The 
answer is: of course there are.  Though they are in the vast minority, there are 
libertarian  groups  –  groups  which,  if  we  endorse  a  libertarian  conception  of 
justice (though most of us do not), we must categorize as oppressed by injustice. 
The point,  at  any rate,  is  simply  that  satisfaction  of  the  correct-and-relevant-
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principles-of-justice requirement (desideratum (a)) will  depend on which ideal 
theory, and theory of rectification, one adopts.
2.3.2.b. Desideratum (b): Voluntariness of Participation
The extent to which the members of a group participate voluntarily is surely also 
important.  Our aim, if you recall, is to judge what people in some larger domain 
(i.e. a society or the world) would prefer if they desired justice, etc., in terms of 
what the members of reformist groups actually do prefer.  But of course in order 
to do this we have to come to epistemically justified conclusions about what the 
members of such groups prefer – and this is by no means an easy thing to do.  A 
person’s decision to voluntarily join a particular reformist group would, though, 
seem to be a good indicator of one thing: if a person voluntarily joins a particular 
group, we seem have sufficient reason to conclude that that person prefers that 
group over others.  Now, of course, people join groups for all sorts of reasons, 
such as strategic ones (they expect that the group is more likely to be successful 
than other groups).   Even this fact,  though – that  a person joins a group for 
strategic reasons – seems telling, however.  It supports the idea that the person is 
more interested in, and prefers to support,  a group that has a good chance of 
making progress.  People care about,  and have preferences related to, relative 
“chances of success.”  I may prefer Group A’s aims to Group B’s aims, all things 
being equal, yet I may join Group B because I care not only about the aims of 
these groups but about  the likelihood of  success.   I  choose Group B because, 
when I weigh what I take to be the relevant issues, I see that I prefer Group B’s 
aims all-things-considered (i.e. including my preferences regarding probabilities 
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of  success).   If  I  really  preferred  Group A’s  aims,  all-things-considered  (even 
given, that is,  the poor likelihood of A’s succeeding in its aims), I would have 
surely joined Group A instead.
One  objection  here  might  be  that  sometimes  people  join  a  group  not 
because they really like the group, but rather, because even though they do not 
really like the group very much at all, they nevertheless regard it as the best group 
available (i.e. the “lesser evil”).  Is this a problem for the Principle of Application? 
No.  Remember, the Principle of Application does not purport to be anything like 
an “objectively good” measure of what people actually  prefer any more than a 
democratic election purports to be an “objectively good” measure of what people 
prefer.  Instead, much like a democratic election, in which people vote for the 
best  available  candidate,  what  we  have  with  different  reformist  groups  are 
essentially different “policy packages” that, by joining that group, each member 
can be taken to voluntarily “vote for” above all other available packages.  The fact 
that most people do not “get everything they” want in joining a reformist group 
seems  regrettable  in  a  certain  sense  –  just  as  it  seems  regrettable  that  in 
democracies  we  do  not  typically  get  to  vote  for  candidates  who  endorse 
everything we prefer.   But  is  either  case  really  regrettable?   One of  the  most 
important things that reformist groups do, just like political parties, is solve some 
very difficult informational problems.  I am a member of the Democratic Party in 
the  United  States,  for  example,  in  part  because  I  realize  that,  as  an  ordinary 
citizen – even as a highly educated citizen – there are many things that I just do 
not  know.   I  do  not  know  the  intricacies  of  government  or  economics,  for 
instance,  nearly  as  well  as  a  politician  or  economist.   The  leaders  of  the 
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Democratic Party, then, provide me with a very important service.  It may not 
satisfy  all  of  my preferences,  but then again,  some of  my preferences may be 
based on misunderstandings about politics or economics.  What I do in becoming 
a  voluntary  member,  then,  is  subscribe  to  the  party’s  general  aims (though I 
might  not  agree  with  all  of  its  particular  decisions)  above  the  aims  of  other 
parties.
I  take it,  then, that reformist groups, like political  parties,  represent us 
through something like our voluntary consent.  The goals or actions of a reformist 
group or political  party may not advance all  of  my favored preferences.   Still, 
there  is  every  reason  to  think  that  such  groups  do  the  best  available  job  of 
representing the interests of all of their members as an aggregate (which is what 
the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory requires).  The Democratic Party 
may not aim to advance all, or even most, of my preferences – and even to the 
extent that it does, it may do so in a highly imperfect manner (corruption, for 
instance,  is  always  an  issue).   Still,  the  question  is  whether,  of  all  available 
methods, the Democratic Party is the best method for me to advance my interests 
in a way that gives everyone else roughly the same opportunity to advance theirs 
– or, similarly, whether the NAACP’s actions are the best available representation 
of each of its members’ interests.  I submit that in both cases, to the extent that 
participation is voluntary, we do have good reason to take these methods to be 
the best available.  Democratic representation may be imperfect, but I think most 
of us take it (when it works relatively well and free from corruption) to be the 
best,  or fairest,  form of government available.   My proposal,  similarly,  is  that 
“reformist  group representation”  may be an imperfect  – but  nevertheless,  the 
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best available – way to represent what people would prefer if they desired fully 
just  conditions  and  the  rectification  of  past  injustices.   A  person’s  voluntary 
participation in a group indicates that person’s “vote” for that group, and its aims, 
above other groups and their aims.
2.3.2.c. Desideratum (c): Responsiveness
Like  democratic  representation,  though,  “reformist  group  representation”  is 
surely better when people not only join and participate voluntarily, but when they 
join and participate because they actually think that the group is responsive to 
their  preferences.   To  understand  what  I  mean  here,  recall  the  “lesser  evil” 
objection discussed in the previous section.  I may voluntarily join, and so “vote” 
for a group above other groups, because I prefer the group, and its aims, to other 
groups.  But now even if this shows that I prefer the group to other groups, this 
does not show that I actually prefer the group “simpliciter.”  I may wish there 
were a better group – one that was more responsive to my actual preferences.
The general,  and fairly  obvious point here, is that how well  a reformist 
group  represents  the  interests  of  its  members  –  and  so  (if  I  am  right)  the 
preferences we would all have if we satisfied the Fundamental Principle of Non-
Ideal  Theory’s  conditions  –  intuitively  depends  not  merely  on  the  voluntary 
participation of its members, but also, on how well it actually responds to their 
preferences.  If I voluntarily join a group, that shows that I prefer the groups to 
rival  groups.   It  shows  that  the  group  does  a  better  comparative  job  of 
representing my preferences than other groups do.  We are not merely concerned 
with  making  comparisons,  though.   We  should  tailor  our  confidence  that  a 
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reformist  group’s  actions  represent  its  members’  preferences  –  and  so  the 
preferences we would have if  we satisfied the Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-
Ideal Theory’s various conditions – to how well that group really does respond to 
what its members want.  Moreover, what if the only reformist group available is 
not a voluntary one?  A group that conscripts or coerces its members may still be 
the best available representation of its members’ interests if we have reason to 
believe,  that despite its coercive nature,  it  is  more responsive to its  members’ 
preferences than other groups (if, let us suppose, those groups are coercive too). 
Making  judgments  about  the  responsivity  of  coercive  groups  will  often  be 
difficult, surely, but not necessarily impossible.
At  any  rate,  our  judgment  about  how  well  voluntary  reformist  groups 
respond to their members’ preferences should, for fairly obvious reasons, impact 
our  degree  of  confidence  that  the  group  does  an  objectively  good  job  of 
representing its members interests.   We should desire that reformist groups – 
voluntary or not – be more responsive to their members rather than less.
2.3.2.d. Desideratum (d): Popularity
On  the  account  I  am  proposing,  each  person’s  voluntary  involvement  in  a 
reformist  group is  tantamount  to  that  person casting  a  vote  for  the  tradeoffs 
endorsed by that group over the tradeoffs endorsed by other groups.  As such, it 
should be fairly clear why the comparative popularity of a given reform group is 
an important desideratum.  A reformist group that is more popular than its rivals, 
in essence, enjoys more “votes” than that group.  The claim then is that the more 
support a reformist group has, the greater claim it has to represent the interests 
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of the oppressed.  It is crucial to be careful here, though.  A reformist group may 
enjoy more popularity than another group for all sorts of illegitimate reasons.  A 
“reformist” group may enjoy a great deal of popularity, firstly, because it is not 
really a reformist group in the relevant sense (the sense of pursuing correct and 
relevant  principles  of  justice).   Sometimes,  oppressed  classes  of  individuals 
support groups not out of any sense of justice, but out of a sense of revenge or 
hate.  We need to be sure, once again, to restrict our focus to legitimate reformist 
groups only.   Second, a  reformist  group may enjoy a great  deal  of  popularity 
precisely because it represents only a small portion of an oppressed population. 
We saw that  this  is  the  case  with  the  Nation  of  Islam – a  group which  only 
purports to represent the interests of Black Muslims.  It is for this reason that we 
must now turn, shortly, to desideratum (f): the desideratum which instructs us to 
focus  our  attention  on  that  reformist  group  whose  membership  best 
approximates a sample of the entire class of persons oppressed by a particular 
form of injustice.
2.3.2.e. Desideratum (e): Rationality and Informedness
Because the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory instructs us to aim to 
advance the preferences that individuals would have if they desired justice and 
were  rational,  we should take  the  members of  a reformist  group to represent 
these preferences only insofar as we are reasonably confident that the members 
that compose the group are generally rational, and moreover, that the particular 
preference being expressed is rational.  Let me explain.
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In some cases,  a  reformist group may endorse an irrational  policy goal 
because  its  leaders  lack  adequate  knowledge  of  relevant  aspects  of  economic 
theory.   This is  not the only way that a reformist group can intuitively  fail  to 
represent the preferences that individuals in society or the world would have if 
those individuals desired justice, were rational, and were adequately informed. 
For there are surely other ways that the leaders of a reformist  group (and by 
extension,  its  members)  might  pursue  goals  on  the  basis  of  inadequate 
information.   Recall  that  the  Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory 
instructs us to aim to satisfy the preferences that individuals who desire justice 
but  who  are  otherwise  concerned  with  transition-costs  can  have  if  they  were 
rational  and  adequately  informed.   In  order  to  adequately  represent  these 
preferences, then, we must expect that the members of a reformist group have 
adequate knowledge of the sorts of transition-costs they stand to incur as a result 
of  different  possible  actions,  and  indeed,  adequate  knowledge  of  the  overall 
distribution of costs and benefits they (as individuals) stand to accrue as a result 
of different actions.  
I take it that in many cases, it is quite clear that the members of reformist 
groups are well aware of the sorts of transition-costs they stand to face.  So, for 
example, it is surely the case that the members of American civil rights groups 
were  aware  of  the  benefits  they would accrue  from the achievement  of  equal 
rights, but also well aware of the sorts of transition-costs they would incur under 
various circumstances (e.g. abuse from police during demonstrations, etc.).  In 
cases like these, it seems reasonable to conclude that each member of a voluntary 
reformist group is a member of that group precisely insofar as he/she judges the 
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goals of that group, compared to the goals of any other group in the actual world, 
to  best  match  his/her  rational  and  adequately  informed  judgments  of  which 
actions or policies will be most advantageous for him/her.
In any case, the question of whether the members, and leadership, of a 
reformist group are generally rational and adequately informed will be a matter 
of judgment,  and we should tailor  our confidence about how well  a  reformist 
group represents its members (and therefore us, qua the Fundamental Principle 
of Non-Ideal Theory) accordingly.  
§2.3.2.e.1. The Presumption in Favor of Rationality and Informedness
I  want  to  conclude  this  section,  however,  by  briefly  defending  the  following 
presumption:
The  Presumption  in  Favor  of  Rationality  and  Adequate  Informedness: 
Absent clear and compelling reasons to the contrary, we should presume 
that  the  members  and  leaders  of  reformist  groups  are  rational  and 
adequately informed.
I propose that this presumption is reasonable a few simple reasons.  I believe that 
if history is any indication, people tend to be too quick, rather than too slow, to 
dismiss other people as irrational or inadequately informed.  The sad fact of our 
world is that people tend to think they know what is best for other people and 
tend to foist upon people their views about what the best life to live is whatever 
those people might think themselves.  I believe that history, our own fallibility, a 
proper appreciation of the fact  that each person has their own life to live, we 
should err on the side of caution when it  comes to the prospect of dismissing 
134
others’ views as irrational or inadequately informed.  Unless people are clearly 
ignorant of critical facts or mentally infirm (due to malnutrition), we should trust 
them  to  judge  how  well  their  own  lives  are  going  and  what  they  want  for 
themselves in the future.  I believe, to quote Isaiah Berlin, that we should err on 
the side of caution with respect to paternalism (err, that is, on the side of not 
being paternalistic), for the following reasons: 
[paternalism] is to treat men as if they were not free, but human material 
for me, the benevolent reformer, to mould in accordance with my own, not 
their, freely adopted purpose…to manipulate men, to propel them towards 
goals which you – the social reformer – see, but they may not, is to deny 
their human essence, to treat them as objects without wills of their own, 
and therefore to degrade them.  That is why to lie to men, or to deceive 
them, that is, to use them as means for my, not their own, independently 
conceived ends, even if it is in their own benefit, is, in effect, to treat them 
as sub-human, to behave as if their ends are less ultimate and sacred than 
my own.96
2.7. Desideratum (f): Composition
We come now, finally,  to  the Principle  of Application’s  final  desideratum: the 
desideratum  which  requires  us  to  prefer  reformist  groups  that  more  closely 
approximate a representative sample of all those who suffer whichever injustice is 
attempting to be overcome or rectified.  The basic (and highly intuitive) idea here 
is  that,  all  things  being  equal,  the  more  similar  a  reformist  group  is  to  the 
96 Berlin (1969): 137.
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population whose interests are at issue – namely, the entire population that is 
subject to a particular injustice – the more reason we have to take the preferences 
of  its  members to  represent  the  preferences of  that  population (and then,  by 
extension, the preferences we would all have if we lived up to our obligations to 
desire justice).
Some examples may be helpful here.  We have already encountered one 
such example.  In Montgomery Alabama in the 1950s, the injustice in question 
was segregation of public transportation.  Now, once again, there were competing 
reformist groups in both cases.  On the national level, the NAACP and the Nation 
of Islam were both advocating “reform” – though, as we have seen, we have good 
reason to doubt whether  the Nation of  Islam’s aims were  consistent  with  the 
demands  of  correct  principles  of  justice.   The  point  now  is  that  the  sheer 
similarity  of  a  reformist  group to a  target  population would seem to be good 
reason  for  taking  the  reformist  group  to  represent  the  interests  of  the  target 
group.  Intuitively, the NAACP is more representative of the legitimate interests 
of blacks than the Nation of Islam simply because the NAACP’s membership is 
composed of by blacks from a wide variety of backgrounds, whereas the Nation of 
Islam’s membership is composed of by black Muslims only. 
Now  consider  a  second  example.   Suppose  we  are  interested  in  what 
should be done about  sexual  inequality  in some society  – such as the sort  of 
inequality that exists in Iran.  In this case of Iran, there are numerous groups 
advocating reform.  Some of these groups, such as Women Movement Against 
Fundamentalism in Iran, are located outside of Iran.97  Other groups, such as the 
97 See http://www.wfafi.org/.
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One Million Signatures Campaign, are located within Iran and have made it their 
stated policy aim to include women in Iran in the movement on a grass-roots 
level.98  The desideratum at issue tells us in this case that, all things being equal, 
we should privilege the latter group over the former.  The mere fact that the latter 
group’s membership is composed of women in Iran is good reason to take that 
group to be more sensitive to their interests than the former group.  
We  should  remind  ourselves,  of  course,  that  this  desideratum  is  one 
among several.  The mere fact that a reformist group is similar in composition to 
an oppressed population is not, in itself, reason to think that group satisfies the 
Principle of Application better than another group.  We must always remember to 
judge  how  well  a  particular  group  satisfies  the  Principle  of  Application’s 
desiderata by considering those desiderata together as a class.
§2.3.2.g  –The  Principle  of  Application’s  Desiderata  and  Pitkin’s  Four 
Conceptions of Representation
At the outset of her seminal work on representation, Concept of Representation, 
Hanna Pitkin points out that “representation, taken generally, means the making 
present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or 
in fact…that in representation something not literally  present is considered as 
present in a non-literal sense.”99  This is clearly what the Principle of Application 
is intended to accomplish.  It is intended to represent the Fundamental Principle 
of Non-Ideal Theory’s satisfaction conditions in a way that can lead us to justified 
98 http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article18.
99 Pitkin (1967).: 8-9.
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conclusions  about  which  actions  best  satisfy  those  conditions  (and  hence  are 
required by justice all-things-considered).  The Fundamental  Principle tells  us 
that we should aim to determine which actions, here and now in the real world, 
would best satisfy a class of counterfactual preferences – a class of preferences 
which, given their counterfactual nature, simply are not present.  The Principle of 
Application then purports to represent those preferences – and indeed, which 
action(s), of those available, best satisfies the collective class of those preferences 
– in terms of the “revealed” preferences of the members of reformist groups (the 
tacitly  or explicitly  demonstrated preferences of a majority  of the members of 
whichever group best satisfies the Principle’s desiderata – more on this shortly).  
I  believe we can see that the Principle of Application embodies all  four 
types  of  representation  that  Pitkin  describes:  authorization,  accountability, 
symbolic  representation,  and  descriptive  representation.   Consider  first  what 
Pitkin calls “representation as authorization.”100  The rough, and highly intuitive, 
idea  here  is  that  someone  –  you,  I,  a  lawyer,  a  king  or  queen,  a  group,  a 
democratically elected politician, etc. – can be said to represent another person 
or group insofar as the latter authorizes the former to do so.  We typically say, for 
example, that an attorney is a person’s legal representative just insofar as the 
person consents to that attorney as his/her legal representative (though of course 
a legal representative can be appointed to a person as well).   The Principle of 
Application’s  second desideratum, (b),  appears to  embody something like this 
idea.  That desideratum says that we should favor a reformist group over others 
insofar as its members are voluntary participants.  Why?  The natural idea, I take 
100 Ibid.: 11, 17-23, 25, 27-34, 42-3.
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it,  is  that if  people volunteer in a reformist  organization,  there is  some broad 
sense in which they authorize its actions.  For while they might not approve of the 
group simpliciter – they might wish the group pursued different ends than it does 
– their voluntary participation in the group would seem to indicate that they at 
least prefer the aims of that group over the aims of all other groups that have a 
realistic chance of realizing their aims.
Next, consider Pitkin’s conception of “representation as accountability.”101 
Pitkin notes that while I may authorize a person or group to represent me, that 
person or group may represent me poorly by not being appropriately accountable 
to me.  Indeed, the idea of representation as accountability, as such, is surely a 
large  part  of  why  we take  modern democracies  to  represent  better  than,  say, 
monarchies.  For even if we were to agree that monarchies could be authorized to 
represent  their  people – and many doubt  this  – it  seems that  democratically 
elected politicians, simply insofar as they can be voted out of office, will tend to 
represent at least the most fundamental interests of the people better than kings 
or queens (who are not held accountable to the people by any such methods). 
Notice how well the Principle of Application’s desiderata (c), (d), and (e) appear 
to  embody  this  idea.   These  desiderata  draw  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  a 
reformist group that has greater popularity, is more responsive to its members, 
and is more rational and informed than rival groups will more accountable to its 
members’ interests than rival groups.  
Similar  considerations  speak  in  favor  of  the  desideratum  (c)  –  the 
“popularity” desideratum – as embodying a form of what Pitkin calls “symbolic 
101 Ibid.: 11, 55-9.
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representation.”102  As Pitkin points out, we tend to take a person or group to 
represent simply insofar as people believe that representation is taking place (she 
says, “the only criterion of what counts as a symbol is in people’s attitudes and 
beliefs”).103  So, to take an example, Martin Luther King seems to have been a 
good  representative  of  black  Americans’  desire  for  equal  civil  rights  in  part 
because a very large class of individuals took him to be their representative (even 
if many of them never explicitly authorized him to represent them, even if he was 
not accountable to many of them, etc.).  
Finally, notice that the Principle of Application’s final desideratum – the 
one that instructs us to favor reformist groups which are the most similar overall 
to the classes of persons who suffer (or suffered) injustice – embodies what Pitkin 
calls “descriptive representation.”104  Here, Pitkin cites John Adams’ claim that a 
representative legislature “should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people 
at  large,  as  it  should  think,  feel,  reason  and act  like  them,”105 as  well  as  the 
common claim that a legislature should “be a ‘mirror’ of the nation or of public 
opinion”106 to represent the public properly.  The rough and highly intuitive idea, 
I take it, is that all things being equal, a representative person or body will tend to 
better represent the preferences or interests of those represented insofar as the 
representative is a truer “sample” of the representative class.107  
102 Ibid.: Ch. 5.
103 Ibid.: 100. 
104 Ibid.: Ch. 4.
105 Ibid.: 60.
106 Ibid.: 61.
107 Pitkin (1972): 74
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§2.3.3 – Stage 3: The Case for the Principle of Application’s Fair Compromise 
Clause
The question now is which kinds of judgments we should make when different 
reformist groups – ones with opposing aims – appear to satisfy the Principle of 
Application’s  desiderata  roughly  equally  well.   The  answer  here  is,  I  think, 
relatively straightforward.  Recall that the Principle of Application is an epistemic 
principle – one that says that reformist groups, to the extent that they satisfy 
various desiderata, are the best available indicators of what justice requires (qua 
the  Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory).   To  say  that  two  or  more 
reformist groups satisfy the Principle of Application’s desiderata roughly equally 
well,  then,  is  to  say  that  each  of  those  groups’  aims are  roughly  on a  par  as 
epistemic indicators of what justice requires.  Notice now, however, that opposing 
groups often cite very different  reasons for the aims they espouse.  Consider, if 
you will, the debate about international free trade.  Proponents of international 
free trade often maintain, in favor of their view, that free trade increases growth, 
and  growth  increases  average  levels  of  human  happiness  and  well-being.108 
Opponents of free trade, on the other hand, often cite environmental  damage, 
lack of workplace safety, and other social effects (such as the “homogenization” of 
culture)  as  reasons  to  oppose  free  trade.109  Notice  now  that  although  these 
groups overall aims are directly opposed – the one group favors free trade, the 
other opposes it – the reasons they give to support their respective views are not 
108 See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org and Wilkinson (2007).
109 Cf. Mander and Goldsmith (1996).
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necessarily  opposed.   Suppose,  then,  to  simply  things  greatly,  that  these  two 
groups – “pro-free-traders”  and “anti-free-traders”  – satisfied the Principle  of 
Application’s  desiderata  roughly equally  well.   This is  to say,  once again,  that 
from an epistemic point of view, we have roughly just as much reason to think 
that both groups’ aims indicate what justice requires.  The point now, however, is 
that insofar as each group bases its aims on particular reasons and their reasons 
do not  conflict,  we have clear-cut  epistemic reasons  to  pursue whatever  aims 
advance the conjunction of those non-conflicting aims.  The point to notice now 
is that the conjunction of those non-conflicting aims intuitively amounts to a “fair 
compromise.”   In the case at hand (assume for the sake of argument that the 
basic  story  is  right),  pursuing  the  non-conflicting  aims  of  both groups  would 
require us to pursue neither full-blooded free-trade policies nor full-blooded anti-
free-trade-policies, but rather something in between: a set of trade policies that 
can be expected to increase economic growth, but which also allow certain limits 
to be placed on trade in order to protect the environment, workers, culture, and 
so on.
It is important to note, however, that in some cases a fair compromise as 
such might take a very different form.  Sometimes opposing groups do not merely 
differ  vis-à-vis  their  overall  aims,  but  espouse  fundamentally  incompatible 
reasons.   Suppose,  to  take  another  simple  example,  there  are  two  reformist 
groups, each of which satisfies the Principle of Application’s desiderata roughly 
equally well, but which disagreed over the moral question of whether torture is 
justifiable if it can be expected to prevent devastating terrorist attacks.  The one 
side, suppose, tends to believe that torture is wrong and unjust even if it would 
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save many lives, whereas the other side believes that torture is right (and indeed 
required by morality and justice) if it can be expected to save many lives.  There 
is, it seems, no room for compromise between these two views.  The reasons that 
each group cites in favor of their policy aims are fundamentally opposed to one 
another.  What, then, should we say about this case?  
Remember, once again, that the Principle of Application is an epistemic 
principle.  In this case, then, we have (and please, just assume for the sake of 
argument that the way I have described the case is  correct)  roughly the  same 
epistemic reason to think that torture is a justified response to certain terrorist 
threats as we have to think it is not.  To say that we have as much reason to think 
that something is true as we have to think it is not true, however, is to say that we 
lack sufficient reason to think that either view is correct.  In the case at hand, 
then, the Principle of Application can be thought of as leading to a fair epistemic 
compromise.   We should remain agnostic  about  the case  in question,  judging 
neither that torture is a justified response to injustice, nor that it is not.  In this 
case,  the Principle of Application implies (plausibly,  I think) that more public 
debate  between  the  opposing  reformist  groups  must  occur  until,  hopefully  at 
least, one group wins out over the other vis-à-vis the Principle’s desiderata (at 
which time, following the Principle, we ought to revise our judgment in favor of 
the prevailing group’s aims).
§2.4. CONCLUSION
I have argued that Principle of Application is the best available epistemic guide, 
here  and  now  in  the  real  world,  to  what  justice  requires  vis-à-vis  the 
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Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory.  My aim now will be to apply the 
Principle  of  Application  to  important  questions  of  international  justice:  to 
questions  regarding  human rights  (Chapter  3),  toleration  of  illiberal  societies 
(Chapter 4), and international economic reform (Chapter 5).
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CHAPTER 3
FROM THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF NON-IDEAL THEORY TO 
HIGHER-ORDER HUMAN RIGHTS
This chapter argues that the non-ideal theory of justice that I have defended in 
this dissertation fills a critical gap in human rights theory, establishing a class of 
higher-order human rights to govern how other, first-order human rights are to 
be promoted, protected, and weighed.  §3.1 argues that two prominent analyses of 
the concept of human rights  are defective,  and ought to be replaced with  the 
simple  analysis  (suggested  by  Charles  Beitz)  that  human  rights  are  simply 
whichever rights are fundamental to the moral evaluation of social institutions.110 
§3.2 then argues, in part by reviewing arguments from Chapter 1, that existing 
political theories do not adequately address the question of whether individuals 
or collectives of individuals have transition-related rights – rights relating to how 
unjust  social  institutions  are  to  be  reformed.   I  argue,  as  such,  that  a  fully 
adequate theory of human rights must be grounded, at least in part, in the sort of 
“non-ideal theory” of justice that I have defended in this dissertation: a theory, 
that is, of how to deal justly with injustice.  §3.3 argues from the non-ideal theory 
I have defended to the conclusion that all persons have higher-order human right 
to have social progress (i.e. toward the promotion and better protection of all of 
their  human rights) governed by the two principles of non-ideal  theory that I 
110 Beitz (2001) espouses “a broad view of the scope of human rights,” one that recognizes them as 
a “a standard of assessment and criticism for domestic institutions, a standard of aspiration for 
their  reform,  and…a  standard  of  evaluation  for  the  policies  and  practices  of  international 
economic and political institutions.” (269)
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have defended: the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory and the Principle 
of Application.  §3.4 argues that this higher-order human right implies, by way of 
the  Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory,  a  defeasible  presumption (at 
least  so  far  as  such  a  presumption  is  consistent  with  one’s  wider  theoretical 
commitments)111 that  all  persons  have  an  equal  human  right  to  have  the 
promotion or protection of two fundamental human rights – the rights to life and 
freedom from severe suffering – take priority over the promotion or protection of 
all  other human rights,  including (assuming they are  human rights)  rights  to 
freedom of speech, association, democratic participation, and so on.  Finally, §3.5 
argues, by way of the Principle of Application, that the higher-order human right 
I  defend makes good sense of and illuminates the conflicting moral intuitions 
that many of us have about three difficult questions about human rights: (i) the 
question  of  whether  the  human  right  against  torture  can  ever  be  violated  to 
promote or protect human lives; (ii) the question of whether the United States’ 
invasion of Iraq was justifiable on human rights grounds; and (iii) the question of 
whether some or all  of the members of illiberal-undemocratic societies have a 
human right to “national self-determination”, or non-interference, even though 
those societies are unjust.
§3.1. HUMAN RIGHTS AS RIGHTS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE EVALUATION OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
There is remarkable little philosophical agreement on the nature of human rights. 
Virtually every property that human rights are supposed to have is the subject of 
111 Readers will see in §3.4. that this is a critical constraint to keep in mind.
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active debate.112  Some philosophers maintain that human rights are whichever 
universal moral rights all persons have in virtue of their humanity, personhood, 
agency, or some other feature(s).113  Others believe that human rights need not be 
universal.114  Some argue that there are many human rights.115  Others claim there 
are  only  a  few.116  Some  affirm  that  human  rights  are  rights  of  individual 
persons.117  Others extend human rights to include group rights.118  Many take it 
for  granted  that  human  rights  are  especially  important  rights  establishing 
minimum standards for the treatment of human beings.119  Others maintain that 
at least some human rights may be relatively unimportant.120  Some contend that 
human  rights  are  trans-historical  rights  that  would  exist  even  in  a  “state  of 
nature.”121  Others  argue  that  some  or  even  all  human  rights  depend  on  the 
existence of institutions, particularly nation-states.122  And so on.
These disagreements might not be so disturbing if there were at least some 
agreement on the considerations that are relevant to settling them.  This seems to 
be no such agreement, however.  As James Griffin points out, “The term ‘human 
112 See Griffin (2008): Ch. 1.
113 See e.g., Buchanan (2004): Ch. 2, Gewirth (1982), Griffin (2008): Ch. 2.
114 See Beitz (2001): 269.




118 See James Nickel’s “Human Rights”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
119 Ibid.  See also Charles Beitz’s “Human Rights”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
120 Raz (2007).
121 Tasioulas (2007).
122 See Nickel’s “Human Rights”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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right’  is  nearly criterionless.   There are unusually  few criteria for determining 
when the  term is  used  correctly  and  when incorrectly  –  and  not  just  among 
politicians,  but  among  philosophers,  political  theorists,  and  jurisprudents  as 
well.”123  But now if the philosophy of human rights is to move forward, we surely 
do  need  some  criterion.    Griffin’s  own  suggestion  that  the  term  is  nearly 
criterionless suggests that there is some common ground that we can should all 
be able to agree upon.  But what might that ground be?
One popular  analysis  of  human rights,  which  Raz  calls  the  “traditional 
conception”, takes human rights to be whichever moral rights all persons have in 
virtue  of  their  humanity,  personhood,  agency,  or  some other  feature(s).124  A 
second view,  the  “institutional”  or  “political”  view espoused by  both  Raz  and 
Beitz, is that human rights are those rights that should function as “sovereignty-
limiting”  standards of conduct  for states – standards that  can justify  external 
interference in states, where external interference is understood in a broad sense, 
ranging from mild international criticism to sanctions and, in the most extreme 
cases, military intervention and war.125  
Offhand, both of these analyses might seem somewhat plausible.  Consider 
the traditional conception.  If we think that people have moral rights – and most 
of  us  think  we  do126 –  it  seems  natural  enough  to  identify  as  human  rights 
123 Griffin (2008): 14.  
124 Raz (2007).
125 Raz (2007), Beitz (2001)
126 Though, of  course, some people deny that we do.  Bentham (1816),  for example,  famously 
referred to moral rights as “nonsense upon stilts” (220-30) and claimed that political philosophy 
based upon the preservation of the natural rights of persons is particularly “dangerous nonsense.” 
(180) 
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whichever moral rights all persons have as “as humans.”  The institutional view 
seems to make much better sense, however, of how the phrase “human right” is 
used in practice.  We do not treat all moral rights that people have in virtue of 
being human as human rights.  Every human being presumably has a moral right 
not to  be slandered by his/her associates,  yet  we do not ordinarily  call  this  a 
human right.  Why not?  The answer, Raz points out, is that the phrase “human 
right”  has  evolved  within  a  certain  kind  of  practice,  mainly  the  practice  of 
international law.  When we say that something is a human right, we ordinarily 
mean that it is something that states and international bodies have a common 
duty to promote and protect.  Human rights are not rights of personal morality. 
They are distinctly social rights.
But is Raz correct about the kind of social and political rights human rights 
are?  Raz claims that human rights are whichever rights can justify international 
interference in the internal affairs of states – interference ranging from criticism 
to sanctions to possibly even military intervention or war.  This view of human 
rights is too restrictive, however.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the United Nations Covenant on Civil  and Political  Rights  both assert  (i) 
individual rights to democratic participation, as well as (ii) a collective right of 
peoples  to  determine their  own social,  political,  and cultural  affairs.   Human 
rights  are  not  understood  in  contemporary  law  and  practice,  then,  as  Raz 
understands them.  If peoples have a collective human right to determine their 
own  social,  political,  and  cultural  affairs,  then  (assuming  non-democratic 
societies can be peoples) they have a right to do so – to be free from international 
interference – even if they are undemocratic.  One need not actually accept the 
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existence of a human right to democracy to see, in this case, that human rights 
are not understood in international law and practice as Raz understands them. 
The very idea of a collective human right of peoples to determine their own social, 
political,  and  cultural  affairs  implies  that  other  human  rights  may  not  be 
sufficient to justify international interference in states that fail to respect them.
But if human rights are not the kind of rights that Raz takes them to be, 
what are they?  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other covenants 
seem to support Charles Beitz’s view that human rights are nothing more (or less) 
than whichever rights are fundamental to the evaluation of social institutions per 
se.   They  are,  as  Beitz  puts  it,  nothing  other  than,  “a  moral  touchstone  –  a 
standard of assessment and criticism for domestic institutions…[as well as] for 
the policies and practices of international economic and political institutions.”127  
It is hard to know what exactly might support the claim that this is the 
correct analysis of human rights aside from the (just-noted) fact that it seems to 
conform best to how the concept is used in international law and practice.  One 
potential test, however, might be this: does the analysis, if it is imported into a 
political theory that presently utilizes some other analysis of human rights, lead 
to a more plausible list of human rights than the theory gave under the previous 
analysis?  Indeed, it seems to me that the best test of an analysis of human rights 
must be how well,  overall,  the human rights  claims it  implies conform to the 
judgments we actually make about human rights.128  Let us see, then, whether the 
127 Beitz (2000)
128 I assume of course that no adequate analysis will be ad hoc. 
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analysis  defended here,  when it  is  imported into a  theory,  makes  that  theory 
more plausible than it previously was. 
Rawls  has  been widely  criticized  for  espousing  a  “minimal”  account  of 
human rights in his The Law of Peoples.  He restricts the class of human rights to 
“the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom 
from slavery,  serfdom,  and  forced  occupation,  and to  a  sufficient  measure  of 
freedom of religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal 
equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be 
treated  similarly).”129  Many  of  Rawls’  critics  have  argued  that  this  list  is 
unacceptably short, and that it is as short as it is precisely because he adopts the 
wrong analysis  of  human rights:  an analysis  which identifies  human rights  as 
rights the violation of which can justify military intervention.130  Let us see what 
Rawls’  human rights  commitments  are,  however,  if  we  impose  upon him the 
analysis that human rights are simply whichever rights are fundamental to the 
evaluation of social institutions.
Rawls espouses two theories of justice: a theory of domestic justice and a 
theory  of  international  justice.   According  to  the  analysis  of  human rights  at 
hand,  then – the  analysis  that  human rights  are  simply  whichever  rights  are 
fundamental to the evaluation of social institutions – we must look at both of 
Rawls’  theories,  and  see  which  rights  they  recognize.   According  to  Rawls’ 
domestic theory, a society is domestically just if and only if it conforms to two 
principles of justice: a principle of equal basic social and political rights for all 
129 See Rawls (1999b): 65. 
130 See Beitz (2001), Raz (2007), and Griffin (2001: 307-8; 2008: Ch. 1).
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citizens,  and  a  principle  of  distributive  justice  that  requires  fair  equality  of 
opportunity for all citizens as well as for the society to be otherwise structured so 
that  it  is  to  the  maximum  advantage  of  its  least-advantaged  members.131 
According to Rawls’ theory of international justice, on the other hand, “liberal” 
and  “illiberal  but  decent”  societies  both  have  a  collective  right  to  non-
interference.132  The analysis of human rights proposed here implies, then, that 
Rawls  is  committed  to  roughly  the  list  of  human  rights  recognized  in  the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other covenants.  It commits Rawls 
to  the  claim  that  individuals  have  human  rights  to  freedom  of  expression, 
association, and democratic participation, but also, to the claim that all legitimate 
“peoples” have a human right, as collectives, to determine their domestic affairs 
without international interference.
The analysis of human rights that I have proposed here, then, essentially 
transforms  what  many  philosophers  have  taken  to  be  a  woefully  inadequate 
account of human rights into one that matches up almost precisely with lists of 
human rights that currently dominate international law and discourse.  If this is 
not a strong mark in favor of an analysis of human rights, I do not know what is.  
What I want to do now, at any rate, is to adopt the analysis and see where 
it leads.  For although, as we have just seen, I believe the analysis tends to lead to 
a plausible list of human rights (though the list to which one is led by it will, of 
course, depend ultimately on whichever political theory one takes to be correct), 
131 Rawls (1999a).  Rawls (2005) appears to adopt a somewhat less exacting standard, claiming 
that a society that conforms to his two principles of justice would be the most reasonable, but that 
there are other sufficiently reasonable ways for societies to be organized.
132 Rawls (1999b).
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we will now see that it leads to an important class of transition-related human 
rights that have not yet received the attention they are due.
§3.2. ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING A NON-IDEAL THEORY OF JUSTICE TO BEAR ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A BRIEF REVIEW OF CHAPTERS 1 AND 2
We  saw  in  Chapter  1  that  existing  theories  of  justice  and  human  rights  are 
incomplete in a critical sense.  Existing theories of justice and human rights, at 
least until now, have lacked anything approaching a fully systematic analysis of 
what it is to deal with injustices in a just manner.  This is a serious omission – 
one that I have attempted to rectify in this disseration.  The non-ideal theory of 
justice that I have defended so far aims to provide a general  analysis of what 
justice requires vis-à-vis dealing with injustice.  I argued, first, for reasons I will 
not belabor repeating, that many (if not all) political philosophers should adopt a 
“non-ideal theoretic” version of Rawls’ famous original position (the “Non-Ideal 
Original  Position”)  to  arrive  at  principles  of  non-ideal  theory.   I  then argued, 
second, that the parties to the Non-Ideal Original Position would agree upon the 
following generic principle:
The Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory:  For any action A, agent 
B,  and  less-than-fully-just  social  conditions  C  (past  or  present),  social 
justice  requires B to perform A given C  if  and only if,  of  all  available 
actions,  B  has  sufficient  reason  to  expect  A  to  best  satisfy  the  social 
preference ordering that would exist if every relevant individual (defined 
relative  to  ideal  theory)  were  (i)  rational,  (ii)  adequately  informed,  (iii) 
endorsed the correct principles of ideal theory (and rectification), but (iv) 
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otherwise  desired  to  advance  his/her  transition-related  preferences  (v) 
within the broader constraints of ordinary morality, (vi) given C. 
Finally,  I argued the following “secondary” principle of non-ideal theory is the 
best  available  practical  (i.e.  epistemic)  guide to  whether  any particular  action 
satisfies the Fundamental Principle:
The Principle of Application:  For any action A, agent B, and less-than-
fully-just conditions C, we should tailor our confidence that social justice 
requires B to perform A in direct proportion to the extent to which we can 
expect B’s performance of A to either
(i)  Best  advance the overall  aims of whichever reformist group – 
past,  present,  or  hypothetical  --  best  satisfies  the  following 
desiderata:
g. Its  members  (at  least  tacitly)  pursue  correct,  and 
relevant,  principles  of  ideal  theory,  rectification,  and 
morality;
h. Its members are voluntary participants;
i. Its  leadership  is  equally  responsive  to  each  of  its 
members’ interests;
j. It has more members than rival reformist groups;
k. Its leadership and members are rational and adequately 
informed; and
l. Its membership is more similar to the complete class of 
individuals  who  suffer  C’s  injustice(s)  than  any  other 
group;
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Or, if more than one reformist group appears to satisfy these desiderata 
roughly equally well, 
(iii)Best advance a fair compromise between the overall aims of the 
reformist groups in question.
I will now argue that these two principles imply a higher-order human right: the 
right of all persons to have injustice met in ways that conform to these very two 
principles.
§3.3. FROM THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF NON-IDEAL THEORY TO A HIGHER-ORDER HUMAN RIGHT 
TO HAVE THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONFORM TO THE TWO PRINCIPLES 
OF NON-IDEAL THEORY
Recall that according to the analysis of human rights I have proposed, a right is a 
human right if and only if it is a right fundamental to the evaluation of social 
institutions.  The standard Hohfeldian analysis of rights analyzes rights, however, 
in terms of duties.133  So, for example, the standard analysis of a “claim-right” is 
as follows:
A has a claim that B φ if and only if B has a duty to A to φ.134
The two principles of non-ideal theory that I have defended, though, assign duties 
to individuals.  They imply, for every individual, that that individual has a duty, 
133 Hohfeld (1919).
134 From  Leif  Wenar’s  entry,  “Rights,”  in  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/.
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founded in justice, to perform a particular action (in response to some injustice) 
if,  and  only  if,  that  agent  can  expect  the  action  to  satisfy  certain  conditions 
(namely, the conditions laid out in the principles).  Accordingly, according to the 
Hohfeldian analysis, every individual has a claim-right upon herself and all other 
individuals who fall under the purview of the two principles of non-ideal theory, 
for injustices to be dealt with in accordance with those two principles.  We can 
put this even more simply as follows: namely, that each person has a right for 
injustices  to  be  dealt  with  in  conformity  with  the  two  principles  of  non-ideal 
theory.
Whatever  other human rights  people might  have (according to existing 
political theories), then, if the analysis of human rights that I have defended here 
is  correct  and  the  non-ideal  theory  of  justice  I  have  defended  is  correct,  all 
persons have a human right for injustices to be dealt with in accordance with the 
two principles of non-ideal theory.
Notice,  first,  that  this  human  right  is  a  higher-order  right  in  that  it 
requires all other human rights (whatever those rights may be, e.g. the rights to 
freedom of association, speech, etc.) to be promoted and protected in a certain 
kind of way: namely, in conformity with the two principles of non-ideal theory. 
The second thing to note is that this higher-order right has contextually sensitive 
and relativistic implications (plausible ones, I think).  Suppose, for example, that 
the reformist group that best satisfied the Principle of Application’s desiderata in 
certain case change its mind from favoring some type of action A at one time to 
favoring not-A at a later time (due, perhaps, to the negative effects that A has had 
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on individuals  so  far).   It  follows  from  the  higher-order  human  right  I  have 
defended here that we should take A to be required by justice initially but not-A 
to be required by justice later on.  Is this unintuitive?  I think not.  The idea that 
requirements of justice can change, depending upon “facts upon the ground,” is 
not at all implausible.  It is important to see, however, that although the higher-
order  human right  that  I  have  defended  has  these  contextually  sensitive  and 
relativistic implications, it does not imply that human rights change over time. 
Recall that on my analysis human rights are whichever rights are fundamental to 
the evaluation of social institutions.135  The two principles of non-ideal theory are 
surely fundamental to the evaluation of social institutions.  Every person has a 
claim-right to have social progress conform to them.  The particular duties that 
those principles can imply at different times on the other hand (a duty to perform 
A at time t but not-A at time t*) are not fundamental to the evaluation of social 
institutions  for the simple reason that they are contextually  sensitive and can 
change over time.
§3.4.  FROM THE HIGHER-ORDER HUMAN RIGHT TO THE PRESUMPTIVE PRIORITY OF “BASIC” 
HUMAN RIGHTS OVER OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS
I believe that the higher-order human right just discussed leads us to a particular 
kind of presumption in favor of the priority of two basic rights – the rights to life 
and freedom from severe suffering – over all other rights (though, as we will soon 
see, we must be very careful when it comes to defining the precise nature of the 
presumptive priority).
135 Rawls (1999a): 53.
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My  argument  for  a  presumption  in  favor  of  the  priority  of  the  two 
aforementioned  “basic”  human  rights  over  other  all  other  human  rights  is 
straightforward.   It is  a truism, after all,  that people – even those who desire 
justice – tend to care about their own lives and basic well-being over other things. 
There are, to be sure, always the brave few who are willing to sacrifice their life 
and well-being for the achievement of liberal conditions (such as, for example, 
the  few  brave  dissidents  in  China  who  are  willing  to  openly  oppose  the 
Communist regime at risk of prolonged imprisonment).  These people are surely 
exceptions among humanity, however, not the norm. But now if this is true – if 
most people who are rational,  adequately informed, and desire justice tend to 
prefer their own self-preservation over all other things – then the Fundamental 
Principle of Non-Ideal Theory implies straightaway that we have a presumptive 
duty to promote and protect two basic rights, the rights to life and freedom from 
severe suffering, over all other rights, at least insofar as doing so is consistent 
with principles of ideal theory, rectification, and morality more broadly.  
It is absolutely critical to keep the italicized portion of this presumption in 
mind, however.  Recall that the non-ideal theory that I have defended is intended 
to  be,  as  far  as  possible,  neutral  between  different  ideal  theories,  theories  of 
rectification, and theories of morality.  Recall  moreover, that the Fundamental 
Principle of Non-Ideal Theory in particular states that justice requires us to aim 
to  deal  with  injustices  in  whichever  ways  we  can  expect  to  best  advance  the 
preferences that all relevant persons would have as an aggregate (transformed, 
once again, into a single social preference function) if each of those individuals 
were  rational,  adequately  informed,  accepted  the  correct  principles  of  ideal 
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theory, rectification, and morality, under whichever conditions of injustice are at 
issue.  The Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory, as such, is supposed to 
be deeply sensitive to the theorist’s wider commitments within ideal theory and 
morality more generally.  The presumption in favor of the priority of the basic 
rights of individuals to life and freedom from severe suffering must, as such, be 
understood relative to the theorist’s wider commitments – commitments which 
might limit the scope of the presumption in important ways.  Let me explain.
One fairly  common point of disagreement in moral  and political  theory 
concerns  distinctions  between  “positive”  and  “negative”  rights  and  duties.136 
Although these distinctions  are  difficult  (and,  some would argue,  incoherent), 
they at least seem highly intuitive.  A negative right is one that precludes certain 
treatment of persons; whereas a positive right is one that requires people to take 
particular actions for the sake of others.  So, for example, if the right to life is 
understood merely as a negative right, it is nothing more than a right not to have 
my life taken by others.  It would be a positive right only if it required others to 
save my life.  If the right to life is merely a negative right, others have duties not 
to stab me to death, but no duty to save my life if I am drowning.  Similarly, if the 
right to freedom from suffering (as I call it) is a purely negative right, it is to be 
understood  as  a  right  for  others  not  to  cause  others  severe  suffering,  not  a 
(positive) right to alleviate their suffering.
These distinctions must therefore figure into the presumptive priority of 
“basic” human rights that I have defended.  A theorist who believes that all rights 
136 See §2.1.8 of “Rights” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/.
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are negative rights must understand the presumption I have defended as coming 
to this: if we are forced to choose (e.g., by some conditions of injustice) between 
violating  many  individuals’  right  to,  say,  freedom  of  speech  and  violating  a 
person’s  right  to  life  –  if  that  is,  there  are  no  other  options  –  we  must 
presumptively violate the right of free speech of the many for the sake of not 
violating the right to life of the single individual.  Notice, however, that on this 
sort of view, we still never have any positive duties to save the lives of others.  The 
presumption in favor of the priority of the two “basic” human rights (i.e. to life 
and  freedom  from  severe  suffering)  is  limited  by  the  theorist’s  wider 
commitments.
The manner in which ideal theory and morality more generally can both 
limit the scope of the presumption I have defended here (the presumption that 
the “basic” rights to life and freedom from severe suffering are to take priority 
over other rights) enables the presumption to avoid some implausible results. 
Consider, for example, the old “sheriff and the mob” case.  A sheriff knows that he 
might be able to prevent a deadly riot (saving numerous lives) by sacrificing a 
single individual’s right to a fair trial (convicting the person to placate the mob). 
One might have thought that the presumption in favor of the priority of basic 
rights that I have defended implies (contrary to what most of us think) that the 
sheriff  has  a  duty,  founded  in  justice,  to  convict  the  innocent  individual  to 
prevent the riot.  Suppose, however, that our ideal theory assigns only negative 
duties to individuals.  In that case, the presumption in favor of the priority of 
basic rights (that I have defended) requires the sheriff to be concerned only with 
how he treats the person on trial; he has no positive duties to try to prevent other 
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people (namely, the mob) from doing immoral things.  The presumption merely 
requires  the  sheriff,  if  he  has  to  choose  (for  some reason,  such  as  extortion, 
suppose) between killing or torturing the person on trial,  on the one hand, or 
sacrificing that person’s right to a fair trial on the other, he should presumptively 
choose the latter (sparing the person’s life at the cost of a fair trial).
I submit, at any rate, that because most people are typically unwilling to 
sacrifice their own fundamental interests in life and freedom from suffering for 
the achievement of less-basic  matters  of justice,  the Fundamental  Principle of 
Non-Ideal Theory implies, within whichever broader constraints of ideal theory 
and morality we take to be correct, that the most “basic” rights of individuals – 
their  rights  to  life  and  freedom  from  suffering  –  are  to  presumptively  take 
priority over all other human rights.137
I suspect some readers may take these restrictions – the sense in which 
ideal theory and morality more generally constrain how the presumption in favor 
of the priority of the two basic rights over all other rights is to be understood – to 
effectively gut the presumption all, or almost all, of whatever force it might have 
appeared to have.  What do we learn, one might wonder, from the claim that 
justice requires us to presumptively prioritize the basic rights to life and freedom 
from suffering over other rights?  Don’t most ideal theories of justice, and indeed 
theories of morality more generally, usually already contain some provision(s) in 
favor of the priority of basic human interests to life (and such) over less basic 
137 I should add that the right to life probably takes presumptive priority over the right to freedom 
from suffering since, plausibly at least, most people would rather live and suffer rather than die 
(though, surely, things do get fuzzy here; I do not think that there is clearly a presumptive priority 
of the right to life over the right to freedom from suffering).
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interests?  My reply is (1) that of course most theories do prioritize these things, 
but that (2) the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory provides yet another 
way  of  understanding  the  nature  and  justification  of  such  a  priority.   The 
Fundamental  Principle  was,  after  all,  derived  from  the  Non-Ideal  Original 
Position:  a  device  that  represents  all  persons  who  otherwise  have  correct 
principles of ideal theory and morality in mind as deliberating to principles for 
meeting  injustice.   The Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory  therefore 
reveals that whatever (if anything) ideal theory or morality more broadly might 
say about the priority (or lack thereof, perhaps), there are distinct grounds within 
non-ideal  theory  for  presumptively  assigning  human  life  and  freedom  from 
suffering greater moral importance than other rights or values.  I take it, then, 
that the argument from the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory to the 
presumption I have defended in this section at least adds to our understanding of 
why human life and freedom from suffering are (as they intuitively are) of such 
great importance.  They are of such great importance, at least in part, because 
otherwise  free  and  rational  individuals  in  a  hypothetical  situation  of  equality 
would  agree  to  such  a  presumption,  regardless  of  whichever  other  moral 
principles of principles of ideal theory those individuals might accept.
It is, at any rate, important to keep in mind that the presumption I have 
just defended (however we fill out its content, i.e. as consisting of negative duties 
only, or including positive duties, and so on) is just that: a presumption.   As we 
will see now (in §3.5), I believe that we can utilize the Principle of Application to 
establish when, and why, the presumption is defeated.  
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§3.5. HOW THE HIGHER-ORDER HUMAN RIGHT ILLUMINATES “HARD CASES”
In this section I will apply my analysis of human rights to a few “hard cases”, 
cases  that  are  often  discussed  in  the  human  rights  literature  and  within 
international  human  rights  discourse,  are  the  subject  of  ongoing,  and  often 
intense debate, and which many of us have conflicting moral intuitions about: the 
cases  of  (1)  whether  torture  is  ever  justified,  (2)  whether  the  United  States’ 
invasion and occupation of Iraq is justifiable on humanitarian grounds, and (3) 
whether  the  members  of  illiberal-undemocratic  societies  have  a  (collective) 
human right to “self-determination.”  I will not try to resolve any of these issues 
here.  I want to show only that the account of human rights that I have developed 
here makes good sense of the conflicting intuitions that many people have about 
these cases, and has important, and plausible, things to say about them.
§3.5.1.  The Human Right Against Torture
It is widely recognized that there is a human right against torture.138  Yet, many of 
us are somewhat ambivalent about this right.  What if, the saying goes, we could 
save millions of lives by torturing suspected terrorists?  Why wouldn’t that be 
justified?   Don’t  the lives  of  millions  outweigh the  well-being of  a  small  few, 
especially when we have reason to believe those few to be guilty of plotting the 
deaths of millions?    Let us see what answers the non-ideal theory of justice that I 
have defended gives to these questions.
138 See  e.g.  The Universal  Declaration of  Human Rights,  as well  as Nickel’s  “Human Rights”, 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/.
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Recall  that  on  the  account  of  human  rights  I  have  developed  here,  by 
reference  to  the  non-ideal  theory  of  justice  that  I  have  defended,  there  are 
“fundamental”  human  rights  to  life  and  freedom  from  severe  suffering  that, 
presumptively at least, take priority over other human rights.  The presumptive 
priority  of  these  basic  rights  is  grounded  in  the  fact  that  people,  generally 
speaking – even those who accept the correct principles of ideal theory, and so on 
– surely tend to care  about  and prefer their  own self-preservation over other 
matters of justice.  Still, people do not always care more about self-preservation 
than other things.  It is often said that torture, even if it would save lives, is a 
betrayal  of  “American  values.”139  What  is  meant  by  this,  exactly?   Different 
people have different ideas about what “American values” are, and it is not my 
aim to debate this question.  I want to suggest instead that whatever “American 
values” may be, it is nevertheless arguably the case that many Americans actually 
do prefer to run the risk of losing their lives in a terrorist attack than have the 
American government engage in acts of torture to protect their lives.  At the very 
least, I think that I prefer this.  The idea that the American government is making 
me  better  off  by  torturing  people  is  not  something  that  fits  with  my  values. 
Notice now, however, that if enough people are like this – if a majority of people 
in (say) America prefer the U.S. government not to torture people even if torture 
would save American lives – then, on the non-ideal theory that I have defended, 
torture (by the American government, at least) is indeed an unjust betrayal of 
what most Americans value.
139 See Sands (2008).
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I submit, moreover, that the Non-Ideal Theory I have defended has more 
to say about the justice of torture than this. The justice of torture is not, after all, 
a purely American issue.  Recall that one of the most basic points of the non-ideal 
theory that I have developed – an idea contained in the Fundamental Principle of 
Non-Ideal Theory – is that we must aim only to advance the legitimate interests 
of individuals,  where these are understood in terms of the preferences people 
would  have  if  they  (i)  accepted  the  correct  principles  of  ideal  theory  and 
rectification, and (ii) were rational and adequately informed, (iii) within whatever 
broader  constraints  of  morality  exist.   Recall  next  that  the  Principle  of 
Application  is  a  practical  principle  for  estimating  what  would  best  advance 
individuals’ legitimate interests as such.  A minute’s reflection on the Principle of 
Application  suggests,  however,  that  Americans  as  a  class  do  not  satisfy  that 
Principle’s  desiderata  nearly  as  well  as,  say,  the international  community as  a 
whole (the vast majority of which has agreed, in the Geneva Conventions, upon 
the prohibition against torture).  The international community not only consist of 
a much larger class of individuals than the United States (qua desideratum (d)); it 
also consists of a class of individuals that is more similar overall to the complete 
class of individuals whose lives might be protected from terrorism via torture, 
since  all  of  the  world’s  individuals  are  potential  targets  of  terror  (qua 
desideratum  (f);  it  has  reached  a  consensus  that  torture  is  immoral  (thus 
satisfying desideratum (a) better than the U.S., since one obvious test of whether 
a group is pursuing correct principles of ideal theory, rectification, and morality 
must surely be worldwide consensus on which principles are correct); and so on. 
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The Principle of Application thus seems to imply that the United States’ 
use of torture is doubly unjust – unjust, first, because its use of torture thwarts 
international consensus against torture, but also, because (at least arguably) a 
large number of Americans themselves seemingly do not want the U.S. to utilize 
torture in their name (i.e. for the sake of their personal safety).
§3.5.2.  Human Rights and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq
I submit that my account has similar implications with respect to the question of 
whether it is just for the United States and its cooperating allies to invade and 
occupy  Iraq.   First,  as  I  argued  in  Chapter  2,  the  United Nations  and a  vast 
majority international community more generally – both of which opposed the 
invasion of Iraq at the time at which it occurred – each satisfy the Principle of 
Application’s desiderata better overall  than the United States and pro-invasion 
forces.   Secondly,  and perhaps more importantly,  the Principle  of  Application 
draws our attention to the Iraqi people themselves.  There is, so far as anyone 
knows,  no  evidence  that  a  majority  of  Iraqis  –  even  those  who  thought  that 
Saddam Hussein’s regime was deeply unjust – wanted to risk their lives or the 
lives of their loved ones for the sake of regime-change.  There is, moreover, no 
evidence, so far as I know, that a majority of Iraqis desire the occupying forces to 
remain in their lands.  Offhand, however, the Iraqi people are the people that the 
Principle  of  Application (and indeed,  the Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal 
Theory) would have us focus upon the most.  They are the people who have to 
bear by far the greatest costs of the war and continued occupation.  The point 
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then is that if the two “reformist” groups that (arguably) best satisfy the Principle 
of Application in this case are (i) the international community as a whole, and (ii) 
the Iraqi people, but (iii) all of the evidence we have indicates that neither group 
preferred the invasion or continued occupation, then we clearly have sufficient 
reason to think that the invasion and occupation are both grave injustices.
§3.5.3.  The “Human Right to National Self-Determination”
Finally,  many of us have conflicting intuitions about whether members of the 
international  community  ought  to  exert  pressure  on  illiberal/undemocratic 
societies.  On the one hand, many of us feel that it is our duty to combat injustice 
wherever it occurs.  On the other hand, many of us also feel that, in some sense, 
we  ought  to  let  different  societies  “solve  their  own  problems”,  and  indeed, 
recognize right to “national self-determination.”  This ambivalence is reflected, in 
fact,  in  contemporary  human  rights  documents  and  treaties.   The  very  first 
section of the first article of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights recognizes that, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”140  At the very same time, however, 
the covenant recognizes, “the obligation of States under the Charter of the United 
Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
freedoms”141,  including  rights  to  freedom  of  speech,  association,  religion, 
140 Article 1, §1.
141 Preamble.
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democratic participation, and non-discrimination.  On the face of it, these two 
assertions stand in opposition.   How can the states of the charter be under a 
common  obligation  to  promote  those  conditions  and  under  an  obligation  to 
respect  the  right  of  all  peoples  to  freely  determine  their  political,  economic, 
social, and cultural development?  I believe that the non-ideal theory of justice 
that I have defended can answer this question.  As we will see in the next chapter, 
I believe that the obligation of justice that we are all under to promote the sorts of 
liberal-democratic conditions the Covenant recognizes involves a presumption, 
on  behalf  of  the  wishes  of  reformist  groups  within  illiberal/undemocratic 
societies,  in  favor  of  allowing  those  societies  to  achieve  liberal-democratic 
conditions themselves.  If this is right, then the two sorts of obligations asserted 
by the Covenant are not in conflict.   We do have a duty to promote universal 
respect for liberal-democratic freedoms.  It is just the case that we fulfill that duty 
by  allowing  illiberal-undemocratic  societies  to  progress  “in  their  own  way” 
(within certain bounds).  I will try to show next, in Chapter 4, precisely why this 
is, and what those bounds are.
§3.6. CONCLUSION
I have  adopted, and attempted to provide further defense of, Charles Beitz’s view 
that  human  rights  are  simply  the  rights  fundamental  to  evaluating  social 
institutions.  I then argued, on the basis of this analysis, that the non-ideal theory 
of justice I have advanced in this dissertation fills an important gap in human 
rights – that gap being that existing theories of human rights have not been based 
upon any systematic analysis of which kinds of costs can be justly imposed upon 
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people for the sake of  promoting or protecting their  human rights.   If  Beitz’s 
analysis of human rights is correct, and the two principles of non-ideal theory 
that I have defended are correct, it follows that all persons have a higher-order 
human right to have all of their other human rights promoted and protected in 
conformity with the two principles of non-ideal theory.  I argued, furthermore, 
that these two principles justify a presumption in favor of the priority of two basic 
human rights – the rights to life and freedom from severe suffering – though I 
have also noted that the precise nature of this presumption depends on wider 
theoretical issues, such as whether rights are “positive,” “negative,” and so on. 
Finally,  I  argued  that  the  two  principles  of  non-ideal  theory  illuminate  some 
“hard” human rights cases that have been the subject of much debate – cases, 
such as the permissibility to violate the human right against torture for the sake 
of protecting the human right of many others to life. 
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CHAPTER 4
FROM THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF NON-IDEAL THEORY TO
INTERNATIONAL TOLERATION
It is hard to see how justice might require, or even allow, foreigners to tolerate 
unjust societies.  Injustices might even seem to be by definition the sort of thing 
that it is unjust to tolerate, since to say that something is unjust is, intuitively, to 
say that it ought not to be the case.  I hope to show here, however, that it is not 
only  possible  for  justice  to  require  foreigners  to  tolerate  unjust  societies,  but 
indeed, that we have sufficient reason to reach the defeasible conclusion (one that 
further  evidence,  as  we  will  see,  could  overthrow  in  the  future)  that  justice 
requires  international  toleration  of  unjust  societies,  at  least  insofar  as  those 
societies respect the most basic rights of individuals.
§4.1  of  this  chapter  discusses  the  concept  of  toleration,  settling  on  a 
particular definition that I take to be adequate for my purposes.  §4.2 criticizes 
arguments  both  for  and  against  tolerating  unjust  societies.   §4.3  then  briefly 
reviews the non-ideal theory of justice that I have defended in this dissertation – 
the theory I have defended of what it is to justly deal with injustice.  §4.4 uses the 
Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory that I defended in Chapter 1 to argue 
that  justice  can,  at  least  in  principle,  require  foreigners  to  tolerate  unjust 
societies.  §4.5 then uses the Principle of Application that I defended in Chapter 2 
to argue that, given our present evidence, justice defeasibly permits foreigners to 
tolerate  unjust  societies  that  adequately  respect  the  most  basic  rights  of 
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individuals.  Finally, §4.6 briefly explains why an analogous argument does not 
justify citizens tolerating unjust conditions in their own societies.
§4.1. THE CONCEPT OF TOLERATION
In order to adequately answer the question of whether, and if  so how exactly, 
justice allows or requires foreigners to tolerate illiberal societies, we must come 
to  a  adequate  understanding  of  what  toleration  is,  including  which  sorts  of 
actions on the part of foreigners would express toleration for such societies, and 
which actions would express non-toleration.  
It  is  surprisingly  difficult,  however,  to  define  the concept  of  toleration. 
There  is  some  disagreement,  for  instance,  over  whether  we  must  morally 
disapprove of something in order to tolerate it, or whether we can tolerate things 
we merely dislike.142  We need not settle  this or other such issues in order to 
adequately  pin  down  the  concept  of  toleration  adequately  for  our  purposes, 
however.   Since  cosmopolitan-egalitarians  do  find  illiberal  societies  morally 
objectionable, the question of whether it is possible to tolerate things one merely 
dislikes is not relevant to our inquiry.
One issue that is relevant, however, is the distinction between toleration 
and “mere acquiescence.”  It is widely agreed that we do not tolerate things when 
we merely acquiesce to them, where this is understood as the choice to refrain 
from acting merely because one thinks one can do nothing to change whatever it 
142 Cohen (2004): 88-90.  See also Creppel (2002): 2-3; Deveaux (1998): 409; Galeotti (2002): 
20-22, 50-51; and Raz (1986): 403.
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is of which one disapproves.143  In this case, one has no real choice but to put up 
with  the  thing  of  which  one  disapproves  against  one’s  will.   Toleration,  it  is 
agreed,  is  the  choice  to  put  up  with  something  one  disapproves  of  out  of 
principle.  
This  distinction  is  important  insofar  as  it  is  sometimes  claimed  that 
liberals  should not  attempt  to  promote  liberal  conditions  in  illiberal  societies 
because,  as  a  matter  of  empirical  fact  (or  at  least  conjecture),  we  should not 
expect our doing so to be successful.  It is surely an important and interesting 
empirical  question  whether  we  should  ever  expect  actions  by  foreigners  to 
successfully promote liberal conditions in illiberal societies.  It is not, however, 
the issue of toleration.  The question that I am concerned with, in any case, is 
whether foreigners ever ought to tolerate illiberal societies out of principle.
Note that toleration, as such, need not be an all-or-nothing thing.  I have 
already indicated, in previewing this chapter’s main argument, that I believe that 
cosmopolitan-egalitarianism requires  us not  to  tolerate  the  violation  of  “basic 
rights”, but that it also at least defeasibly allows us to tolerate illiberal societies to 
the extent that they adequately respect those basic rights.  What I am defending, 
then, is a “limited” (as well as defeasible) scheme of toleration.  My view is not 
that  cosmopolitan-egalitarianism  defeasibly  permits  foreigners  to  tolerate 
anything  and everything  an illiberal  society  might  do.   It  is  only  that  we  are 
defeasibly permitted to tolerate those societies to the extent that those societies to 
“adequately” respect basic rights (I will say more about the notion of “adequacy” 
143 King (1998): 22-3.
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in due course).  It is also worth noting that we might be justified in tolerating a 
certain thing in some ways but not others.  So, for instance, there are various 
ways  in  which  a  foreign  society  might  express  an  attitude  of  non-toleration 
toward another society.  The former society might express its disapproval of the 
other society in various ways, such as by imposing political or economic sanctions 
upon it, by engaging in military action upon it, or perhaps merely by providing 
the society with positive political or economic incentives to become more liberal.  
In  light  of  the  considerations  just  discussed,  I  propose  the  following 
definition of toleration as adequate for our purposes:
Definition of Toleration: An agent S tolerates X in some way W if and only 
if (i) S morally disapproves of X, and (ii) S engages in W to allow X to 
continue to obtain on the basis of some principle of morality or justice that 
S endorses.
We can then move from this  definition to the following definition of  justified 
toleration:
Definition  of  Justified  Toleration:  An  agent  S  is  morally  justified  in 
tolerating X in some way W if and only if (i) S morally disapproves of X, 
and (ii) S engages in W to allow X to continue to obtain on the basis of 
some (true) principle of morality or justice that S endorses.
Now that we have these definition on hand, let us evaluate from a cosmopolitan-
egalitarian  perspective  the  sorts  of  arguments  that  have  been  given  for  and 
against the view that foreigners should tolerate illiberal societies.  
173
§4.2. CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TOLERATION
I  will  argue  in  this  section  that  actual  and  potential  arguments  both  for  and 
against international toleration of unjust societies are unconvincing. 
§4.2.1.b. Communitarian Arguments
Contemporary arguments for international toleration often stress how happy or 
secure individuals feel under the conditions in which they find themselves, and 
how disorientating and alienating they find liberal conditions.144  The Stanford 
Encyclopedia’s entry entitled “Nationalism” suggests four variants of the sort of 
“communitarian” argument suggested here for international toleration. The first 
variant,  the  “Argument  From  Flourishing,”  states  that  an  “ethno-national 
community is  essential  for  each of  its  members  to  flourish.”145  One potential 
argument for international toleration, then, might be this:
THE FLOURISHING ARGUMENT
(a) Failure to tolerate unjust societies undermines those societies’ ethno-
national  communities  and therefore the ability of  their members to 
flourish.
(b) Justice requires advancing or at least protecting the ability of people to 
flourish.
(c) So, justice requires the toleration of unjust societies.
144 See e.g. Beitz (2001): 271-4 for a nice overview and brief discussion of some such arguments.
145 §3.2., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/
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A second argument, the “Argument From Identity,” is similar but focuses not on 
human flourishing but on human identity.  As Neilsen says,
We are, to put it crudely, lost if we cannot identify ourselves with some 
part of an objective social reality: a nation, though not necessarily a state, 
with  its  distinctive  traditions.  What we find in people — and as deeply 
embedded as the need to develop their talents — is the need not only to be 
able to say what they can do but to say who they are. This is found, not 
created, and is found in the identification with others in a shared culture 
based  on  nationality  or  race  or  religion  or  some  slice  or  amalgam 
thereof.  ...  Under modern conditions,  this  securing and nourishing of a 
national  consciousness  can  only  be  achieved  with  a  nation-state  that 
corresponds to that national consciousness.146 
We can, then put the Argument from Identity (or simply, the Identity Argument) 
as follows:
THE IDENTITY ARGUMENT
(a) Failure to tolerate unjust societies undermines the ability of members 
of those societies to form and maintain their own identity.
(b) Justice requires advancing or protecting the ability of persons to form 
and maintain their identity.
(c) So, justice requires foreigners to tolerate unjust societies.
146 Nielsen (1998): 32
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 A  third  argument,  the  “Argument  From  Moral  Understanding”,  suggests 
similarly that toleration might be justified because it is only through their own 
cultural situation that individuals are able to engage with and understand moral 
ideas  and  arguments.147  Finally,  there  is  the  “Argument  From  Diversity,”  an 
argument that suggests that toleration might be justified somehow by the fact 
that “each [culture] presents a wonderful exfoliation of human potentialities in its 
own  time  and  place  and  environment.”148  There  are  other  variations  on  the 
general of theme of these arguments as well.  
There are these kinds of arguments for international toleration of unjust 
societies.  One problem is empirical.  All of the arguments just mentioned depend 
on  empirical  claims  (e.g.,  about  flourishing,  identity,  the  ability  to  form 
conception of the good, etc.).  Are the empirical claims true?  Mere intuition is 
not in general a good guide to empirical matters.  You may think that the ability 
of individuals to flourish, form an identity, or form and pursue a conception of 
the good, all  depend on a relatively stable culture;  I may disagree.  What can 
settle the issue?  Some of the claims these arguments make – such as the claims 
about  identity  –  seem  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  test  (how  can  we 
operationalize the relevant notion of identity?).  The empirical claims that these 
arguments  make  that  do  seem testable,  on  the  hand –  such  as  claims  about 
happiness and flourishing – seem, however, to be demonstrably false.  Empirical 
studies  have  repeatedly  supported  the  idea  that  liberal  conditions  correlate 




strongly with both “subjective” (i.e. self-reports) and “objective” (e.g. incidents of 
crime, average levels of wealth, etc.) measures of human happiness or well-being. 
Table A (below) illustrates the widely confirmed positive correlative relationship 
between reports  of  subjective  well-being and liberal-democratic  conditions,  as 
and widely confirmed negative correlation between “subjective” reports of well-
being and illiberal/unjust conditions.149 




Subjective well-being and democratic institutions150
150 Inglehart and Klingemann (2000).  Vertical axis is the sum of the Freedom House ratings for 
Civil Liberties and Political Rights, from 1981 through 1998. Horizontal axis reflects each public's 
mean factor score on happiness and overall life satisfaction and subjective well-being. r=.78 N=62 
p=.0000.  Cf. http://www.freedomhouse.org and yearly Freedom in the World reports at http://
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15.
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A similar  relationship is (as I  already mentioned) also widely recognized with 
respect to “objective” measures of human well-being (e.g.  incidences of crime, 
economic growth, public violence, etc.).  As Jeffrey Haynes puts it, “it is generally 
the case that the democratic regime-type has a notable performance profile. In 
most cases, the democratic regime-type seems to perform better than any other 
regime-type”, including regimes categorized as “illiberal democracies.”151
An  even  more  serious  problem  with  communitarian  arguments  for 
international toleration, however, is that it is hard to see how, even if they were 
empirically  correct,  the  considerations  they  adduce  –  human  flourishing, 
identity, and so on – could be sufficient to justify toleration.  Most of us do not 
think that people who benefit from injustice have any right to flourish, or found 
their identity, and so on, on the backs of those who suffer injustice.  Consider, for 
example, the era of slavery in the United States.  Defenders of the institution of 
slavery  evidently  often  claimed  that  slaveholders  and  slaves  alike  flourished, 
staked their identities, and so on, under the institution of slavery.  But so what? 
Slavery is  unjust – and few, if  any,  of us today take seriously the idea that it 
should have been tolerated by anyone, even if (as a matter of fact) tolerating it 
would have promoted such things.  In order for communitarian arguments for 
international toleration to be compelling, then, communitarians must show why 
the  kinds  of  flourishing,  identity,  or  other  values  they  mention  could  be  of 
sufficient moral importance to justify tolerating deeply unjust conditions.  The 
arguments, at least as they are presented, affirm the importance of flourishing, 
151 Haynes  (2001):  50,  and  Ch.  3  more  generally.   See  also  the  World  Values  Survey 
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org) and Wilkinson (2007).
179
identity, and so on.  They do not, however, establish the  greater importance of 
these things to justice.  
§4.2.1.b. Collective Right to Self-Determination Arguments
Michael Walzer and many others have defended the idea that political societies 
must be presumed to enjoy a collective right to self-determination.152  One version 
of this argument is empirical.  So, for example, Walzer says, “The members of a 
political community must seek their own freedom…They cannot be set free…by 
any external force…Self-determination is the school in which virtue is learned (or 
not)  and liberty  is  won (or  not).”153  We can  set  aside  this  sort  of  argument, 
however, for two reasons.  First, it is not an argument for toleration per se, but 
for  mere  acquiescence.   It  purports  to  derive  a  moral  right  to  national  self-
determination  from  the  impossibility  of  “setting  people  free.”   Second,  the 
empirical claims the argument is based on seem dubious.  It may not be easy to 
promote the achievement of liberal/democratic conditions by external force or 
pressure, but there are as far as I know no conclusive reasons to think that it 
cannot be done.
In any case, the more interesting (and relevant) Argument from Collective 
Self-Determination is a philosophical argument.  The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy’s entry on “Nationalism” asserts that,  “A sufficiently large group of 
people  has  a  prima  face  right  to  govern  itself  and  to  decide  its  future 
152 See  Walzer  (2000):  53-8  an  86-95,  the  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy’s  entry  on 
“Nationalism”, §3.3., and also Gans (2003) and Moore (1998).
153 Walzer (2000): 87.
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membership,  if  the  members  of  the  group  so  wish.  It  is  fundamentally  the 
democratic will of the members themselves that grounds the right to an ethno-
national  state  and to ethno-centric  cultural  institutions  and practices.”154  The 
problem with this argument should be clear, however.  Even if we grant the prima 
facie claim that a group has a right to govern itself if its members so wish, it is 
hard to see how persons as treated as “free and equal” when they are subject 
against their will to conditions that treat them unequally.  As Bruce Ackerman 
puts the worry,
There is no Islamic nation without a woman who insists on equal rights; 
no Confucian society without a man who denies the need for deference. 
Sometimes these liberals will be in a minority in their native lands…[Why] 
should we betray our own principles and side with the oppressors rather 
than the oppressed?155
Indeed, it would seem that as long as there is even one member of an illiberal 
society who wants to enjoy the liberal-democratic conditions, that person is owed 
those conditions as a free and equal person (regardless of what anyone, even a 
majority, wants).
§4.2.1.c. Rawls’ Argument for Toleration in The Law of Peoples
Rawls’  Law  of  Peoples  has  been  widely  criticized  for,  among  other  things, 
eschewing cosmopolitan-egalitarianism.  One might wonder why, if indeed Rawls 
rejects cosmopolitan-egalitarianism, it is worth critiquing his arguments for the 
154 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry on “Nationalism”, §3.3..
155 Ackerman (1994): 382-3
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toleration of (what he calls) “illiberal but decent societies” from a cosmopolitan-
egalitarian point-of-view.  One reason for doing so, we will now see, is that one of 
Rawls’ main (although merely implicit) arguments for tolerating decent societies 
can plausibly be transformed into a genuinely cosmopolitan-egalitarian argument 
(ableit a weak one). 
Rawls  argues  that  only  a  very  restricted  class  of  illiberal  societies  are 
worthy of toleration.  These “decent” societies, for Rawls, are illiberal societies 
that (i) adequately respect a small class of “human rights”; (ii) are non-aggressive 
towards  other  societies;  (iii)  are  organized  around  some  “common  good” 
conception of justice, (iv) ensure that all of their members can play a meaningful 
(though  non-democratic)  role  in  political  decisions,  and  (v)  are  capable,  as 
societies, of engaging in reciprocity with other liberal and decent societies.156  One 
problem is that it is not clear whether any present-day societies qualify as decent 
in  Rawls’  sense.   The  only  actual  example  Rawls  gives  is  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire.157  Rawls  explicitly  denies  that  aggressive,  or  human-rights-violating, 
“outlaw regimes” ought to be tolerated158, as well as that “benevolent absolutisms” 
– societies that respect basic human rights but do not allow all of their members 
to play a meaningful role in politics159 – ought to be tolerated.  Let us set these 
issues, however, and consider Rawls’ reasons for tolerating decent societies.
156 See Rawls (1999b): 4, 23-30, 32-5, and Part II.
157 Rawls (1999b): 76, fn. 18.
158 Rawls (1999b): 4-5, 48, 80-1, 90, 94-5. 
159 Rawls (1999b): 4, 63.
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Rawls says in the Introduction to The Law of Peoples that his account is 
motivated by that “once the gravest forms of political injustice are eliminated” the 
great evils of “unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of 
liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, not to mention genocide and mass 
murder” will “eventually disappear.”160 Rawls also says that, “the basic idea is to 
follow Kant’s lead as sketched by him in Perpetual Peace (1975) and his idea of 
foedus pacificum”161 – Kant’s the idea that a long lasting and stable international 
peace  is  achievable.   Rawls’  assertions  of  purpose  here  should  not  be 
underestimated.  Rawls is well known for emphasizing interpreting texts in favor 
of the stated aims their authors make at the outset.162  Rawls also spends a great 
deal of time, moreover, discussing the idea of “democratic peace”, and of trying to 
show  that  decent  societies  possess  many  of  the  same  features  as  democratic 
societies.  He endorses the claim that democratic societies lack reasons to go to 
war with one another,  as  well  as the claim that since 1800 firmly established 
liberal societies have not fought one another.163  Rawls appears to want to say that 
because decent societies share many features of liberal societies, an international 
order that tolerated both liberal and decent societies would stand the best chance 
of achieving prolonged peace.164  He remarks that a lack of respect toward decent 
peoples “may wound the self-respect” of those peoples, which he thinks in turn is 
160 Rawls (1999b): 7.
161 Rawls (1999b): 10.
162 Freeman (2007): 8.
163 Rawls (1999b): 44-54.
164 Rawls (1999b) Part II.
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likely  to  lead  to  a  “lapsing  into  contempt  on  one  side,  and  bitterness  and 
resentment on the other side, only causing damage.”165
Now  if  Rawls  could  substantiate  the  idea  that  a  Law  of  Peoples  that 
includes toleration of decent societies is the best system for achieving prolonged 
international peace, as well as for reducing the incidences of other evils such as 
genocide  and so on,  he might have a  liberal  argument for tolerating “decent” 
societies.  Or, at least, we might be able to construct such an argument on his 
behalf.  Many “Rawlsian-Cosmopolitans”, after all, have suggested, against Rawls’ 
own view, that his original position from A Theory of Justice should be applied to 
the global  order as a whole.   Rawls,  however, is notable for claiming that the 
parties to his original  position ought to deliberate according to the “maximin” 
rule for social choice.  If we assume (i) that Rawls is right about the empirical 
facts of war and genocide, (ii) that the parties to a global original position would 
reason by maximin, and (iii)  that maximin requires the avoidance of war and 
genocide above all else (as seems plausible), then we would seem to have a strong 
Rawlsian-Cosmopolitan  argument,  at  least,  for  tolerating  decent  societies.   It 
does seem, after all, that it would be much for any person in a decent society to 
continue  living  under  those  conditions  than  live  under,  or  die  as  a  result  of, 
conditions of war.  There are two serious problems with this sort of argument, 
however.  First, claim (i) is questionable at best.  The root causes of war are still 
very  much  a  mystery.   Second,  claim  (ii)  –  the  claim  that  the  parties  to  a 
cosmopolitan-egalitarianism  would  reason  according  to  maximin  –  seems 
questionable as well.  Rawls’ case for maximin in the domestic case is predicated 
165 Rawls (1999b): 61, 62.
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upon, among other things, his claim that free and equal individuals would not 
have much to gain from results above what they would obtain above maximin.  It 
is far from obvious, however, that this is true in the cosmopolitan case at hand.  It 
is far from obvious that free and equal individuals would want to avoid war at all 
costs.  After all, if international strife that led to the occasional war could also be 
expected to promote liberal conditions in illiberal societies, then free and equal 
individuals would have much to gain from such strife – namely,  liberal  social 
conditions that treat them as free and equal individuals.  In any case, why should 
we think that free and equal persons in a cosmopolitan original position would 
want the avoidance of war to always take precedence over social progress?  Why 
should we not suppose that the parties  to  a global  original  position would be 
willing to bear the risks of international strife, and perhaps the occasional war, if 
the  benefits  of  that  strife  in  the  longer  run  might  be  liberal  conditions 
everywhere?   I  have  a  hard  time  seeing  how  anything  close  to  conclusive 
argument could be made one way or the other here.
Rawls  also  appears  to  provide  other  reasons  for  tolerating  illiberal 
societies, however.  First, Rawls is clear both in Political Liberalism and The Law 
of Peoples that he is concerned with describing systems of social cooperation that 
are not imposed on people coercively.166  He says in Political Liberalism that a 
political  order  organized around a  single  “comprehensive  doctrine”  – such as 
utilitarianism,  Christianity,  and  so  on  –  “can  be  maintained  only  by  the 
oppressive use of state power.”167  He calls this “the fact of oppression” and states 
166 Rawls (2005): 37; Rawls (1999b): 31. 
167 Rawls (2005): 37.
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that his aim is to describe, in this case for a domestic society, how a liberal society 
can  be  stable  over  time  without  oppression.   His  claim  there  is  that  liberal 
conditions  of  equality  can  be  brought  about  without  oppression  in  liberal 
societies because liberalism is not a single comprehensive doctrine, but one that 
the many reasonable conceptions of the good in a liberal society all in some sense 
accept  as  a  matter  of  “public  reason”  (the  idea,  roughly,  is  that  Christians, 
Atheists, Muslims, and so on, in a democratic society all share an “overlapping 
consensus” on issues such as free speech, religious freedom, and so on).168  Rawls 
clearly has a similar concern in the international  case.   He says, “The idea of 
public reason for a Society of Peoples is analogous to the idea of public reason in 
the  domestic  case  when  a  shared  basis  of  justification  exists  and  can  be 
uncovered  by  due  reflection.”169  He  takes  the  Law  of  Peoples  to  consist  of 
principles that all liberal and decent societies could accept without oppression or 
merely as a “modus vivendi.”170  The basic problem with argument, however, is 
that it is not clear why liberal societies should engage in public reason as such 
with  “decent”  societies.   Such  societies  oppress  their  own members,  after  all. 
They  fail  to  treat  their  members  as  free  and  equal  individuals.   How  is  it 
oppressive to release persons from conditions that treat them as less than free 
and equal?
In reply to this, Rawls might appeal to his claim that decent societies are 
minimally cooperative social systems that treat people “decently.”  Rawls seems 
168 Rawls (2005), particularly Lectures I and IV.
169 Rawls (1999b): 19.
170 Ibid.
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to take the idea that decent societies are organized around some “common good” 
conception  of  justice,  after  all,  as  “[imposing]  bona  fide  moral  duties  on 
obligations (distinct from human rights) within all persons within the people’s 
territory”, and their members as, “[recognizing] these duties and obligations as 
fitting with their common good idea of justice and do not see their duties and 
obligations  as  mere commands imposed by force.”171  There are two problems 
with this argument, however.  First, as we have already seen, it will presumably 
be the case that some members of any decent society will (correctly) regard their 
unequal social position as unjust and unworthy of toleration.   Thus, even if many 
members of decent societies do not regard their presumed duties and obligations 
to be mere commands imposed by force, other members presumably will  – in 
which case it is not clear that there is a truly common good conception of justice 
at all.  Now, in reply, one might ask in Rawls’ defense, “Why should one liberal, or 
a small dissenting minority in an illiberal/undemocratic society, get to determine 
how the rest shall live?”  This question brings us, however, to the second problem 
for Rawls’ argument, which is that even if we suppose that every member of an 
illiberal/undemocratic society were to accept its conception of justice as imposing 
bona fide duties upon them, why should outsiders conceive themselves as under a 
duty to tolerate the society?  If, as members of liberal-democratic societies, we 
truly believe that all persons should be treated as equals, why should we refrain 
from attempting to change decent societies?  Rawls appears to recognize the force 
of this question when he says, “Some may feel that permitting this injustice and 
not insisting on liberal principles for all societies requires strong reasons.”172  His 
171 Rawls (1999b): 65-6.
172 Rawls (1999b): 62.
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reply  fails  to  address  the  cosmopolitan-egalitarian  worry,  however.   He  says, 
“Most  important  is  maintaining  mutual  respect  among peoples.   Lapsing into 
contempt on the one side, and bitterness and resentment on the other, can only 
cause damage.”173  Yet why should we think that attempts to influence illiberal but 
“decent” peoples can only cause damage?  International criticism, sanctions, and 
other  actions  toward  Rawlsian  decent  societies  might  indeed  cause  some 
bitterness and resentment, and it might even provoke strong words or threats. 
All the same, if doing so might lead to greater justice – that is, to individuals 
enjoying the liberal-democratic conditions they are due as individuals – wouldn’t 
this  “damage”  be  outweighed  (by  individuals  finally  enjoying  the  sorts  of 
conditions they are due)?  
§4.2.1.d. Conclusion
We have just  considered three  well-known sources  of  argument for tolerating 
illiberal/undemocratic societies.  Some of those arguments may be compelling to 
non-cosmopolitan-egalitarians.  If we do not assert a global right of all persons to 
free and equal  treatment,  then perhaps these arguments  succeed.   It  is  clear, 
however, that these arguments do not succeed from a cosmopolitan-egalitarian 
perspective.   If  we  are  to  show  that  cosmopolitan-egalitarianism  allows  or 
requires  the  toleration  of  illiberal/undemocratic  societies,  we  must  look 
elsewhere.
173 Rawls (1999b): 62.
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§4.2.2.  A Critique of  the “Standard Liberal  Argument” Against  International  
Toleration
Liberal political philosophers typically provide a simple argument for the claim 
that liberalism cannot permit toleration of illiberal societies.  We have seen this 
argument repeated again and again, in fact, in the previous section.  It is this:
THE  STANDARD  LIBERAL  ARGUMENT  AGAINST  TOLERATING 
UNJUST SOCIETIES
(1) Liberalism requires the free and equal treatment of persons.
(2) To tolerate an illiberal society is to tolerate the treatment of persons 
otherwise than as free and equal.
(3) Therefore, liberalism is inconsistent with tolerating illiberal societies.
This line of thought is evident in the following passage by Pogge: “…the basic 
political  structure  of  a  society  or  the  world  as  a  whole  “can  be  structured  or 
organized in only one way…There is no room for accommodation here” since it is 
precisely the characteristic of a liberal fundamental law that it [and it alone] must 
apply to and be justifiable to all.”174  It is also evident when Barry writes, “there 
are  certain  rights  against  oppression,  exploitation,  and injury,  to  which  every 
single human being is entitled to lay claim, and…appeals to cultural diversity and 
pluralism  under  no  circumstances  trump  the  value  of  basic  liberal  rights.”175 
Ackerman, Beitz, Caney, Kuper, and Tan all make similar remarks.176
174 Pogge (1994), 217.
175 Barry (2001): 132-3.
176 Ackerman (1980): 382-3; Beitz (2000), Caney (2002), Kuper (2000): §2, and Tan (1998).
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The simple liberal argument against tolerating illiberal societies omits any 
analysis, however, of which sorts of transition-costs can be justly imposed upon 
individuals, qua free and equal persons, to eliminate illiberal conditions.  No one 
will deny, after all, that particular actions to promote conditions of greater justice 
will  often,  if  not  always,  impose  costs  (and  possibly  even  benefits)  upon 
individuals.  So, for instance, consider the “Little Rock Crisis” during the black 
American civil rights movement.177  After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Brown 
vs. Board of Education of Topeka (347 U.S. 483) that public schools must be 
desegregated,  the  National  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Colored  People 
(NAACP) attempted to register  black students in previously all-white schools in 
cities throughout the South, including nine black students at Little Rock’s Central 
High School.   On the first  day of school,  however,  only one of the nine black 
students enrolled at Central High showed up.  She was harassed by whites and 
had to be escorted home in a police patrol car.  Then, on the first day that all nine 
students did show up, they had to pass through a “gauntlet of spitting, jeering 
whites.”  For the rest of the year, the nine students had to be escorted to school by 
military personnel in jeeps, and to and from classes by federal troops.  One of the 
“Little Rock Nine” was eventually expelled for dumping a bowl of chili on a white 
student who was harassing her, and only one of the Little Rock Nine graduated. 
Finally, at the end of the 1957-8 school year, the Little Rock school system shut 
down completely in order to avoid further integration, and many other schools in 
the South did the same.  
177 Cf. Jacoway (2007).
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The black students who underwent integration endured some severe costs 
for the sake of social progress, then.  Similarly, consider the Mississippi Summer 
Project, a civil rights group that is most well known for the fact that three of its 
participants  disappeared  after  being  released  from  police  custody  and  whose 
bodies were later found along with several corpses of other black Mississippeans 
whose disappearances had not attracted any public attention.178  Here again, we 
see individuals suffering significant costs – indeed, perhaps the greatest cost of 
all, death – for the sake of social progress: the process of mobilizing as an activist 
group under severely unjust conditions. 
Now I take it that most of us believe that it was just for the NAACP to 
strive for the integration of public schools, despite the costs its strategies had on 
the  aforementioned students  and others.   Similarly,  I  take  it  that  most  of  us 
believe  that  it  was  just  for  the  Mississippi  Summer  Project  to  mobilize  its 
members for the cause of overthrowing racial injustice, even though in the end its 
activities cost some innocent individuals their lives.  Few of us believe, however, 
that just any costs can be imposed on upon people for the achievement of just 
future conditions.  Many of us do not believe, for instance, that war is a morally 
permissible, or just, means to promote liberal/democratic values.  But now how 
are we to distinguish legitimate transition-costs for the achievement of justice 
from  illegitimate  ones?   Since  liberals  are  committed  to  the  free  and  equal 
treatment of persons, we should aim to put together a systematic theory of which 
sorts  of  transition-costs  (and  perhaps,  transition-benefits)  are  consistent  with 
treating persons as free and equally.  However, as I argued in Chapter 1, we do 
178 Cf. McAdam (1990).
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not presently have such a theory.  We should be therefore be suspicious of the 
simple  liberal  argument  against  tolerating  illiberal  societies.   In  order  to 
determine  whether  liberalism  permits,  requires,  or  prohibits  the  toleration  of 
such societies, we need a systematic theory of the sort just mentioned – and it is 
precisely this kind of theory that I have defended in this dissertation.
§4.3. THE NON-IDEAL THEORY OF JUSTICE DEFENDED IN THIS DISSERTATION: A BRIEF REVIEW
We saw in Chapter 1 that existing theories of justice are incomplete in the sense 
that they fail to account for the kinds of transition-costs (and benefits) we can 
justly impose on people in order to eliminate injustices.  The non-ideal theory of 
justice  that  I  have  defended  so  far  in  this  dissertation  aims  to  rectify  this 
omission.  I argued, first, for reasons I will not belabor repeating, that political 
philosophers in general ought to adopt a “non-ideal theoretic” version of Rawls’ 
famous  original  position  (the  “Non-Ideal  Original  Position”)  to  arrive  at 
principles of non-ideal theory.  I then argued, second, that the parties to the Non-
Ideal Original Position would agree upon the following generic principle:
The Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory:  For any action A, agent 
B,  and  less-than-fully-just  social  conditions  C  (past  or  present),  social 
justice  requires B to perform A given C  if  and only if,  of  all  available 
actions,  B  has  sufficient  reason  to  expect  A  to  best  satisfy  the  social 
preference ordering that would exist if every relevant individual (defined 
relative  to  ideal  theory)  were  (i)  rational,  (ii)  adequately  informed,  (iii) 
endorsed the correct principles of ideal theory (and rectification), but (iv) 
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otherwise  desired  to  advance  his/her  transition-related  preferences  (v) 
within the broader constraints of ordinary morality, (vi) given C. 
Finally,  I argued the following “secondary” principle of non-ideal theory is the 
best  available  practical  (i.e.  epistemic)  guide to  whether  any particular  action 
satisfies the Fundamental Principle:
The Principle of Application:  For any action A, agent B, and less-than-
fully-just conditions C, we should tailor our confidence that social justice 
requires B to perform A in direct proportion to the extent to which we can 
expect B’s performance of A to either
(i)  Best  advance the overall  aims of whichever reformist group – 
past,  present,  or  hypothetical  --  best  satisfies  the  following 
desiderata:
a. Its  members  (at  least  tacitly)  pursue  correct,  and 
relevant,  principles  of  ideal  theory,  rectification,  and 
morality;
b. Its members are voluntary participants;
c. Its  leadership  is  equally  responsive  to  each  of  its 
members’ interests;
d. It has more members than rival reformist groups;
e. Its leadership and members are rational and adequately 
informed; and
f. Its membership is more similar to the complete class of 
individuals  who  suffer  C’s  injustice(s)  than  any  other 
group;
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Or, if more than one reformist group appears to satisfy these desiderata 
roughly equally well, 
(iv)Best advance a fair compromise between the overall aims of the 
reformist groups in question.
Let us now apply these principles to the question of whether liberalism can allow 
for, or even require, toleration of illiberal societies.
§4.4.  FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF NON-IDEAL THEORY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL TOLERATION
Some readers might suggest that the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory, 
when combined with the liberal idea that all persons must be treated as free and 
equal equally, implies straightforwardly that any form of toleration for illiberal 
societies is unjust. The Fundamental Principle tells us, after all, to aim to advance 
the  social  preference  ordering  composed  of  the  preferences  that  rational, 
adequately informed, and otherwise moral, individuals would have if they desired 
the achievement of fully just (i.e. liberal) conditions.  One might then suppose 
that if liberalism is true, every such person must prefer liberal conditions, and 
thus,  that  the Fundamental  Principle of Non-Ideal  Theory will  be satisfied by 
those, and only those, actions that can be expected to eliminate illiberal social 
conditions  –  in  which  case  toleration  for  illiberal  societies  is  ruled  out 
immediately.
  This is too quick.  The Fundamental Principle allows that persons who 
desire fully just conditions can have transition-related preferences related to how 
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those conditions are achieved.  This point is crucial.  It takes only a few moments 
of reflection to note that individuals who are subject to injustice, and who want to 
be treated as free and equal  very much,  often seem to want to deal  with and 
overcome those injustices themselves.  Consider, for example, the policy aims of 
the One Million Signatures Campaign, which is one of the most visible liberal 
activist campaigns today in Iran.  The One Million Signatures campaign asserts 
that it aims “to identify the everyday concerns of women, especially their legal 
needs and problems…relying on the needs identified by women themselves”, “to 
carrying out bottom-up reform and to creating change through grassroots and 
civil  society  initiatives,  and  seeks  to  strengthen  public  action  and  empower 
women”, and finally, goes out of its way to restrict participation in the movement 
to Iranian men and women.179  Indeed, the One Million Signatures Campaign’s 
statement of aims here suggests two reasons why, in the view of its organizers, it 
is  important  for  Iranians  to  achieve  conditions  of  greater  gender  equality 
themselves.  First, there seems to be a concern for the sorts of costs that women 
in Iran can be expected to incur as a result of social change.  It is claimed that it is 
important to be sensitive to the everyday needs of women as identified by those 
women.  This suggests, not implausibly, that women in the ground in Iran are 
more knowledgeable  of  their  own everyday  needs  than  outsiders.   There  also 
seems to be a clear suggestion, however, that there are benefits to be achieved by 




Now of course it  is  important  not to  overly romanticize  the benefits  of 
social movements to the oppressed.  It would seem just as important, however, 
not to summarily  dismiss the idea that there may be such benefits.   After all, 
consider the following autobiographical account of a member of the One Million 
Signatures Campaign, a story which I first recounted in Chapter 1:
…the experience that I want to tell is in regards to one of my closest family 
members, my father. My father is a very kind, sincere, religious and pious 
human being. At the same time he is drawn to knowledge, reflection and 
logic as well. At first, he would try to answer my criticisms of the status 
quo laws with kindly advising me not to seek the reasons and causes for 
these historic injustices and discrimination between men and women. He 
would say “Probably there is some wisdom embedded in the unequal laws 
that I have not found, and for this reason I should study more.”  Due to 
this rationale, my father was against changing the laws. I listened to my 
father, so with much persistence and diligence I researched the literature, 
but the more I studied, the deeper my convictions became that the laws 
were discriminatory and unjust.
With all this, a subconscious fear grew in me. What if my patient father, 
who  has  spent  his  life  in  promoting  science  and  religion  and  has  no 
expectations from anyone or any rankings, was to become offended and 
take away his kindness from me?  Because of this, I stopped the discussing 
this topic with him, but I kept up on my research.
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After joining the campaign and battling with myself, I broached the subject 
of the movement and its goals with friends and neighbors. All the while I 
was  afraid  of  worrying  my  father.  From  the  corner  of  my  eye,  I  kept 
watching for his reactions.
Talking of the campaign among family and friends resulted in a variety of 
questions regarding the validity of its goals (questions that rarely come up 
when  talking  with  other  activists.)  Of  course,  I  defended  the  woman’s 
rights movement of my country as well as the inalienable rights of Muslim 
women  with  strong  reasons  and  I  explained  that  the  current  laws  are 
creating  many  problems  for  women.  I  also  described  the  positive  new 
movements in other Islamic countries that were attempting to correct their 
own  discriminatory  laws.  Since  I  believe  that  Islam  is  a  religion  that 
defends justice and equality, at least that is what my father taught me, why 
should  Muslim  women  be  quiet  in  the  face  of  injustice?  Are  we  less 
deserving than other women?  Since we are Muslims, does this mean we 
should be without rights?
These questions continued for some time and I noticed my father carefully 
monitoring my answers. Days and weeks passed by in similar fashion until 
I gradually felt that the clouds of sadness and worry were starting to lift 
from  my  father’s  kind  and  compassionate  face.  Little  by  little,  he 
developed a smile of support for me and my fellow campaigners. Finally, 
one day while  signatures were being collected from various friends and 
family, my father asked to sign and be part of the campaign as well.
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That night, I cried tears of joy. The relief I felt made me lighter,  as if I 
could fly. For some time I felt that my dear father was distancing himself 
from me and I thought that I was going down a path that he disapproved 
of. His becoming part of the campaign brought us closer. I was so happy.
Yes, I have learned a big lesson that change takes time and I have to be 
more patient.  I have realized that influencing other people’s beliefs and 
opinions takes time and doesn’t happen over night!
What is interesting is that my father is now very persistent in wanting to 
collect signatures from friends and co-workers. I have witnessed many of 
his arguments and discussions in the effort to convince his friends for the 
need for women’s rights, as well as the need to interpret religion based on 
changing  times.  I  get  unbelievable  energy  from him and I  bask  in  the 
happiness this brings me.180
This account brings to the fore, I believe, the sorts of “hidden”, but nevertheless 
very real, costs and benefits that free and equal persons might be concerned with 
vis-à-vis social  progress toward liberal  conditions.  This particular woman – a 
woman who truly  wanted  gender  equality  –  is,  as  I  think  most  of  would  be, 
concerned with maintaining one of her most cherished personal relationships, 
her  relationship  with  her  father,  through social  progress.   She  also  seems to 
believe  that  the  very  process  that  she  engaged  in  with  her  father  has  been 
beneficial to both of them.  Finally, as she indicates in the following passages, she 
180 http://www.we-change.org/spip.php?article326
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conceives  of  herself  as  having  developed  her  own  personal  capacities,  self-
respect, and identity as a person, as a result of her engagement in the Campaign. 
She writes,
Long  before  the  start  of  the  “One  Million  Signature”  campaign,  I  was 
frustrated with the difficult plight of women and I wished from the bottom 
of my heart for these unfair laws against women to change. In gatherings 
and various get-togethers, I would broach the topic of the problems that 
women face today, but there were times when I would lose the motivation 
for discussions and arguments. It was as if, I was devoid of hope. In fact, 
prior  to  working  with  the  campaign,  I  would  only  speak  with  specific 
people  such  as  close  friends  and  some  family  members,  and  I  would 
generally  avoid  bringing  up  the  topic  of  women’s  difficulties  in  larger 
groups or in the presence of strangers. Sometimes I would be ashamed. 
Low self esteem and not knowing all the facts would cause me to stop short 
of mentioning women’s issues and I would allow the social gathering to go 
about its traditional routine.
However,  since joining the campaign,  I  slowly  began to feel  a  sense of 
conviction  and responsibility  in  articulating  the  pain  and difficulties  of 
women,  and  my  self  confidence  in  discussing  these  issues  in  social 
gatherings grew, especially in the presence of my family elders. In a way, 
answering people’s questions about the various details of the laws made 
me even more aware of feminism and the situation of the women in my 
country.  More importantly,  I  knew that  I  was  not  alone.  Knowing that 
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many unacquainted friends of the campaign in Tehran and other parts of 
Iran were busy collecting signatures gave me a good feeling. No longer 
feeling alone in this small city gave me a sense of support and hope. Being 
a member of the campaign gave me a new sense of identity.181
Now, it would be presumptuous to take this woman’s experiences to be typical of 
Iranian women, or even members of the One Million Signatures Campaign.  This 
is  not  the  question,  however,  to  ask  in  considering  whether  cosmopolitan-
egalitarianism could in principle require foreigners to tolerate illiberal societies. 
In order to establish the in-principle possibility that cosmopolitan-egalitarianism 
might require foreigners to tolerate illiberal societies, we must establish only that 
it would be possible for free and equal persons, generally speaking, to share this 
woman’s attitudes.  I submit that this clearly is possible for the sorts of reasons 
just mentioned.  We have seen that, for all sorts of reasons, it seems possible for 
rational and adequately informed persons who desire liberal justice to desire to 
achieve it themselves, without any sort of pressure or intervention by foreigners.
Some readers might want to deny that it is really possible, however, for 
rational  and  adequately  informed individuals  to  have  such  preferences,  given 
what we know about the relationship between liberal-democratic conditions and 
basic rights.  Amartya Sen has famously argued, on the basis of his research about 
the  cause  of  famine,  that  certain  basic  rights  –  the  right  to  subsistence  in 
particular  –  are  never  secure  without  liberal-democratic  conditions.182  Sen 
181 http://www.we-change.org/spip.php?article326
182 See Sen (1981, 1984, 1992, 1999).
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contends  that  illiberal/undemocratic  conditions  lend  themselves  to  famine, 
whereas famines almost never occur under liberal-democratic conditions.  Some 
readers might then suggest that if the members of illiberal societies who desire 
liberal-democratic conditions (such as the aforementioned Iranian woman) were 
fully aware of this, they would surely desire liberal-democratic conditions to be 
brought about as quickly as possible (the thought being that, surely, people who 
are properly opposed to injustice ought to rationally care more about avoiding 
famine than about offending their family members).
There are two problems with this argument.  First, it is not the case, as 
Andrew Kuper claims, that, “there is simply no more impressive body of theory 
and evidence”, than Sen’s claims about famine.183  Although Sen won the Nobel 
Prize for his work on famines, his data, methodology, and interpretation of his 
data  on  famines  have  not  only  been  the  subject  of  severe  criticism  in  the 
academic press in recent years184; it also now widely recognized that “Causation is 
the central,  most important,  and most controversial issue in the literature and 
theory of famines.”185   Second, I see no reason why a rational and adequately 
informed individual  must prefer  to  avoid the possibility  of  famine at  all  cost. 
Even if famines were more common in illiberal-undemocratic societies than in 
liberal-democratic  ones,  they  are  surely  fairly  uncommon  in  both  cases. 
Accordingly, even if famine is a possibility, it might be a fairly remote one.  I see 
no reason why a rational and adequately informed individual might prefer to risk 
183 Kuper (2000): footnote 81.
184 See e.g.,  Bowbrick (1986, 1987, 1999),  Basu (1994, 1996),  Goswami (1990), Kumar (1990), 
Padmanabhan (1973), Dyson (1991, 1996), Dyson and Maharatna (1991).
185 Taugher (2003): 45.  Cf. Devereux (1993) for a survey of different theories of famine.
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such a remote possibility for the sake of almost certainly protecting other things 
she values, such as relationship with her family.  As an analogy, the mere fact that 
it is more far more likely for a house in Louisiana to get destroyed by a hurricane 
than a house in California is not, in itself, reason to suppose that no rational or 
adequately informed individual could prefer to have a house in Louisiana than in 
California.   Many  of  us  are  willing  to  endure  certain  possibilities  of  absolute 
disaster so that we can enjoy other things we value greatly (such as Louisiana 
culture, food, etc., or in the case of illiberal societies, our familial relations, etc.). 
I see no reason, furthermore, to think that individuals such as the Iranian woman 
I discussed should be thought to be ignorant of the relevant facts.   If  anyone 
knows the relevant facts on the ground about (e.g.) Iran – such as the state of the 
availability of food, etc. – it is surely the very individuals on the ground who are 
in a good position to be aware of, and weigh, the relative importance (to them) of 
the various possibilities for themselves.
In any case, I will now utilize the Principle of Application to argue that 
because the evidence we presently have stands approximately equally in favor of 
and against the proposition that individuals in illiberal  societies,  qua free and 
equal  individuals,  prefer  foreigners  to  tolerate  illiberal  societies  in  particular 
ways,  it  follows  (qua  the  Principle  of  Application)  that  liberalism  defeasibly 
requires  foreigners  to  tolerate  illiberal  societies  that  adequately  respect  basic 
rights.
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§4.5. FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF APPLICATION TO A DEFEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL DUTY TO TOLERATE 
“BASIC-RIGHTS-RESPECTING” SOCIETIES
The Principle  of  Application,  if  you recall,  is  (or  so  I  have  claimed)  the  best 
available epistemic indicator to us, here and now in the real world, of whether a 
particular response to injustice is just (qua the Fundamental Principle).  Let us 
apply it, then, to the question of international toleration.
The Principle of Application instructs us to proportion our confidence that 
a particular response to injustice is  just to the extent that we can expect that 
response to either best advance the overall  aims of whichever reformist group 
best satisfies the following desiderata; or, if two or more reformist groups satisfy 
these desiderata equally well, to the extent that we can expect that response to 
advance a fair compromise among the aims of those competing groups:  
a. Its  members  (at  least  tacitly)  pursue  correct,  and 
relevant,  principles  of  ideal  theory,  rectification,  and 
morality;
b. Its members are voluntary participants;
c. Its  leadership  is  equally  responsive  to  each  of  its 
members’ interests;
d. It has more members than rival reformist groups;
e. Its leadership and members are rational and adequately 
informed; and
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f. Its membership is more similar to the complete class of 
individuals  who  suffer  C’s  injustice(s)  than  any  other 
group.
There are, when it comes to the question of international tolerate, a number of 
candidate  reformist  groups  as  such.   Liberal-democratic  states  and  various 
international  organizations  (such  as  the  United  Nations  and  Human  Rights 
Watch) clearly regard illiberal/undemocratic societies as unjust, and thus appear 
to satisfy the Principle of Application’s first desideratum.  These are not the only 
reformist groups to consider, however – nor, in fact, are they the groups that can 
plausibly stake a claim to best satisfy the Principle of Application’s desiderata. 
Let me explain.
§4.5.1  Liberal  Reformist  Groups  Within  Illiberal/Unjust  Societies  as  Best  
Satisfying the Principle of Application’s Desiderata
Although,  as  I  just  noted,  some  of  the  candidate  groups  that  I  have  already 
mentioned – particular liberal-democratic societies (such as the United States, 
Canada, France, etc.), as well as international organizations, such as the United 
Nations  and  Human  Rights  watch  –  appear  to  satisfy  the  Principle  of 
Application’s  first  desideratum,  there  are  often  reasons  to  doubt  whether  the 
aims of these groups, specifically as they relate to illiberal/unjust societies, are in 
fact  motivated by  correct  principles  of  ideal  theory.   The  United  States  and 
members of the United Nations have, for example, all kinds of military/strategic 
interests  at  stake  in  their  dealings  with  unjust  societies.   Similarly,  non-
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governmental  organizations  such  as  Human Rights  Watch  also  have much at 
stake  besides  justice.   They  are  very  much  dependent  upon  monetary 
contributions by individuals and other interest groups, and have a great deal of 
money at stake in their endeavors (Human Rights Watch, in particular, is as of 
2007 a $123 million dollar organization).186  I do not mean to suggest here that 
we  should doubt  the  sincerity  of  these  organizations  vis-à-vis justice.   I  only 
mean to point out that they do have other interests at stake besides justice.
I want to draw attention now to what I will call “local” reformist groups – 
groups  within  illiberal/undemocratic  societies  that,  in  their  actions  and 
proclamations, display similar interests in eliminating injustices.  I have in mind 
here groups such as the One Million Signatures Campaign in the case of Iran187, 
the African National Congress (ANC) in the case of Apartheid-era South Africa, 
the NAACP and Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee in the Jim Crow-
era United States, and so on.  My claim here is that when it comes to the Principle 
of Application’s first desideratum – the “correct principles of justice and morality 
requirement” (as I call it) – these groups fare at least as well as the other groups 
just mentioned (i.e. the U.S.,  the U.N., Human Rights Watch, etc).  Insofar as 
both kinds of groups exhibit concerns for justice, they all have at least  roughly 
similar claims to satisfy desideratum (a) as one another. 
Let  us  turn  now,  however,  to  the  Principle  of  Application’s  other 





members are voluntary participants.  Liberal nations such as the United States 
and  international  institutions  such  as  the  United  Nations  score  poorly  with 
respect to this desideratum.  It is simply not the case, in any ordinary sense of the 
word, that U.S. citizens are  voluntary members of the U.S.-qua-international-
reformist group.   Most U.S.  citizens would remain U.S. citizens  regardless of 
whether the U.S. government decided to tolerate illiberal/undemocratic regimes 
or not.  The U.S. government’s policies toward illiberal/undemocratic societies 
are simply not the  reason that most (if not all) of us are U.S. citizens.  Groups 
such as Human Rights Watch, on the other hand, and the One Million Signatures 
Campaign, seem paradigmatically voluntary.  Generally speaking, it is surely the 
case that people who join Human Rights Watch do so because they voluntary 
accept and support its aims vis-à-vis human rights, including its stance on how to 
deal  with  unjust societies  that  fail  to  respect  human rights.   The One Million 
Signatures Campaign is voluntary in much the same way, in that every member 
who participates in the campaign – by signing its petition – voluntarily signs his/
her name in support of the Campaign’s aims.
Now consider desiderata (c) and (d).  The former desideratum instructs us 
to  evaluate  reformist  groups  in  terms  of  how  responsive  they  are  to  their 
members, whereas the latter has us evaluate reformist groups in terms of sheer 
numbers: in terms of how many members they have.  Although it might at first 
come as somewhat  of  surprise,  I  submit that  non-governmental  organizations 
such as Human Rights Watch and the One Million Signatures Campaign fare at 
least  as  good,  if  not  better,  than,  the  U.S.,  other  liberal  nations,  the  United 
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Nations, and other such bodies.  This claim might seem bizarre insofar as, clearly, 
the U.S.  and U.N. have more  members,  strictly  speaking,  than Human Rights 
Watch or the One Million Signatures Campaign.  It is important to remember, 
though, that we are evaluating these groups as reformist groups.  What we want 
to know, in other words, is  how many members these groups have qua their 
concern with eliminating injustice.   In this case, I think it  is hard to say how 
many members the U.S. and United Nations really have.  Once again, most U.S. 
citizens are presumably not U.S. citizens specifically  because of the U.S.’s aims 
vis-à-vis unjust nations.  Though of course many U.S. citizens care deeply about 
international terrorism, it is still surely the case that few, if any, U.S. citizens are 
U.S. citizens because they want to eliminate injustices in other societies.   It is 
hard  to  say,  then,  how  many  real  members the  U.S.  or  U.N.  have  qua 
international reformist groups.  The correct answer is probably: not many.  Since 
the average U.S. citizen would presumably remain a U.S. citizen regardless of the 
U.S.’s stance toward unjust societies, it is implausible to regard most U.S. citizens 
as  members  of  the  U.S.  (or  UN),  so  far  as  we  are  thinking  of  them  as 
international reformist groups.  The same is not true of Human Rights Watch or 
the One Million Signatures Campaign.  Their members, once again, voluntarily 
“sign on” to  those  organizations  either  by donating money or by  (in the  One 
Million Signatures case) literally signing a piece of paper.  
So far, then, when it comes to the Principle of Application’s desiderata, no 
group really stands out.  We are not finished however.  Desiderata (e) and (f) are 
still in question.  Let us consider each of them in turn.  Desiderata (e) instructs us 
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to  evaluate  reformist  groups  in  terms  of  how  “rational”  and  “adequately 
informed”  they  are.   Here  again,  I  think  that  of  the  groups  we  have  been 
considering are roughly on a par.  It is hard for me to see how any of the groups 
we  have  been  discussing  can  be  said  to  be  clearly  more  rational  or  better 
informed than the others.  Desiderata (f), however, is a very different story.  The 
United States,  U.N.,  Human Rights  Watch,  and other  international  bodies or 
organizations simply are not very similar, in terms of their composition, to the 
complete class of individuals who the kinds of injustices that are at issue in the 
case of international toleration.  It is not U.S. citizens, members of the U.N., or 
Human Rights Watch volunteers who suffer, say, the injustices we see in Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, China, and other illiberal/undemocratic societies.  It is instead the 
members of what I have called “local” reformist groups – groups of reformists 
located  within  the  societies  in  question  –  whose  members  actually  suffer 
injustice.  
I believe, as such, that desideratum (f) is the turning point, so to speak, 
with respect to the justice of international toleration.  What distinguishes “local” 
reformist groups as such from all other candidate reformist groups is the simple 
fact  that it  is  the members of  those groups (i.e.  women in Iran) who actually 
suffer the brunt of whatever injustices are at issue.  Let us look, then, at what 
kinds of aims these groups have.
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§4.5.2. Local Reformist Group Consensus Against Toleration of “Basic Rights”  
Violations
Local  reformist  groups (within  unjust  societies)  have  a  long history  of  urging 
foreigners  not  to  tolerate  illiberal  societies  when  individuals’  basic  rights  are 
seriously threatened.  So, for instance, consider Oliver Tambo’s 1963 speech to 
the U.N. General Assembly on behalf of the African National Congress:
As early as 1958, we in South Africa were convinced that if nothing was 
done to bring pressure to bear upon South Africa in addition to what we 
were doing, so as to compel abandonment of [Apartheid], the stage would 
be reached which is contemplated in a paragraph of the preamble of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I quote from that paragraph:
"... it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as 
a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that 
human rights should be protected by the rule of law..."
We were aware that the rule of law in South Africa was fast becoming a 
dead letter, that our own pressures internally were not bringing about the 
peaceful changes in which we believed, and that it had become necessary 
to supplement these pressures with what could be done from outside. So, 
in 1958, at the first meeting of the All-African People's Conference the 
South African delegation tabled a resolution for an international boycott of 
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South African goods. That resolution was adopted and picked up in a 
number of countries by various organisations.188
Or consider the “Stop Stoning Forever Campaign”  in Iran.   The Stop Stoning 
Forever Campaign, “invites all citizens of the world to contact the Iranian officials 
by phone and/or fax and ask them to stop the public stoning of Mokarrameh 
Ebrahimin, the 43 year old mother of three children, and her partner, the father 
of her 11 year old child.”189  
We see the same sort calls for international action from opposition groups 
in Zimbabwe and Kenya – societies where the most basic human rights to life and 
security of the person are systematically violated.  According to various human 
rights  organizations,  Zimbabwe  systematically  violates  the  rights  of  personal 
freedom and integrity by regularly assaulting, torturing, threatening, kidnapping, 
arresting, and detaining civilians, particularly members of opposition groups.190 
It is thus not surprising that Zimbabwe’s opposition leader,  Morgan Tsvangirai, 
has urged the United Nations and African Union to intervene to put an end to the 
present election crisis there (Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has failed to 
step  down after  being  soundly  defeated  by Tsvangirai  in  general  elections).191 
Similarly,  in the case of Kenya, the spokesman for the main opposition group 







level of violence in Kenya is unprecedented. It's on a terrifying scale and it has 
not really diminished…For sure, international assistance is needed.”192
These  groups  are  not  alone  in  their  agreement  that  the  international 
community ought not to  tolerate  violations of  basic  rights.   The idea that the 
international  community  has  a  duty  to  protect  against  grave  and  persistent 
violations of individuals’ basic rights is enshrined in literally every international 
covenant on human rights.193  Thus, if the Principle of Application is correct, it 
follows that we should be very confident that the international community ought 
not to tolerate these sorts of human rights violatons.
§4.5.3.  The  Evident  Openness  to  Toleration  of  “Basic-Rights-Respecting”  Societies  
Among Local Reformist Groups
Local  reformist  groups  commonly  appear,  however,  to  have  very  different 
attitudes  and  aims  with  respect  to  international  toleration  for  other  kinds  of 
injustices  (injustices  that  are  not  violations  of  the  most  basic  rights  of 
individuals).   Now  unfortunately,  there  is  to  my  knowledge  no  systematic 
research on the aims of local reformist groups vis-à-vis international toleration. 
This is not to say that we lack any good evidence of what these sorts of groups 
prefer or aim for, however.  I will now argue, to the contrary, we have a great deal 
of anecdotal evidence that local reformist groups in unjust societies tend to prefer 
192 http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/02/03/kenya.violence/index.html
193 Cf. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as The United Nations Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  
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the international community to tolerate their society, even when their society is 
unjust, up to the point that their society violates “basic rights.”
I want to concede, before making my case, that the evidence I shall provide 
is indeed incomplete, as well as largely anecdotal.  I believe, however, that there 
is nothing wrong with using the best evidence we have, even if it is not very good, 
to settle upon defeasible conclusions about what justice requires or permits.  I am 
more than open to the idea that we should revise our judgments in the light of 
better evidence.  All I shall claim is that our present evidence supports tentative 
conclusions  in  favor  of  international  toleration  of  unjust  societies  (up  to  the 
point, once again, that those societies violate basic rights).
§4.5.3.a. Domestic Reformist Groups in Apartheid-Era South Africa
Apartheid  had  formally  existed  in  South  Africa  as  far  back  as  1948  (and 
informally for many years before that).   Why was it not until 1958, at the All-
African  People's  Conference,  that  the  South  African  delegation  asked  for  an 
international boycott of South Africa?  And why did it take until 1963 for the ANC 
to  make  the  aforementioned  speech  to  the  U.N.  General  Assembly?   Oliver 
Tambo explicitly gave some reasons in the part of his speech to the U.N. cited 
earlier, which I repeat below,
We were aware that the rule of law in South Africa was fast becoming a 
dead letter, that our own pressures internally were not bringing about the 
peaceful changes in which we believed, and that it had become necessary 
to supplement these pressures with what could be done from outside.
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Tambo says here, quite clearly, that the ANC only regarded international action 
to be “necessary” once it became clear that the rule of law was a “dead letter”, and 
that the pressures they were providing “internally” were not working.  It is also of 
particular note, I think, that Tambo refers to the year 1958 as the time at which 
the ANC came to hold this view:
As early as 1958, we in South Africa were convinced that if nothing 
was done to bring pressure to bear upon South Africa in addition to what 
we were doing, so as to  compel abandonment of [Apartheid],  the stage 
would be reached which is contemplated in a paragraph of the preamble of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I quote from that paragraph:
"... it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as 
a  last  resort,  to  rebellion  against  tyranny  and  oppression,  that 
human rights should be protected by the rule of law..."
The year 1958 is important, I think, because as a matter of history it is clear that 
it is really only at that time, with the lack of any rule of law, that individuals’ most 
basic rights  – the rights  to  security  of the person in particular  – were clearly 
inadequately  protected.   1958  was  the  year  that  the  “Grand  Apartheid”  was 
instituted.  Grand Apartheid began an era of the forced removal of blacks from 
designated  white  areas,  which in turn instigated  the Sharpesville  Massacre  in 
which 69 blacks were killed and 169 injured by police gunmen, which in turn led 
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to the arrest and detention without trial of over 18,000 people, including much of 
the ANC and Pan African Council (PAC) leadership.194  
I submit, then, that in the case of South Africa we see that its largest and 
most  influential  liberal  reformist  group  clearly  preferred  international  non-
toleration – or, at least, saw non-toleration as required – only when individuals’ 
basic rights were widely and routinely violated.
§4.5.3.b. Domestic Reformist Groups in the Islamic Republic of Iran
We  have  already  seen,  for  example,  how  the  organizers  of  the  One  Million 
Signatures Campaign have gone out of their way to state a preference in favor of 
“bottom-up” reform fuelled by people who actually reside in Iran – and we have 
seen some of the reasons why its members seem to prefer this approach (e.g. self-
respect, their ability to maintain important familial relationships, etc.).  It is also 
of  note  that  the  Stop  Stoning  Campaign  mentioned  earlier  never  requests  a 
general stance of foreign non-toleration toward Iran, but merely requests that the 
international community not tolerate the stoning of individuals.  What we have 
so  far,  then,  are  two  domestic  liberal  groups  in  Iran  that  appear  to  desire 
international toleration for Iran so long as non-basic rights are at issue.
These are not the only domestic reformist groups in Iran that espouse this 
view, however.  The same view is espoused by many reformists in Iran on the 




Arguing  about  stuff,  arguing  about  public  affairs  is  taking  root  in  the 
blogosphere, on the conservative side, on the reformist side, all over.195
and indeed, that
…the inherent freedom of the Internet (anonymity, decentralized control, 
etc.) allows the true minds of Iran’s youth, journalists, and intellectuals to 
be known publicly. In their blogs and online chats we see their rejection of 
the  regime,  its  brutal  paternalistic  control,  its  enforcement  of  archaic 
sexual mores, its corruption and incompetence, and of the legitimacy of 
the  Islamic  Republic  itself…the  Iranian  blogosphere  is  a  place  where 
women speak out for their rights, young people criticize the moral police, 
journalists  fight  against  censorship,  reformists  press  for  change,  and 
dissidents press for revolution…196
…the story about Iranian online discourse usually reported in the West is…
inadequate. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the larger network 
of bloggers is its sheer diversity.197
Dissidents  within  the  Iranian  blogosphere  and  elsewhere,  however,  do  not 
generally support international attitudes of non-toleration toward Iran.198 In his 
article, “Is American Support for Middle Eastern Dissidents the Kiss of Death”, 
Michael  Rubin recounts the remarks of a well-known Iranian dissident, Akbar 
195 “Diversity in Unlikely Spot: Iranian Blogosphere Tests Government Limits,”  The New York 
Times, International Report, Sunday April 6, 2008, page 20.
196 Kelly and Etling (2008): 6.
197 Ibid.: 17.
198 Kelly and Etling (2008).
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Ganji, who is a former member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who served 
ten years in an Iranian prison for dissidence.  Rubin reports,
As he traveled through the United States, Ganji was vocal in his opposition 
to funding other dissidents. “What we need in our fight for freedom is not 
foreign  aid  but  the  conditions  that  would  allow  us  to  focus  all  of  our 
energies  on  the  domestic  struggle  and  to  rest  assured  that  no  one  is 
encouraging the regime’s oppression.”199
§4.5.3.c. Domestic Reformist Groups in China
Similar attitudes are also found among the blogs of Chinese dissidents.  A recent 
systematic  study of  the  Chinese blogosphere  by the RAND Corporation found 
that “Chinese language BBS sites are filled with messages denouncing various 
dissidents,  lamenting  the  ineffectuality  –  and  sometimes  questioning  the 
patriotism – of the overseas democracy movement…”.200  Indeed, in a somewhat 
humorous footnote, the RAND study recounts the following example:
A  recent  message  entitled  “To  Every  Overseas  Democratic  Personage” 
illustrates  the  persistent  divisions  between  the  mainland  and  overseas 
dissident movements.  The poster decries members of the exile dissident 
community as “Yankee’s lackeys” and suggests that they engage in several 
199 http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25243/pub_detail.asp
200 Chase and Mulvenon (2002): 39.
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alternative  pastimes (none of  which is suitable  to  mention here) rather 
than “interfering with Chinese affairs.”201
§4.5.3.d. Domestic Reformist Groups in Saudi Arabia
Finally, we see similar attitudes in the case of Saudi Arabian dissidents.  One of 
the  most  well-known  Saudi  dissidents,  Dr.  Saad  al-Faqih,  the  head  of  the 
“Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA)” and formerly a leading figure 
of the “Committee for Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR)”, has asserted that 
“In Islam there is no clear justification for denying [women the rights to drive 
and  vote].”202  Moreover,  the  MIRA  homepage  asserts,  “MIRA  seeks  major 
reforms in Arabia; in particular, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and 
the  abolition  of  the  Secret  Police  units  subverting  political  movements  and 
activity.”203  It would appear, then, that Dr. al-Faqih and the organizations he has 
spearheaded  are  sincerely  concerned  with  bringing  about  liberal  conditions. 
Once again, however, we see that Dr. al-Faqih’s aims, and the primary aims of the 
organizations he has worked with, are domestic in nature.  In response to the 
question “What is your strategy for engineering the [Saudi] regime’s collapse?”, 
Dr. al-Faqih asserts,
We are  working  to  inform,  empower,  and  mobilize  the  people  through 
radio and television broadcasts and other means of communication. The 
first  test  [of  this  strategy]  came  in  October,  when  we  succeeded  in 




organizing  an unprecedented demonstration in Riyadh.  However,  while 
we're working to change the regime ourselves if necessary, we anticipate 
that it will fall on its own from internal problems. And our role then would 
be to prevent the chaos rather than remove the regime.204
He also asserts, of the CDLR, 
The first principle was that CDLR should be focused on Saudi Arabia. It 
should  not  involve  itself  with  any  other  country.  The  second  was  that 
CDLR should be a discreet and independent group. It would respect other 
groups and might even exchange ideas and experience, but it would not 
make an alliance or affiliate itself with any other group. The third principle 
was  that  decision-making  in  CDLR  should  be  based  on  collective 
consultation.  The  fourth  was  we  saw  our  role  as  ambassadors  and 
messengers. We don't sell or promote ourselves as the future presidents or 
future leaders of the country. The real action is inside the country.205
Finally, of the United States, Dr. al-Faqih has says, “There should be no special 





§4.5.4.  Conclusion:  The  Principle  of  Application  Provides  Defeasible  Grounds  for 
Tolerating of “Basic-Rights-Respecting” Societies
We have just seen that anecdotal evidence supports the claim that local reformist 
groups  (groups  within  unjust  societies  that  are  opposed  to  those  societies’ 
injustices) commonly appear to prefer international toleration for their societies 
up to the point at which their societies violate the basic rights of individuals.  If 
this is right, and if (as I have argued) local reformist groups as such satisfy the 
Principle of Application’s desiderata better than other reformist groups, it follows 
that  we  have  sufficient  reason  to  adopt  the  defeasible  view  (one  that  further 
evidence could disprove) that justice requires international toleration of unjust 
societies up to the point that those societies violate the basic rights of individuals.
§4.5.5.  Why a Similar Argument Does Not Justify Domestic Toleration of Injustices  
Within Societies
Some readers might wonder whether the argument I have given might lead to the 
view that people should tolerate injustices within their own societies.  The answer 
is that it does not.
There are typically  vigorous debates in domestic societies  not only over 
which sorts of conditions are unjust (those in oppressing majorities often seem to 
see  nothing wrong with  the  injustices  they inflict  upon others),  but  also  over 
which sorts of ways of dealing with injustice are just.  So, for instance, consider 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous “Letter from Birmingham Jail”, a letter in which 
Dr.  King  vigorously  rejected  the  view,  apparently  commonplace  among white 
clergy  and  many  white  Americans,  that  the  tactics  of  civil  rights  groups  – 
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including, notably, forms of civil disobedience – were too socially destabilizing: in 
short, “too much too soon.”  Dr. King rejected this view by stating, essentially, 
that  blacks  had  endured  enough injustice  and  had  every  right  to  achieve  the 
equality they were due by the sorts of non-violent tactics the mainstream civil 
rights movement employed.  Dr. King, in other words, espoused the view that 
blacks, as a group, had the right to undermine social stability in the ways they 
did.
Now of course there was at least one other side in this debate, namely, the 
side of the white “reformists” Dr. King was arguing against: the clergy members 
and other white individuals who claimed to desire racial equality, but who did not 
approve of the mainstream civil rights movement’s tactics.  It is crucial to note, 
however, that this “reformist” group fares nowhere near as well on the Principle 
of Application’s desiderata as the groups, such as the NAACP, that constituted the 
mainstream civil rights movement.  First, there is every reason to be suspicious of 
whether  “reformist”  groups  dominated  by  white  individuals  really  were 
committed to correct principles of justice (qua desideratum (a)), or whether they 
were merely paying lip service to racial equality in order to prevent advances in 
the civil rights movement.  Second, these groups, just insofar as they were largely 
composed  of  by  white  individuals,  fare  far  more  poorly  with  respect  to 
desideratum (f), the “compositionality” requirement.  The disagreement between 
these sorts of groups on a domestic level, as such, is very different than the sort of 
disagreement about international toleration I have highlighted.  
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The cases of international toleration (i.e. toleration of injustices in other 
societies) and domestic toleration (i.e. toleration of injustices within one’s  own 
society)  are,  then,  very  different.   In  the  international  case,  the  Principle  of 
Application pushes  us  to  toleration  for the  simple  reason that  local  reformist 
groups typically  appear to prefer to deal with their society’s injustices without 
international interference.  In the domestic case, on the other hand, the Principle 
of Application very clearly leads us to a doctrine of non-toleration, as it is rarely, 
if ever, the case that reformist groups within unjust societies prefer the status-
quo to domestic reform.
§4.6. CONCLUSION
We have seen, contrary to received wisdom, that liberalism can not only require 
foreigners  to  tolerate  “basic-rights-respecting”  illiberal  societies,  at  least  in 
principle,  but  also,  that  given  the  (admittedly  poor)  empirical  evidence  we 
presently have, it permits foreigners to do so.  Future empirical  evidence may 
indeed require us to reconsider the latter issue, but for now, at least,  we have 
reason to take it to be permissible for foreigners to tolerate such societies.
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CHAPTER 5
FROM THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF NON-IDEAL THEORY TO DUTIES TO AMELIORATE GLOBAL 
POVERTY AND ENGAGE IN FAIR INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Many political philosophers maintain that the global economic order is unjust. 
Simon  Caney  and  Darrel  Moellendorf  argue,  for  example,  that  a  just  global 
economic  order  would  provide  all  persons  with  roughly  the  same  economic 
opportunities.207  Charles Beitz, Andrew Kuper, and Caney have argued that a just 
global  order  would  conform  to  a  “global  difference  principle,”  a  principle 
requiring the rules and institutions of the global  order to be to the maximum 
benefit of  the worst off.208  Thomas Pogge has argued that a just global  order 
would  implement  a  “global  resources  dividend”  (or  GRD),  or  compensate  for 
differences in natural  resources across different societies by virtue of a tax on 
resource  extraction.209  And  so  on.   These  philosophers  never  systematically 
consider the question, however, of which kinds of costs it is just to impose upon 
people for the realization of these ends (and why).  Economic reform imposes 
costs  upon people,  after  all.   Critics  of  “globalization”210 and  free  trade  often 
maintain, as we will see, that whatever economic benefits these things may have 
207 Caney (2000, 2001, 2005: Ch. 4.), Moelledorf (2002).
208 Beitz (1983, 1999, 2000), Kuper (2000; 2006).
209 Pogge (2002).
210 “Globalization” is a term that belies a simple definition.  It is typically used to refer to a number 
of distinct phenomena, ranging from the liberalization of international markets and development 
of international economic institutions to the manners in which capital, goods, and services are 
traded globally.  
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for people (and, of course, their economic benefits are contested), the costs they 
impose  upon  people  –  social,  political,  environmental,  and  personal  costs  – 
outweigh the benefits.  Proponents of globalization and free trade, of course, do 
not buy these arguments.  They often point out (as we will also see) that empirical 
studies of human happiness and well unequivocally show that economic growth 
associated with globalization and free trade make people happier and better off. 
How compelling are these kinds of arguments, however?  This dissertation has 
advanced a fully general and systematic “non-ideal theory” of justice: a theory of 
just social progress.  This theory should enable us to determine which kinds of 
costs can be justly imposed on people for the sake of global economic reform, and 
why.  I will use the theory, at any rate, to argue that justice requires economic 
injustices to be dealt with through “fair trade” practices.
§5.1 shows how philosophical arguments for principles of global economic 
justice, in setting aside questions related to transition, at best establish ceteris 
peribus requirements to reform the global order.  §5.2 then briefly reviews the 
non-ideal theory of justice that I have defended in this dissertation.  §5.3 argues 
that the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory that I have defended cannot 
be  appealed  to  directly  in  order  to  justify  any  particular  responses  to  global 
economic injustices.  §5.4 then argues from the Principle of Application that I 
have defended to the view that global economic reform should be accomplished 
as far as possible by “fair trade” policies.  Finally, §5.5 responds to a number of 
potential objections.
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§5.1.  WHY ARGUMENTS FOR PRINCIPLES OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE AT BEST ESTABLISH 
CETERIS PERIBUS DUTIES 
Simon Caney and Darrel Moellendorf have advanced the following argument for 
global economic reform:211
THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ARGUMENT
(1) Justice  is  a  matter  of  treating  all  persons  equally  (definition  of 
cosmopolitan-egalitarianism)
(2) Treating persons equally means that a person’s fate should not depend 
on  “arbitrary”  features  of  a  person’s  life  (i.e.  features  that  are  not 
chosen by the person, such as his/her race, sex, ethnicity, etc.).
(3) Thus,  all  persons  should  enjoy  the  same  economic  opportunities, 
regardless of their race, sex, ethnicity, etc.
(4) A person’s nationality is no less an arbitrary feature of a person’s life 
than his/her race, sex, ethnicity, etc.
(5) So, persons of different nations should enjoy equal opportunities.
Is this argument valid?  Consider Sam, a small farmer in a less-developed society 
who has fewer economic opportunities the average United States citizen.  Sam 
did not choose to be born in the society in which he finds himself, nor did he 
choose to have fewer opportunities than people in the United States.  Suppose 
next that the only way to give Sam more economic opportunities is to subject his 
society to all kinds of “free trade” policies – policies which do not permit Sam’s 
society to enact legislation or agree to trade agreements that will protect Sam’s 
211 Caney (2005): 122-3, Moellendorf (2002): Ch. 4.
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small farm from international competition.  Suppose, finally, that because Sam 
cannot  compete  with  international  competition,  these  policies  will  effectively 
force him off of his land and out of the occupation (farming) that he enjoys, that 
he has constructed his life and relationships around, and which has been a family 
business for generations.  Free trade, as such, appears to carry enormous costs 
for Sam.  It might promise him greater wealth in the longer run.  In the shorter 
run,  however,  it  promises to  either whisk away or undercut  much of what he 
values in life.  The point to notice now, at any rate, is that free trade, as such, even 
if it gives Sam more economic opportunities, and therefore reduces one respect in 
which  his  life  is  determined  by  “arbitrary”  features  of  the  world,  in  another 
respect makes his life more determined by arbitrary features of the world, not 
less.  Free trade will not allow Sam to choose whether to remain a farmer, after 
all.  It imposes trade rules on him that can be expected to force him off his land, 
regardless of what he wants or prefers.  
Are there really people like Sam?  A recent article in the San Francisco 
Chronicle, entitled, ““Land is Priceless, Indian Farmers Tell Developers”, reports 
that vast numbers of peasant farmers in India have refused to sell their lands to 
developers for vast sums of money – sums ($24,000) that are over forty times 
what  they make off  of  their  lands in a  typical  year  (about  $600) – and have 
literally armed themselves with bamboo sticks to keep developers out of town, 
enduring  violent  clashes  with  police  (at  least  14  peasants  were  killed  and  45 
injured in clashes with police after of 12,000 acres were seized for a chemical 
plant  and  shipping  yard  in  West  Bengal  State.212  The  suggestion  that  these 
212 San Francisco Chronicle, June 18, 2007, p. A13
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farmers might be irrational or inadequately informed is implausible.  They would 
have to be fantastically ignorant to be unaware of the things they could buy for 
themselves – better housing or remedial health care – with the large sums of 
money they have been offered.  When asked why they want to remain on their 
lands,  a  common reply  was,  “our lands  will  feed our families  throughout  our 
lives.”213  Evidently,  economic development and factory work are just not very 
attractive to these farmers.  Despite the fact that they are living far below the 
common definition of absolute poverty ($2 per day), these farmers are evidently 
satisfied  with  the  lives  they  live.   They  do  not  regard  themselves  as  living  a 
miserable existence out of which economic development can raise them.  
I expect some readers to object at this point that free markets do allow 
people like Sam to choose between economic development and other things they 
value.  If, after all, Sam can convince enough people in his society to “buy local,” 
Sam’s inability  to compete with international  prices will  not force him off  his 
land.  The problem with this argument, however, is that is well established that 
actual markets, and particularly international markets, suffer from all kinds of 
“market failures,” or failures of the market to take into account individuals’ real 
preferences.  One problem is informational.  As Joseph Stiglitz famously argues,
Whenever there are “externalities” – where the actions of an individual 
have impacts on other for which they do not pay or for which they are not 
compensated – markets will not work well.  But recent research has shown 
213 Ibid.
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that  these  externalities  are  pervasive,  whenever  there  is  imperfect 
information or imperfect risk markets – that is always.214
Another  related  problem  is  that  free  markets  are  often  subject  to  various 
collective-action problems and can approximate the “Prisoners’ Dilemma.”  The 
Prisoners’  Dilemma  shows  that,  under  certain  conditions  of  uncertainty, 
individually  rational  agents will  behave in ways that,  collectively,  lead to sub-
optimal results  that  none of  the individuals  involved really  want.   The classic 
presentation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma goes as follows:  
Two  suspects  are  arrested  for  a  crime,  and  the  police  lack  sufficient 
evidence to convict either suspect.  The police then separate the prisoners 
and offer them the same deal.  Each prisoner is told (1) that if he testifies 
for the prosecution (if he “defects”) and the other prisoner remains silent, 
he will  go free and the one who remains silent will be sentenced to ten 
years in prison; (2) that if both of them remain silent (if both “cooperate”), 
both will  be sentenced to only six months in jail; and finally, (3) that if 
they both betray one another (if both “defect”), both of them will receive 
five-year sentences.
It is assumed, of course, that both prisoners want to spend as little time in prison 
as possible.  What each prisoner really wants, then, is for him to defect and the 
other  to  remain  silent  –  for  in  that  case  he  will  go  free  immediately.   The 
problem, though, is that each prisoner is uncertain of what the other will do.  This 
214 “Managing Globalization: Q & A with Joseph Stiglitz,  International  Herald Tribune, Oct 11 
2006, http://blogs.iht.com/tribtalk/business/globalization/?p=177. 
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uncertainty  generates  the  following  situation.   Each  prisoner  knows  that 
whatever the other prisoner does, he is better off defecting.  Each prisoner is, 
after all, in the following situation.  Each knows, on the one hand, that if the other 
cooperates, he is better off defecting (he will get out of prison immediately if the 
other cooperates).  Each also knows, however, that if the other defects, he is once 
again better off defecting (since if they both defect, they each get six months in 
jail,  whereas if the other defects and he does not, he gets ten years in jail).  It 
follows, as such, that it is rational for each person to choose to defect, given their 
uncertainty about what the other person will do.  Notice, however, that this will 
lead both of them to a result that neither of them really wants.  If both defect, 
they will both get five years in prison – something, once again, that neither of 
them really wants.
A similar problem can arise in the market, leading collectives of otherwise 
rational individuals to ends results that none of them really want.  Suppose, for 
example, that every member of a particular society, S, prefers that S to retain its 
cultural traditions above all else, even economic growth.  Suppose next that these 
same individuals believe that a new business in town, “Bigmart”, will undermine 
their society’s traditions if  it succeeds financially.   There is a very clear sense, 
then, in which no one in the society at issue wants Bigmart to succeed.  Each of 
them  would  prefer  Bigmart  to  fail.   Suppose  now,  however,  that  as  in  the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, each person knows that she is better off shopping at Bigmart 
irrespective  of  what  others  do.   Suppose that  each  individual  knows  that  her 
decisions will not determine whether Bigmart succeeds or fails.  After all,  it is 
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rarely the case that one person’s shopping decisions spell success or bankruptcy 
for a business.  Each person in this situation will know, on the one hand, that if 
enough  people  in  her  society  shop  at  Bigmart,  then  Bigmart  will  succeed 
regardless of whether she shops there, and on the other hand, that if not enough 
other people shop at Bigmart,  then Bigmart will fail regardless of whether she 
shops there.  Suppose, finally,  that each individual knows that if  she shops at 
Bigmart, she will save money.  The problem here is this.  It seems clearly rational 
for every individual to shop at Bigmart under these conditions.  Each individual 
knows that  Bigmart’s  success or failure  will  not be decided by what  she does 
individually, but that if she does shop there, she is assured of saving money.  The 
problem, obviously, is that if every individual in S is rational, every individual will 
choose to shop at Bigmart.  But that is just to say that the members of S will, as a 
collective,  arrive  at  a  result  that  literally  none  of  them  want.   Bigmart  will 
succeed,  undermining what  each of  them cares  about  the most:  their  cultural 
traditions.
Let us return now to our hypothetical farmer, Sam.  Sam did not choose to 
be a small farmer in any ordinary sense.  He was born into the occupation.  Now 
that he is a small farmer, however, subjecting him to free trade policies may force 
him off of his land whatever he actually wants. For Sam, free trade is a “bad deal” 
– one that makes his life less dependent on features of Sam’s choosing, not more. 
(Sam’s own thoughts on the matter might go roughly as follows: “First, this world 
I found myself in forced me to be a farmer.  I didn’t exactly ask to be a farmer, but 
whatever, it was my only option, I accepted it, came to enjoy it and the culture 
229
that goes along with it, and so on.  Now, some philosophers and economists want 
reform the world so I cannot be a small farmer.  If they succeed, my life overall 
has been doubly the result of things I have not chosen.  I didn’t really choose to 
be a small farmer in the first place, but now, if I am forced off my farm, I haven’t 
really chosen that either.”)
We cannot  assume, then,  that free markets  will  best  reduce the overall 
amount of “arbitrariness” in individuals’ lives.  But now insofar as this is the case, 
we can see that the Equal  Opportunity  Argument is  of limited import.   If  we 
accept its premises, there is surely one sense in which Sam and others like him 
“should” enjoy the same opportunities as people in wealthier nations.  The Equal 
Opportunities Argument entails that Sam “should” have the same opportunities 
as others setting questions of transition-costs aside.  Until we have some account, 
however, of how to weigh different “arbitrary” features of Sam’s life – the sense in 
which free trade would, for example, undermine Sam’s culture and other things 
he values, and so on – against other “arbitrary” features, the Equal Opportunities 
Argument does not establish that the global economic order should be reformed 
at all, all-things-considered.  For all that has been established, global economic 
reform of any sort may make Sam’s life “more arbitrary” overall (by, once again, 
depriving him of things he values) rather than less.
Beitz,  Kuper,  and  Caney’s  argument  for  a  “global  difference  principle” 
faces the same problem:
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THE RAWLSIAN-COSMOPOLITAN ARGUMENT
(1) Justice is a matter of treating all persons as free and equal.
(2) Rawls’  original  position argument  from  A Theory of  Justice models 
persons as in a particular society as free and equal.
(3) So,  Rawls’  original  position  argument  ought  to  be  extended  to  the 
global order as a whole (i.e. to include all persons).
(4) Rawls argues from the original position to the “difference principle”: a 
principle  requires  the  laws  and  institutions  of  society  to  be  to  the 
maximum benefit of the worst off.
(5) So, justice requires conformity to a global difference principle.
We saw in Chapter 1,  however, that Rawls’  original position is based upon an 
assumption of “strict-compliance”: an assumption that, “everyone is presumed to 
act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions.”215  Rawls only arrives 
at  the difference principle,  in other words, by setting aside less-than-fully-just 
conditions.  And indeed, Rawls recognized this.  He wrote,
…we must ask how well  [the two principles of justice]  apply under less 
than  favorable  conditions,  and  whether  they  provide  any  guidance  for 
instances  of  injustices.   The principles  and their  lexical  order were  not 
acknowledged with these situations in mind and so it is possible that they 
no longer hold.…I shall not attempt to give a systematic answer to these 
questions.216
215 Rawls (1971): 8.
216 Rawls (1999a): 215-6.
231
The Rawlsian-Cosmopolitan Argument at best establishes, then, that a fully just 
global  order  would  conform to  a  global  principle.   It  provides  no  analysis  of 
whether  a  less-than-fully-just  global  order  –  such  as  the  one  in  which  we 
obviously find ourselves – ought to comply with such a principle.  In order to 
answer this question, we must provide a systematic answer to the questions that 
Rawls sets aside.  But this, of course, is precisely what my non-ideal theory of 
justice purports to do.  
What about Pogge’s argument for his Global Resources Dividend (GRD)? 
This arguments faces the same problem as well.  Although Pogge maintains that 
the GRD would impose relatively minor costs upon people, it  is hard to know 
which kinds of costs really are minor without a non-ideal theory of justice.  Costs 
that might seem minor to one person might seem enormous to another person. 
One  obvious  cost  that  a  GRD  would  impose  upon  people  is  that  it  would 
undermine the political sovereignty of particular states.  This cost might not seem 
like much to Pogge.  What if, however, the GRD could be expected to force small 
farmers such as Sam off their land,  or otherwise force people out of jobs and 
lifestyles to which they had been long accustomed?  It is plausible, offhand, that 
the GRD would have these sorts of effects.  Resource-rich nations, no longer able 
to  exploit  their  previous  advantages  in  terms  of  natural  resources,  would 
presumably have to overhaul their economies and social structure, focusing less 
on the industries that had traditionally advantaged them and more on developing 
other industries.  
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We cannot determine whether implementing Pogge’s GRD would actually 
be just, then, until we subject the proposal to a systematic non-ideal theory of 
justice, such as the one developed in this dissertation.  
§5.2. THE NON-IDEAL THEORY OF JUSTICE DEFENDED IN THIS DISSERTATION: A BRIEF REVIEW
We saw in Chapter 1 that existing theories of justice are incomplete in the sense 
that they fail to account for the kinds of transition-costs (and benefits) we can 
justly impose on people in order to eliminate injustices.  The non-ideal theory of 
justice  that  I  have  defended  so  far  in  this  dissertation  aims  to  rectify  this 
omission.  I argued, first, for reasons I will not belabor repeating, that political 
philosophers in general ought to adopt a “non-ideal theoretic” version of Rawls’ 
famous  original  position  (the  “Non-Ideal  Original  Position”)  to  arrive  at 
principles of non-ideal theory.  I then argued, second, that the parties to the Non-
Ideal Original Position would agree upon the following generic principle:
The Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory:  For any action A, agent 
B,  and  less-than-fully-just  social  conditions  C  (past  or  present),  social 
justice  requires B to perform A given C  if  and only if,  of  all  available 
actions,  B  has  sufficient  reason  to  expect  A  to  best  satisfy  the  social 
preference ordering that would exist if every relevant individual (defined 
relative  to  ideal  theory)  were  (i)  rational,  (ii)  adequately  informed,  (iii) 
endorsed the correct principles of ideal theory (and rectification), but (iv) 
otherwise  desired  to  advance  his/her  transition-related  preferences  (v) 
within the broader constraints of ordinary morality, (vi) given C. 
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Finally,  I argued the following “secondary” principle of non-ideal theory is the 
best  available  practical  (i.e.  epistemic)  guide to  whether  any particular  action 
satisfies the Fundamental Principle:
The Principle of Application:  For any action A, agent B, and less-than-
fully-just conditions C, we should tailor our confidence that social justice 
requires B to perform A in direct proportion to the extent to which we can 
expect B’s performance of A to either
(i)  Best  advance the overall  aims of whichever reformist group – 
past,  present,  or  hypothetical  --  best  satisfies  the  following 
desiderata:
g. Its  members  (at  least  tacitly)  pursue  correct,  and 
relevant,  principles  of  ideal  theory,  rectification,  and 
morality;
h. Its members are voluntary participants;
i. Its  leadership  is  equally  responsive  to  each  of  its 
members’ interests;
j. It has more members than rival reformist groups;
k. Its leadership and members are rational and adequately 
informed; and
l. Its membership is more similar to the complete class of 
individuals  who  suffer  C’s  injustice(s)  than  any  other 
group;
Or, if more than one reformist group appears to satisfy these desiderata 
roughly equally well, 
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(v) Best advance a fair compromise between the overall aims of the 
reformist groups in question.
Let us now apply these two principles to the question of what a just response 
would  be  to  the  sorts  of  global  economic  injustices  commonly  alleged  by 
cosmopolitan-egalitarians.
§5.3. WHY THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF NON-IDEAL THEORY ONLY DIRECTLY JUSTIFIES AN 
INTERNATIONAL DUTY TO AMELIORATE SEVERE POVERTY
We  can  presumably  reach  a  relatively  unsurprising  conclusion  about  global 
economic justice by way of the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory alone: 
namely, that the international community has a duty to aim to ameliorate the 
severest  forms  of  absolute  poverty  (i.e.  poverty  resulting  in  widespread 
starvation, severe disease, and death).  It is presumably the case, after all, that 
most (if not all) people, regardless of whichever ideal of justice is correct, would 
(if  they accepted that theory) prefer not to live in such severe poverty.   Thus, 
whatever else the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory’s social preference 
ordering includes – that is, whatever else the Fundamental Principle requires as a 
matter of justice – it  will  surely imply a duty on the part of the international 
community to ameliorate such poverty.  This conclusion, however, while is not 
unsubstantial, is relatively uncontroversial.  Most, if not all, Western moral and 
political  philosophers  appear  to  believe  that  the  international  community  has 
some such duty.217  There is, however, something about the precise nature of this 
217 I  assume that the Fundamental  Principle  implies that  the international  duty to ameliorate 
severe poverty is a duty that falls primarily upon states and non-governmental organizations such 
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duty, at least so far as the Fundamental Principle establishes it.  Presently, people 
are defined as living in severe poverty if they live on less than $2 per day.  The 
rural Indian farmers mentioned earlier, however, live on far less than $2 per day 
(approximately, $1.09 per day on average) – yet, as we have seen, by their very 
own lights, those farmers do not live miserable (ie. starvation or severe-disease-
ridden) existences.  As they put it themselves, “our lands will feed our families 
throughout our lives.”218  The Fundamental  Principle  does not  directly  justify, 
then, an international duty to ameliorate severe poverty as it is presently defined. 
It requires us to be sensitive to actual conditions on the ground, not simply to 
assign  the  $2  per  day  definition  to  all  individuals  in  all  situations.   The 
Fundamental Principle requires us only to ameliorate poverty that causes great 
human suffering.
as the United Nations.  The idea that the Fundamental Principle would impose a duty upon every 
individual to aim to ameliorate global poverty is implausible.  Insofar as people have lives to live, 
care about their ability to live their lives very much, and do not generally consider themselves 
under  an  obligation  to  cast  lives  aside  and  devote  themselves  to  poverty  eradication,  it  is 
implausible  to  suppose  that  the  social  preference  ordering  that  constitutes  the  Fundamental 
Principle’s satisfaction condition would include, at least very high in its ranking, a preference for 
every person to aim to ameliorate poverty.  It is far more plausible to suppose that most people, if 
they satisfied the Fundamental Principle’s counterfactual conditions, would prefer that states and 
non-governmental organizations do so.  As such, the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory 
– and indeed, the non-ideal theory I have advanced here more generally – seems to avoid the sort 
of “overdemandingness” objection often leveled at utilitarianism, which seems to inevitably lead 
to  overly  strong  moral  claims,  such  as  Peter  Singer’s  (1972)  famous  argument  that  wealthy 
individuals have a moral duty to devote most of their resources to poverty-reduction.
218 Ibid.
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Can the Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory directly  justify any 
more substantial  conclusions  about  global  economic  justice  than  this?   Some 
readers might think so.  One argument might go as follows:
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF NON-
IDEAL THEORY TO ECONOMIC GROWTH MAXIMIZATION
(1) It is plain that people, generally speaking, prefer to be happy or “well-
off” in their lives.  
(2) Economic growth has been observed to correlate strongly with higher 
average levels of human happiness and well-being.
(3) Therefore, the social preference ordering that defines the Fundamental 
Principle’s satisfaction conditions (and thus, what justice requires), in 
the case of global economic reform, must be: prefer economic growth 
to all else.
(4) So,  justice  requires  the  global  social  order  to  maximize  economic 
growth. 
This  argument  might  seem  particularly  strong  if  we  attend  to  the  empirical 
evidence cited by premise (2).  Consider, for example, the following table:
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TABLE B
Cross-national  differences  in  satisfaction  with  one's  life  as  a  whole, 
1973-1998.  Subjective  well-being  by  level  of  economic  development. 
World  Values  Surveys,  GNP/capita  purchasing  power  estimates  from 
World  Bank,  World  Development  Report,  1997.  R=.70 N=65 p<.0000. 
(Inglehart 1997)
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These trends have been widely observed: wealthier societies are, on average, far 
“happier” than less wealthy societies.219  
There two problems with this kind of argument, however.  The first, and 
less serious, problem is that particularly rapid periods of economic growth have 
been observed to have a negative overall effect on various measures of quality of 
life of the worst off – leading, in fact, to the four “D’s”: disruption, deprivation, 
disease,  and  death.220   This  speaks  against  the  claim  that  we  should  aim to 
overcome the global social order’s injustices by maximizing economic growth.  A 
much more  serious  problem,  however,  is  philosophical.   Empirical  studies  of 
human happiness and well-being tend to understand these notions in one of two 
ways: either in terms of individuals’ own subjective reports of their own levels of 
happiness  (i.e.  “subjective”  happiness),  or  in  terms  of  particular  “objective 
indicators”  of  human  well-being,  such  as  availability  of  health  care,  levels  of 
violence, economic freedom, and so on.221  Both ways of understanding human 
happiness and well-being are seriously deficient, however.  Few of us think that 
human  well-being  is  nothing  more  than,  or  even  primarily,  a  matter  of  how 
people feel about their lives subjectively, or even how well provided for people are 
in  more  objective  terms  (i.e.  how  much  health  care  a  person  has).   Aldous 
Huxley’s famous novel, Brave New World, describes a dystopia in which all of 
humanity  lives  in  a  carefree,  luxurious,  technologically  advanced  society  –  a 
society  in  which  poverty  has  been  eliminated  and  in  which  everyone  is  in  a 
219 Wilkinson (2007).
220 Szreter (1997).
221 Diener and Lucas (2000), Wilkinson (2007)
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permanent state of bliss, thanks to government-provided conditioning and drugs. 
One of the main points of Brave New World, of course, is that few (if any) of us 
regard  the  people  Huxley  describes  as  truly  happy  and  flourishing.   Their 
“happiness”, if we call it that, seems shallow and not worthwhile.  Their lives are 
not ones we would actually choose to live for ourselves.  Why?  The reason seems 
to be that their lifestyle – the elimination of poverty and their carefree, hedonistic 
existence – has been achieved precisely by the elimination of things that most of 
us take to central to our identity and valuable in life: family, culture, literature, 
art, religion, and so on.  Indeed, one of the most disturbing things about Brave 
New World is that none of the people, aside the protagonist, Bernard Marx, make 
much of an impression at all.  It is almost as if the “people” in Brave New World 
have no identity at all.  They seem more like robots than people.  They all do the 
same things (i.e. engage in casual sex and take the same drug, Soma); they all say 
the same things, engaging in nothing but banal small-talk; and so on.  They do 
not have real values of their own.  The only thing they all understand and strive 
for are carefree, hedonistic lives.  And it seems sad to us.
Notice that it is precisely these things – family, culture, literature, art, and 
religion – that critics of globalization, international free trade, and so on, tend to 
worry about.  So, for example, consider the following criticism of globalization 
and free trade:
The question, as propounded by corporations, is how to make trade rules 
more uniform.  The proper question, it seems to me, is How do we make 
trade rules more differentiated so that different cultures, cities, peoples, 
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places, and countries benefit the most?...Nations, for all  their faults, set 
trade standards.  Those who are willing to meet those standards can do 
business  in  their  countries.   Do  nations  abuse  this?   Always  and 
constantly…But nations do provide, when democracy prevails, a means for 
people to set their own policies, to influence decisions and determine their 
future.  Globalization supplants the nation, the state, the region and the 
village.   While  eliminating  nationalism  is  indeed  a  good  idea,  the 
elimination  of  national  sovereignty  is  not…Globalization  leads  to 
concentration of  wealth  inside  such large  multinational  corporations  as 
Time-Warner,  Microsoft,  General  Electric,  Exxon,  and Wal-Mart.  These 
giants  can  obliterate  social  capital  and local  equity,  and create  cultural 
homogeneity in their wake.222
Or consider the following passage by Joseph Stiglitz:
Globalization had succeeded in unifying people from around the world—
against globalization. Factory workers in the  United States saw their jobs 
being  threatened  by  competition  from  China.  Farmers  and  developing 
countries saw their jobs being threatened by the highly subsidized corn 
and  other  crops  from the  United  States.  Workers  in  Europe saw  hard-
fought-for  job  protections  being  assailed  in  the  name  of  globalization. 
AIDS activists  saw a new trade agreement raising the prices of drugs to 
levels that were unaffordable in much of the world. Environmentalists felt 
that  globalization  undermined  their  decade  long  struggle  to  establish 
222 Hawken (2007): 63.
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regulations to preserve our natural heritage. Those who wanted to protect 
and  develop  their  own  cultural  heritage  saw  too  the  intrusions  of 
globalization.223
Neither  of  these  authors  seem  primarily  concerned  with  “subjective”  or 
“objective” measures of well-being.  They seem concerned, quite differently (and, 
I think, in conformity with our judgments about the case of Brave New World) 
with the fact that globalization, as they see it, tramples all over the deepest values 
of individuals.
Indeed, consider a devout Hindu or Muslim who cares deeply about her 
society’s longstanding Hindu/Islamic culture and traditions (suppose her society 
is not blatantly unjust – that women and men in her society are treated roughly 
as equals).  Suppose that this person believes that there are morally regrettable 
aspects of Western society and culture.  Suppose that when she considers wealthy 
societies  such  as  the  United  States  and  European  nations,  she  sees  their 
economic, capitalist  traditions as making worse people – greedy, self-centered 
people, perhaps.  This person sincerely believes, let us suppose, that it is morally 
better for people – morally better, more to the point, for her – to lead a more 
traditional Hindu/Islamic life.  She recognizes how “subjectively happy” women 
in Western societies may be, but at the same time, she regards their “happiness” 
as “false,” and indeed debased, from a moral point-of-view.  She does not want to 
live in, or her children to be raised in, a society in which “Sex and the City” (a 
television show about four sexually promiscuous older women in New York City) 
223 Stiglitz (2006): 7.
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is one of the most popular shows on television.  By a similar token, let us suppose 
that this woman accepts that economic growth in her society would provide her 
important goods – such as health care – but that, at the end of the day, she thinks 
it is more important for her to live in a society whose values she believes in than 
for her to sacrifice those values for better health care.  It is hard to see however, 
as a matter of justice, this woman’s own preferences – what she values in life – 
should come in second to empirical studies about human “happiness” and well-
being.  Most of us do not want to be “subjectively” or “objectively” happy at any 
and all costs.  We want to be subjectively and objectively happy only insofar as 
those things are consistent with our most deeply held values.  A devout Christian 
wants to feel “happy”, and have objective goods such as health care, only insofar 
as those things are consistent with his/her Christian values.  An Atheist wants to 
feel “happy”, and have other goods, only insofar as those things are consistent 
with his/her Atheist values.  For these reasons, it hardly seems right to say that 
economic growth makes people truly better off simply because it makes people 
“subjectively happier” or “objectively better off.”  As we see in the hypothetical 
case  of  the  Hindu/Muslim  individual  we  have  been  considering,  such  an 
individual  might  know  that  economic  growth  can  be  expected  to  make  her 
happier and better off  in these ways,  and yet rationally  reject those particular 
ways of being happy and well off as desirable.
Now  I  expect  some readers  to  object  that  there  is  a  critical  difference 
between the world described in Brave New World and the actual world: namely, 
the fact, displayed in Table B and even more explicitly in Table C (below), that 
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individuals in wealthier nations are far happier, on average, than people in less 
wealthy nations.
TABLE C
Subjective well-being rankings of 82 societies
(based on combined Happiness and Life Satisfaction scores)



















































































High-income countries are shown in bold face type.  All 28 high-income countries 
(in bold type) rank high or medium-high on subjective well-being; all 10 Latin 
American  countries  (in  italics)  except  Peru  also  rank  high  or  medium-high. 
(Inglehart, 2004)
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Some readers might suggest that when differences in subjective happiness levels 
between  wealthy  and  less  wealthy  societies  are  this  enormous,  it  is  surely 
irrational for a person to care so much about preserving things she values.  The 
idea that people can rationally care about preserving their culture, and so on, is 
plausible in itself.  The idea that people can rationally prefer to be miserable to 
being happy (and indeed, Table C, seems to indicate that the poorest societies 
tend to be far less happy than people in wealthier nations) is far less plausible.  As 
Jagdigh  Bhagwati  puts  it,  “if  reducing  poverty  by  using  economic  analysis  to 
accelerate  growth  and  therefore  pull  people  up  into  gainful  employment  and 
dignified sustenance is not a compelling moral imperative, what is?”224   
The  objection  that  it  is  patently  irrational  for  a  person  to  prefer  the 
preservation of her culture and other such things to economic growth might have 
some real bite if economic growth actually had the sort of misery-ameliorating 
effects that Bhagwati, and Tables B and C, seem to suggest.  The problem is that 
the relationship between wealth and happiness is far more complicated than it 
first appears.  For although the positive correlation between societal wealth and 
mean reported happiness levels indicated in Tables B and C is well-confirmed, 
there is also a well-confirmed body of research indicating that economic growth, 
even when it is very strong and provides people with an enormous array of goods 
they previously lacked, does not lead to significantly significant increases of mean 
happiness levels over time, even over the course of several decades.  
224 Bhagwati (2004): 17.
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So, example, consider life in Japan between the years of 1958 and 1987.  During 
this period real per capita income in Japan multiplied five-fold.225  In 1958, few 
households in Japan had television sets,  washing machines,  refrigerators,  and 
other durable goods; by 1987,  virtually  every household had these goods; and 
similarly,  whereas in 1958 roughly 1% of Japanese owned cars;  by 1987, 60% 
did.226  In purely economic terms, Japan’s standard advanced from far short of 
western standards to about two-thirds that of the United States.227  As Table D 
indicates,  however,  that there was no statistically  significant  increase in mean 








1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986
Source: Veenhoven (1993)
Mean "Subjective Well-Being" in Japan as 
Per Capita GDP Increased x 5
[Change not statistically significant]
225 Summers and Heston (1991).
226 Yasuba (1991)
227 Summers and Heston (1991).
228 Veenhoven (1993), see also Inglehart and Rabier (1986): 44.
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These results are not unique to Japan.  The very same failure of economic growth 
to  lead  to  appreciable  increases  in  mean  reported  happiness  levels  has  been 
found in many societies, including the United States.229  
The obvious question is how this can possibly be the case.  How can it 
possibly  be,  as  Tables  B  and  C  indicate,  that  there  is  such  a  strong  positive 
correlation between wealth and happiness, but no significant positive correlation 
over  decades  between  economic  growth  and  increases  in  mean  reported 
happiness levels in societies?  These puzzling set of facts, known as the Easterlin 
Paradox, appear to have two explanations.  The first explanation is that economic 
growth does lead to increases in mean reported happiness levels in society; it just 
takes a very long time.  One hypothesis is that while economic progress fails to 
lead to any appreciable affects on the happiness of individuals during their own 
lifetimes,  it  does  have  statistically  significant  effects  on  happiness  over 
generations.230  So, for instance, according to one estimate will take 167 years of 
current levels of economic growth for the mean level of reported subjective well-
being in the United States to rise by one full point.231  Table B that something 
similar is the case in Japan.  One can see by looking at Table B that there was an 
extremely small (though not statistically significant) increase in mean reported 
happiness levels during the period between 1958 and 1986.  If this explanation is 
right,  economic growth does have significant effects on human happiness over 
the very long run; it is just that these effects happen so slowly that they do not 
229 Easterlin (1995).
230 Eckersley (2000): 271.
231 Veenhoven and Haggerty (2006): 429.
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appreciably  affect  any  particular  person’s  life.   A  second  explanation  of  the 
Easterlin Paradox, on the other hand, is that if we take into account increases in 
life  span and heath,  we find that  economic  growth  in  a  society  increases  the 
number of “happy life years” a person in that society is likely to live.
TABLE E232
Wealth and Happy Life-Years in 66 Countries in the 1990s
Let us return, however, to the objection with which we began.  According to that 
objection, while there is nothing irrational per se about people preferring things 
232 Veenhoven (2005): 6186.
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they values – such as the preservation of her culture, traditions, and so on – to 
expected increases in “subjective happiness” or standard “objective” measures of 
happiness (affordability of health care, etc.), it is patently irrational for people to 
prefer things they value to economic growth that can be expected to ameliorate 
abject  misery.   The Easterlin Paradox seems to show, however, that economic 
reform and growth do not ameliorate abject misery.  Recall the aforementioned 
estimate (published in the year 2000) that it will take 167 years of existing levels 
of economic growth in the United States for average subjective reports of human 
well-being  to  increase  one  full  point.   If,  as  the  Easterlin  Paradox  suggests, 
roughly  the  same thing  is  true  of  societies  in  general  –  if,  that  is,  economic 
growth only causes increases of happiness in societies over the very long run – it 
is hard to see how it is patently irrational for individual to prefer the preservation 
of their cultures and traditions over the “fruits” of economic growth.       
We cannot  simply assume, then,  that  people want  to be subjectively or 
objectively  happy  in  the  senses  measured  by  empirical  studies,  nor  that  free 
markets  will  be  appropriately  responsive  to  individuals’  deepest  values.   The 
Fundamental  Principle  of  Non-Ideal  Theory  all  alone  is  too  crude  for  our 
purposes.   In  order  to  determine  what  justice  requires,  we  must  utilize  the 
Principle of Application.  Let us now apply the Principle of Application to the 
problem of global economic justice, then, to see which sorts of reforms, if any, it 
supports.
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§5.4. FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF APPLICATION TO FAIR TRADE
The Principle of Application states, once again, that we should advance the aims 
of  whichever  particular  reformist  groups  best  satisfies  the  following  class  of 
desiderata, or, if more than one group satisfies these desiderata roughly equally 
well, to aim to advance a fair compromise among aims of the relevant groups:
a. Its  members  (at  least  tacitly)  pursue  correct,  and 
relevant,  principles  of  ideal  theory,  rectification,  and 
morality;
b. Its members are voluntary participants;
c. Its  leadership  is  equally  responsive  to  each  of  its 
members’ interests;
d. It has more members than rival reformist groups;
e. Its leadership and members are rational and adequately 
informed; and
f. Its membership is more similar to the complete class of 
individuals  who  suffer  C’s  injustice(s)  than  any  other 
group.
Offhand, it is hard to see which “reformist group”, in the case of global economic 
justice and reform, could possibly have the best claim to satisfy these desiderata. 
A brief look at the literature on globalization, free trade, fair trade, and so on 
indicates a truly astounding amount of educated disagreement about the basic 
issue  of  what  is  relevant  from  the  point-of-view  of  justice.   Proponents  of 
globalization and free trade sometimes dismiss opponents of globalization and 
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free trade as poorly informed.  So, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati opines, “I think 
that…anti-capitalist  attitudes…[come  from]  the  dissonance  that  now  exists 
between  empathy  for  others  elsewhere  for  their  misery  and  the  inadequate 
intellectual grasp of what can be done to ameliorate that distress.”233  This kind of 
criticism  misses  the  point,  however.   For  although  many  opponents  of 
globalization and free trade contest economists’ views about the effectiveness of 
globalization  and  free  trade,  many  (and  probably  most)  opponents  to 
globalization and free trade do not regard economic facts as settling the debate. 
A central component of debates about global justice and economic reform has to 
do  with  the  question  that  I  have  focused  on  in  this  chapter:  the  question  of 
whether  whatever  economic  benefits  globalization  and  free  trade  might  have 
outweigh their social, political, and cultural costs.  Indeed, I have only mentioned 
some such costs, such as the costs that small farmers might face as a result of 
their  inability  to  compete  with  international  prices.   These  are  not  the  only 
potential social,  political,  and cultural costs.  Some critics of globalization and 
free  trade  worry,  not  implausibly,  that  globalization  and  free  trade  lend 
themselves to fascism and terrorism:
…it is important to retain a historical perspective.  During the first phase 
of globalization, an era that spanned the nineteenth century and ended in 
1914,  the  reaction  to  capitalism’s  inexorable  commodification  of  the 
natural and social world was a search for community, for a new basis of 
social solidarity beyond the market.  In retrospect, socialism, communism, 
social  democracy and national  liberation movements can all  be seen as 
233 Bhagwati (2004): 18.
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expressions of this countervailing thrust.  Fascism…was also part of this 
countervailing drive, one that hijacked the search for community in the 
service of reaction, counterrevolution, and racism…
Similarly, the second phase of globalization, which began with the 
dismantling of the Keynesian state in the 1980s and reached an apogee in 
the  mid-1990s,  has  provoked  diverse  expressions  of  a  search  for 
community, not all of them progressive.  One of them is radical Islamism, 
which saw US corporate and military hegemony as the apogee of the long-
running Western effort to erode the integrity of Islamic societies…234
In any case, much of the (often fiery) debate about globalization, free trade, and 
global economic reform has to do with the very question that Bhagwati treats as 
merely  rhetorical.   Bhagwati,  once  again,  asks:  “if  reducing  poverty  by  using 
economic analysis to accelerate growth and therefore pull people up into gainful 
employment and dignified sustenance is not a compelling moral imperative, what 
is?”235  Opponents  of  globalization  and  free  trade  often  seem  to  regard  this 
question as not nearly so easily answered.  What right do we have, they ask, to 
impose trade standards on small farmers “for their own sake” when, as a matter 
of fact, those farmers do not want to leave their farms?  Indeed, for my own part, 
I  think  the  best  answer  to  Bhagwati’s  question  is:  reducing  poverty  is  a 
compelling moral ideal only insofar as it does not impose costs on individuals 
that conflict with those very individuals’ deepest values.  Kant once wrote, after 
234 Bello (2004): 28.
235 Bhagwati (2004): 17.
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all,  that,  “Nobody may compel me to be happy in his way…Paternalism is the 
greatest despotism imaginable.”236  While this may be an overstatement (Nazism 
was surely a greater despotism), I think it is critical to deal with whatever global 
economic  injustices  there  may  be,  including  poverty,  in  ways  that  respect 
individuals’ own views about what is important in life.  As Isaiah Berlin wrote,
[paternalism] is to treat men as if they were not free, but human material 
for me, the benevolent reformer, to mould in accordance with my own, not 
their, freely adopted purpose…to manipulate men, to propel them towards 
goals which you – the social reformer – see, but they may not, is to deny 
their human essence, to treat them as objects without wills of their own, 
and therefore to degrade them.  That is why to lie to men, or to deceive 
them, that is, to use them as means for my, not their own, independently 
conceived ends, even if it is in their own benefit, is, in effect, to treat them 
as sub-human, to behave as if their ends are less ultimate and sacred than 
my own.237
The  Principle  of  Application  makes  good  sense  of  these  worries  about 
paternalism.  It requires us not to simply judge for ourselves what we consider to 
be best for people; it has us defer our judgments to reformist groups, particularly 
(in  virtue  of  its  last  desideratum)  groups  that  are  more  similar  overall  in 
composition  to  the  complete  class  of  individuals  who  suffer  injustice.   In  a 
236 Kant (1793).
237 Berlin (1969): 137.
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manner  of  speaking,  then,  the  Principle  of  Application  purports,  as  far  as 
possible, to give the poor a proper say over what happens to them “for their sake.”
The problem, though, with respect to global economic justice is that it is 
simply not clear which reformist group, if any, can stake the greatest claim to 
satisfy the Principle of Application’s desiderata.  Pro- and anti- globalization and 
free trade forces both purport to be concerned with making the poor better off. 
Since all of the arguments covered so far – those by Caney, Moellendorf, Beitz, 
Pogge, and so on – all direct our concern toward the life-prospects of the poor, it 
seems that both sides of these debates have roughly an equal claim to satisfy the 
Principle of Application’s first desideratum: the desideratum which instructs us 
to  evaluate  reformist  groups in terms of  how concerned they are with correct 
principles  of  ideal  theory.   And  the  same  seems  true  of  the  Principle  of 
Application’s  other  desiderata.   Roughly  speaking,  just  about  every  side  of 
mainstream  debates  about  globalization,  free  trade,  and  other  proposals  for 
global  economic  reform,  seems  to  satisfy  the  Principle’s  desiderata  roughly 
equally well.  Each side can claim to have, and be responsive to, a large number of 
voluntary participants  (qua desiderata  (b)-(d));  each side enjoys support from 
highly educated and informed individuals (qua desiderata (e)); and each side can 
even purport to enjoy a great deal of support from the global poor themselves 
(qua desideratum (f)),  given that  many members of  the  global  poor evidently 
enjoy the opportunities and wealth that globalization and free trade have given 
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them, while other segments of the global poor have protested and lobbied against 
these policies.238 
That the Principle of Application does not univocally lead us to prefer any 
one of these groups’ aims over the others is not, I think, surprising.  Every side of 
mainstream debates about global economic reform seems, as we have seen, to 
have  a  legitimate  point.   Those  on  the  side  of  globalization  and  free  trade 
rightfully point out that economic growth does lead to higher “subjective” and 
“objective” levels of human happiness and well-being,  at  least  over the longer 
run.  Those who are against globalization and free trade, on the other hand, seem 
to rightfully point out that there are all kinds of social, political, and cultural costs 
to these things.  It should be no surprise, as such, that both sides enjoy a great 
deal  of  voluntary  support  by  educated  individuals,  and  indeed  the  poor 
themselves.  I  submit,  furthermore,  that  the Principle of Application,  as such, 
leads  us  to  a  highly  plausible  conclusion:  namely,  that  in  the  case  of  global 
economic reform,  we have every  reason to  accept  a  compromise position – a 
position that accepts the pro-globalization/free trade claim that economic growth 
is generally speaking a good thing, but also, the anti-globalization/free trade view 
that economic growth should be tempered by the legitimate concerns that people 
have  to  protect  political,  social,  and  cultural  things  they  find  valuable.   The 
question now is whether there any particular policy approach approximates such 
a compromise.  
238 Bello (2004) repeatedly notes how protests against globalization, the WTO, and so on, are 
often attended by large numbers of  the global poor themselves,  at  least  when it  is  financially 
possible for them to attend.
255
I propose that “fair trade” policies best approximate such a compromise. 
Fair trade is a market-based approach to alleviating poverty – one that aims for 
“fair” economic growth: growth that stabilizes and increases the poor’s standards 
of living over time, but which at the same time empowers them to join unions and 
engage  in  democratic  bargaining  for  social,  cultural,  and  political  goods  that 
matter to them.239  According to the Fair Trade Federation,
Fair trade is a system of exchange that seeks to create greater equity and 
partnership in the international trading system by
• Providing fair wages in the local context, 
• Supporting safe, healthy, and participatory workplaces, 
• Supplying financial and technical support to build capacity, 
• Ensuring environmental sustainability, 
• Respecting cultural identity, 
• Offering public accountability and transparency, 
• Building direct and long-term relationships, and 
• Educating consumers. 
FTF  members  foster  partnerships  with  producers,  because  they  know 
these  connections  are  a  highly  effective  way  to  help  producers  help 
themselves.  
Fair  trade  is  not  about  charity.  It  is  a  holistic  approach  to  trade  and 
development that aims to alter the ways in which commerce is conducted, 
239 http://www.fairtradefederation.org/
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so  that  trade  can  empower  the  poorest  of  the  poor.  Fair  Trade 
Organizations seek to create sustainable and positive change in developing 
and developed countries.240
It should not come as much of a surprise that fair trade has come under attack 
from both poles of the political  spectrum.  Economists and conservative think 
tanks often deride fair trade as a form of subsidy interfering with free markets.241 
Others on the far left, on the other hand, advocate “deglobalization”, or a move 
away  from  international  trade  altogether  toward  “the  local”,  instead  of  fair 
trade.242  The Principle of Application, however, implies that it is this very sort of 
disagreement that supports fair trade over these alternatives.  Fair trade is the 
fairest compromise among the various positions that different reformist groups 
have staked out within global economic justice debates.
§5.5. REPLIES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
§5.5.1. Is Fair Trade Compromise, or Just Wishy-Washy?
I  expect some readers to recoil  from the idea that  we should judge justice as 
supporting fair trade because of the amount and kind of public debate over global 
economic justice.  “Why”, these readers might ask, “should I abandon my own 
views about what is just – about free trade, deglobalization, or what have you – 
merely because there are large groups of people who disagree with me?”  
240 http://www.fairtradefederation.org/ht/d/sp/i/2733/pid/2733.
241 Singleton (2005), see also http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?
story_id=8380592.
242 Bello (2004), Jacquiau (2006).
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My reply is that the Principle of Application does not require us exactly to 
give up our views.  It merely requires us, plausibly I submit, to give up a certain 
amount  of  confidence  in  our  views.   Here  is  what  I  mean.   For  all  that  the 
Principle of Application says, I can really believe that free trade is best for people. 
All that the Principle requires is that, when I am thinking about policy, I do not 
regard myself as having a right to impose my view about what is best for people 
upon them.  According to the  Principle,  I  should realize  that  there  are  many 
rational, highly educated people out there just like me who hold a very different 
point-of-view, and as a result, when it comes to actually implementing policy, I 
should be willing to compromise my view with theirs.  
I  recognize  that this  still  might seem overly wishy-washy to some (and 
perhaps many) readers.  It is not only hard, psychologically, to compromise one’s 
views when one thinks one is right and others are wrong; it is also not something 
that  we  ordinarily  expect.   In  democratic  elections  and  public  debate,  for 
example, we typically expect people to “vote their conscience” and “speak their 
minds,” not to compromise their most strongly-held views.  I submit, however, 
that this is a very different kind of case.  When it comes to ordinary public debate 
and democratic elections, it is the people themselves – those who are speaking 
and voting – whose interests are at issue.  Debates about global economic reform, 
on the other hand, typically involve very well off people speaking for the poor.  I 
believe that this fact makes an enormous difference.  To recall the earlier worries 
about paternalism, the problem with regarding one’s own views about what is 
best for the poor as correct, instead of settling on a compromise between various 
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views,  is  that  in this  case  it  is  not our lives that  are primarily  at  stake.   The 
Principle  of  Application  draws  our  attention  to  the  fact  that,  when  we  are 
deliberating about how to deal with injustices, we are deliberating about other 
people’s lives.  My claim, once again, is that the Principle of Application rightly 
places an onus upon us not to take our own views as authoritative.  It recognizes 
that insofar as we are concerned with other people’s lives, they should have the 
final say about what we do “for their sake.”  The Principle’s desiderata and fair 
compromise clause are simply means to this end.  Accordingly, I claim, there is 
nothing wishy-washy about the Principle, nor its leading us to fair trade.  In this 
case, accommodating others’ views is not wishy-washy; it is giving them, as far as 
possible, the say they are due as a matter of justice.
§5.5.2.  Do  Anti/De-Globalization  Groups  Really  Satisfy  the  Principle  of  
Application’s “Correct Principles of Justice” Desideratum?
The Principle of Application, recall,  requires us to evaluate different reformist 
groups  along  a  particular  class  of  desiderata.   The  very  first  among  these 
desiderata, however – desideratum (a) – instructs us to evaluate reformist groups 
in terms of whether they are pursuing correct principles of ideal theory: correct 
principles, that is, of what would constitute a fully just social order.  One worry at 
this point might be that the anti- and de- globalization groups I have referred to 
appear not to be concerned with the correct principles of ideal theory.  Suppose, 
for example, that Caney and Moellendorf are correct that a fully just global order 
would conform to a principle of equal economic opportunity.  What if, next, as 
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advocates of globalization and free trade claim, it is true that these things can be 
expected to lead to more equal opportunities for people over time?  
This  objection is  clearly  misplaced.   The very  point  of  the  Principle  of 
Application – indeed, the point of the non-ideal theory that I have defended more 
generally – is that we seeking an answer to the question: “At what costs can just 
ends (such as equality of opportunity) be justly achieved?”  One would be hard-
pressed to argue that anti-globalization groups,  generally  speaking,  would not 
prefer the global poor to have more economic opportunities, or even the same 
opportunities  as  people  in  wealthier  nations.   For  although  some  anti-
globalizations  do  seem  to  be  nothing  more  than  nationalists  –  members  of 
wealthy  societies  often  oppose  globalization  and  free  trade  because  they  fear 
losing  the  economic  advantages  they  enjoy  –  as  a  general  matter  the  anti-
globalization movement is  marked by an overwhelming concern for the global 
poor themselves.  Anti-globalizationists do not in general deny that a world in 
which the poor had much greater opportunities than they do would, all-things-
being-equal, be more just than the world in which we live.  They simply deny that 
all  things are equal.   They believe that global/international  efforts  to  equalize 
opportunities, and so on, by their very nature take things of great value from the 
poor, such as the ability of poor farmers to live as they want to live, and so on. 
What, many anti-globalizationists ask, is so good about economic opportunities 
for  a  poor  farmer  when,  all-things-considered,  that  very  farmer  would  rather 
continue to be a farmer than enjoy those opportunities?  The choice, these anti-
globalizationists think, should as far as possible be his.  But that, they think, is 
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something that can only occur if decision-making is located at a more local level – 
if,  that  is,  it  is  not  the  WTO  and  IMF  which  give  the  farmer  opportunities 
regardless of what he might want himself, but rather his society (which, although 
it  is  not  under  his  direct  control,  will  in  most  cases  more  sensitive  to  his 
preferences, and the preferences of others like him, than an international body 
that  meets  thousands  of  miles  away  in  Geneva,  or  Qatar,  and  so  on,  as 
international bodies do).
§5.5.2. Does Fair Trade Work?  Does it Reduce Severe Poverty?
Critics  of fair trade often claim, once again,  that free markets produce greater 
amounts of economic growth and poverty reduction than regulated markets.  It is 
important to remind ourselves, however, that we have seen here that economic 
growth and poverty reduction – at least as poverty is presently defined ($2 per 
day) – are not the only things that are relevant from the perspective of justice. 
We  arrived  at  fair  trade  as  a  fair  compromise between  the  values  of  pro-
globalization and free trade groups (roughly: economic growth is good) and the 
values  of  anti-/de-globalization  and  anti-free  trade  groups  (roughly:  culture, 
tradition,  social  integrity,  and  political  sovereignty,  are  all  important).   The 
question of whether fair trade “works,” then, is not as simple – at least not if we 
are  concerned  with  justice  –  as  free-market  economists  might  take  it  to  be. 
Indeed, if the arguments I have given here are correct, the question of whether 
“fair trade” works is a two-pronged question.  Since I have purported to establish 
an international  duty to ameliorate the most severe forms of absolute poverty 
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(poverty  resulting  in  great  human  suffering  and  death),  as  well  as  a  duty  to 
compromise between economic growth,  on the  one hand,  and preservation of 
culture, traditions, and so on, we must evaluate fair trade with respect to these 
outcomes.  How well, then, does fair trade fare?
Impact studies indicate that fair trade works, at least when there is enough 
demand for fair trade products.  In Costa Rica, “fair trade can be said to have 
accomplished its goal of improving the returns to small producers and positively 
affecting their quality of life and the health of the organisations that represent 
them locally, nationally and beyond.”243  In Latin America, fair trade has, “in a 
short time greatly improved the well-being of small-scale coffee farmers and their 
families,”244 increasing their access to credit and development funding245, as well 
as  their  access  to  childhood education and overall  stability.246  In Bolivia,  fair 
trade has not only had a positive impact on coffee prices, benefitting  all small 
coffee  producers  (not  just  fair  trade  producers);  it  has  also  significantly 
strengthened  producer  organizations  and  increased  the  political  influence  of 
small producers.247   Finally, and more generally, as Daniel Jaffee states,
Fair trade's higher prices increase gross household income…Participation 
in  fair  trade  reduces  households'  debt  and  enhances  their  economic 
options,  affording  them  the  possibility  of  better  feeding  and  educating 
their children. Fair trade affords peasant farmers partial protection from 
243 Ronchi (2002): 25-6.
244 Murray, Raynolds, and Taylor (2003): 28.
245 Taylor (2002): 18.
246 Murray, Raynolds, and Taylor (2003): 6.
247 Eberhart (2005): 29
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some of the worst aspects of commodity crises and in many cases allows 
them  the  breathing  room  needed  to  engage  in  more  sustainable 
agricultural practices. Furthermore, the extra capital from fair trade can 
generate important economic ripple effects within communities, providing 
additional employment even for nonparticipating families. However, fair 
trade is not a panacea, and it does not bring the majority of participants 
out  of  poverty.  (...)  Demand  for  fair  trade  products  must  increase 
dramatically  in order  to  augment the  economic benefits  for  such small 
farmer families and allow the system to include many more producers of 
coffee and other commodities around the world.248 
The fact that fair trade has not brought a majority of its participants out poverty 
(defined,  once  again,  as  $2  per  day)  is  not  sufficient  reason  to  doubt  its 
effectiveness.  As we have just seen, a number of case studies support the efficacy 
of fair trade, as well as (as Jaffee notes) the idea that a greater demand for fair 
trade will increase the benefits it bestows upon the poor.
§5.6. CONCLUSION
This chapter has argued that whatever a fully just global economic order would 
be like, justice requires the international  community to seek to ameliorate the 
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